NODULE X6

CIA’S CI-SIG REACTION TO OSWALD’S DEFECTION INDICATED ANGLETON WAS RUNNING HIM

For the most up-to-date version of this Nodule go to http://ajweberman.com/nodulex6.pdf
OSWALD believed that ANGELTON had dispatched him on an official CIA mission. OSWALD'S early belief that he had a connection to the CIA was hinted at by the absence of the words "CIA" or "Central Intelligence Agency" in any of his writings, letters or speeches until the summer of 1963. OSWALD was pro-Soviet, yet he never mentioned the Communists favorite whipping boy, the CIA? He was over-acting in order to disassociate himself from it. Marina Oswald was asked by the HSCA if her husband ever mentioned the word CIA. She responded: "Not that I recall. I never knew what the CIA was until they started asking me the questions. Until I came to this country I never knew what the CIA was." [HSCA V12 p381. 366] In reality, OSWALD was not carried on the CIA's books. He was a vest pocket operation of his father figures ANGELTON and HEMMING. There was no document that indicated he worked for the CIA in the CIA's files. ANGELTON used OSWALD because OSWALD filled a vacuum.

THE SUSPICIOUS FACTORS ABOUT OSWALD'S CIA FILE
WHY DID THE OSWALD DOCS GO TO OS RATHER THAN CI/SIG?

The first document on OSWALD was a State Department cable dated October 31, 1959. The HSCA reported:

A confidential, State Department telegram dated October 31, 1959, sent from Moscow to Washington and forwarded to the CIA reported OSWALD, a recently discharged Marine, had appeared at the U.S. Embassy, Moscow...and has offered the Soviets any information he has acquired as [an] enlisted radar operator.

This cable was first routed to the CIA's Office of Security where a file was opened on OSWALD which was known as Security File # 351-164. The location of the original of this document was found in this file. It was somewhat odd that this document was found in the files of the Office of Security. The original should have been routed by the Records Integration Group (RID) to other CIA components which routinely handled defector matters. The CIA declassified one pre-201 Routing and Record Sheet that presumably was placed in the OSWALD Office of Security file dated May 1, 1960: "From Counter-Intelligence Research & Analysis/RS (deleted) 200-5-40." Copies were sent to IP /AN, (Intelligence Project / Analysis Section) IP/EDI (Intelligence Project) and IP/FI. (Intelligence Project / Foreign Intelligence) [CIA 1188-1000]

CIA/Office of Security files and activities are thought to be maintained primarily to record actions taken by the Office of Security in granting or denying security clearances to those persons whose relationship with the Agency gives them access to classified information. The Rockefeller Commission reported:

The bulk of the files maintained by the Office of Security consist of approximately 90,000 security dossiers, each relating to the security investigation of a specific Subject (person, organization, business or project) of Agency interest. About one third of these files are retired. About 90% of the security files relate to individuals, a majority of whom are
United States citizens. The remaining 10% relate to organizations, businesses etc. A few Office of Security files are maintained on persons who are unaware that they have any Agency relationship. Likewise, clearance information may be maintained by the Office of Security on persons whom the Agency is thinking of contacting, or foreign nationals of potential operational use, even if the Agency consequently decides not to contact the individuals, or contacts them and they refuse to assist the Agency. Some Office of Security files have been compiled on organizations and individuals thought to pose a threat to Agency personnel, installations or operations. But, as a practical matter, 95% of all requests to establish new files are routine, and are undertaken at the request of the Office of Security Clearance Division, which insures that a security clearance is approved before access is granted to classified Agency information.” [RR p247].

THE OFFICE OF SECURITY AND ILLEGAL CIA OPERATIONS

This is not all together true. The CIA’s Office of Security often ran Operations involving domestic targets. The most extensive program of illegal "domestic spying" by CIA on Americans was the "CHAOS" program. CHAOS was the centerpiece of a major CIA effort begun in 1967 in response to White House pressure for intelligence about foreign influence upon American dissent. The CHAOS mission was to gather and evaluate all available information about Communist links to racial, antiwar and other protest activity in the United States. CHAOS was terminated in 1974. The CHAOS office participated in the preparation of some half dozen major reports for higher authorities, all of which concluded that no significant role was being played by foreign elements in the various protest movements. This repeatedly negative finding met with continued skepticism from the White House under two administrations and pressures for further inquiry. In response to this skepticism CHAOS continued to expand its coverage of Americans in order to increase White House confidence in the accuracy of its findings.

A second major element of the CHAOS operation was to pursue specific inquiries from the FBI about the activity of particular Americans traveling abroad. CHAOS received a great deal of information regarding Americans from CIA stations abroad, as well as from the FBI itself. In addition, CHAOS eventually received such information from its own agents who participated in domestic dissident activity in America in order to develop radical "credentials" as cover for overseas assignment. CHAOS also obtained information about Americans from other domestic CIA components, from the CIA mail opening project and from a National Security Agency international communications intercept program. CHAOS also ran an Operation involving staging attacks on American radicals overseas. Singer Phil Ochs had his throat cut and Abbie Hoffman was beaten up as a result of the fact the CIA can operate against Americans overseas.
OPERATION CHAOS

CHAOS amassed thousands of files on Americans, indexed hundreds of thousands of Americans into its computer records, and disseminated thousands of reports about Americans to the FBI and other government offices. Some of the information concerned the domestic activity of those Americans. Within CIA, there was no written directive from Helms to Karamessines, his deputy for the Plans Directorate, to establish the CHAOS program. The first recorded authorization is an August 15, 1967 memorandum from Karamessines to JAMES ANGELTON, Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff. Karamessines' memorandum refers to discussions earlier that day among himself, ANGELTON and Helms and asks ANGELTON to designate a staff officer to run the program. The memorandum contemplated the conduct of operations to collect intelligence. It also acknowledged the program's "domestic counterintelligence aspects," and the need for dissemination of the information obtained to domestic agencies. The memorandum requested:

a. The exclusive briefing of specific division chiefs and certain selected officers in each division, on the aims and objectives of this intelligence collection program with definite domestic counterintelligence aspects.

b. The establishment of some sort of system by Dick Ober (or whatever officer you select) for the orderly coordination of the operations to be conducted, with the responsibility for the actual conduct of the operations vested in the specific area divisions.

c. The identification of a limited dissemination procedure which will afford these activities high operational security while at the same time getting the information to the appropriate departments and agencies which have the responsibility domestically. 17

Angular chose Richard Ober to head what became the Special Operations Group within the Counterintelligence Staff. Ober had already been involved in a more limited inquiry into possible foreign links to American dissidents.

MERRIMAC AND RESISTANCE

The MERRIMAC and RESISTANCE programs were both run by the CIA Office of Security, a support unit of the CIA charged with safeguarding its personnel, facilities and information. Project MERRIMAC involved the infiltration by CIA agents of Washington-based peace groups and black activist groups. The stated purpose of that program was simply to obtain early warning of demonstrations and other physical threats to the CIA. The collection requirements, however, were broadened to include general information about the leadership, funding and activities and policies of the targeted groups. Project RESISTANCE was a broad effort to obtain general background information for predicting violence which might create threats to CIA installations, recruiters or contractors and for security evaluation of CIA applicants. From 1967 until 1973, the program compiled information about radical groups around the country, particularly on
Much of the reporting to headquarters by field offices was from open sources such as newspapers. But additional information was obtained from cooperating police departments, campus officials and other local authorities, some of whom, in turn, were using more active collection techniques such as informants.

Edward Petty must have not been privy to the above OPS:

There simply isn't anything there to indicate a real interest in OSWALD [because of OS interest]. It simply has to do with interagency exchange of information on people who've gone aboard. That's all there is to it. The Office of Security had every right to receive the document, if it asked for it.

But the Office of Security, CI/SIG and ANGLETON weren't engaging in any operations based upon these documents. I know CI/SIG, I know what they did. It was not an operational group. That's true, that's the way it is, and no amount of speculation will make any change in it. It's true that ANGLETON did a lot of things on his own, sometimes - probably more times than not - at least somebody in CI/SIG would know what he was doing. At the same time he did things which I am sure we did not know anything of...I'm really not trying unduly to debunk you, anything is possible. I think if what you were saying was true, I think I would know it. That's basically what I am going on. And I don't think it is true. I wasn't there when this particular thing was going on, so I can't rule everything out. Because I was first there in 1966, that doesn't mean that I wouldn't have known about it. Part of my job was to make myself familiar with all the material. There was so much of it, I do not remember everything. However, when you add the sum total of my actual knowledge of this material with what people did and did not do, your contention does not make sense. I don't believe for one minute that ANGLETON was engaged in running OSWALD. I don't think ANGLETON had anything to do with OSWALD. He had to do with a great many things which were of a lot of interest, but not that one. If I could find something there I would be very interested in it, but honestly I don't.

The Directors of the Office of Security have included Sheffield Edwards, Howard Osborne and Leo Dunn. Bruce Solie was head of OS Research. The Directors of Security came and went but ANGLETON remained. (ANGLETON was the de facto Director of the CIA). ANGLETON and the OS both had the responsibility of protecting the CIA from hostile elements so they had to work closely together. Both CI-SIG and OS ran deep cover operations. The Church Committee reported:

Most of the assets of OPERATION CHAOS developed their leftist coloration by entering universities in the United States after an initial period of basic agent training. When in school, they participated in the radical community. While preparing for their future assignments, the agents filed detailed reports and were also debriefed by their case officer.
In the process, they provided considerable information on their associates, dissident organizations, demonstration plans and sometimes personal information. One asset submitted a 60 page report for a three week period which included detailed information on demonstrations, group meetings, and general accounts of such activity as Women's Liberation efforts in the area.

OSWALD defected and had threatened to give military secrets to the Soviets. On November 2, 1959, Sam Papich, the FBI liaison between the FBI and the CIA, requested information on OSWALD from CI/SIG, and was advised that CI/SIG had no information on him. On November 2, 1959 this document was generated: "Internal note dated November 2, 1959, (oral FBI name check request) and NO RECORD reply dated November 4, 1959. The location of the original of this document was found in CI/LSN (Counter-Intelligence Liaison Jane Roman)." This document read: "OSWALD, LEE HARVEY. Mr. Papich would like to know what we know about this ex-Marine who recently defected in the USSR. November 2, 1959. Mr. Papich was advised that we had no info on SAC. November 4, 1959." [CIA 592-252B] On November 4, 1959, an FBI memorandum was sent from the FBI's Counter-intelligence Soviet Section Chief, William A. Branigan, to A.H. Belmont, "summarizing agency checks regarding OSWALD and recommending that no further action was warranted by this Bureau concerning OSWALD at the time." [WCE 834 p2]

ONI advised they contemplated taking no action in this matter. No derogatory information was found in the files of the U.S. Marine Corps concerning SAC, and there is no indication of any Soviet Contacts involving SAC. Since SAC's defection is known to the Department of the Navy, and since SAC apparently has no knowledge of any strategic information that would be of benefit to the Soviets, it does not appear that any action is warranted by the Bureau in this matter. It is recommended however, that this memo be referred to the Identification Division so SAC's service fingerprints can be placed in the criminal files and that a stop be placed against the prints to prevent SAC's entering the United States under any name. Espionage section should be advised if SAC again enters the United States. [FBI 105-82555-3]

Branigan, contacted in July 1993 stated, "I don't remember that. You got something there in writing? What the hell? We couldn't investigate him in the Soviet Union. You can't do that. But when he comes back, he's a defector you know, and then he's fair game for investigation." William, A. Branigan, who was disciplined by the FBI for his pre-assassination handling of the OSWALD case, was in charge of the FBI's mail opening program. [Scott, Deep Politics p64] On November 9, 1993, William Branigan, 77, died of cancer.

The memorandum continued:
Since Subject apparently has no knowledge of any strategic information which would be of benefit to the Soviets and there is no indication of any Soviet contacts...it does not appear that any action is warranted by the Bureau in this matter. [FBI 105-82555-3]

When this telephone interviewer mentioned OSWALD'S access to information on the U-2, William Branigan commented, "I don't know much about OSWALD and Atsugi. You are surmising he had access [to U-2 information]...you surmise these things. It could be. I don't know." He was asked, "What made the FBI believe he possessed no strategic information?" He responded, "From the fact of who he was, where he lived, and what he did. There was nothing about OSWALD that would indicate, well, hell, this guy is something really important. No, no, no. There was nothing. Somehow it sticks in the back of my mind that the Soviets did not think very much of him. They thought he was a jerk. 'This guy was something we don't want to fool with.' That's my recollection now and that was a long time ago. You could prove me wrong..."

WILLIAM CORNELIUS SULLIVAN

In 1964 William Branigan, and his colleague William Cornelius Sullivan, were in charge of directing the FBI's investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy for the Warren Commission. William C. Sullivan, a farm boy from Bolton, Massachusetts, entered the FBI as a Special Agent on August 4, 1941. During World War II, he worked in the Special Intelligence Service of the FBI, and was closely connected to the OSS. On his return, he became a security field supervisor at FBI Headquarters in Washington; he remained at Headquarters for the duration of his FBI career. In 1961 he became FBI Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). William C. Sullivan was the house intellectual at the DID. He had close ties to ANGLETON, and was listed in Who's Who in the CIA as having been co-opted by the Agency. In 1961 William C. Sullivan was named Bureau representative to the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), a position he held for ten years. The USIB was composed of CIA, DIA, NSA, Atomic Energy Commission, DOS, ONI etc. The Chairman of the Intelligence Board was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, until he left the Agency in November 1961. Allen Dulles was succeeded as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by John McConel and then Richard Helms.

The Navy believed OSWALD had no access to U-2 information via his job so they gave him a clean bill of health. But ANGLETON could have given OSWALD the exact information he needed to give to the Sovs so they could shoot down the U-2. Evidence of the CI/SIG's continued interest in OSWALD was found in the OSWALD’s 201-File.
ANGLETON DELAYED OPENING OSWALD’S 201 FILE

ANGLETON and CI/SIG opened an OSWALD dossier, or 201 file only because it was forced to do so. ANGLETON wanted as little a paper trail between him and OSWALD as was possible that was one reason why OSWALD’s documents were sent to the Office of Security. No CIA documents existed on OSWALD until his 201 file was opened on December 9, 1960. David E. Murphy, Soviet Russia Division Chief, was told by Allen Dulles that "Warren Commission members could not understand why CIA had not begun an investigation of OSWALD as soon as it received word that he had defected.”

Some component other than CI-SIG should have opened a 201 File on OSWALD immediately after he threatened to give military information to the Soviets but ANGLETON took over the investigation.

THE ESTABLISHED CRITERION FOR OPENING A 201 FILE
ACCUMULATION OF DOCUMENTS

The Rockefeller Report:

The fact that a name has been entered into the index does not mean that a [201] file exists on that person. Files are open only at the direction of a division or staff and only when it appears that the person will be of continuing intelligence interest. In that case, a so-called personality (or 201) file is opened, i.e., a manila folder is prepared to hold relevant documents accumulating on that person.

A CIA Handbook stated: "201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories: (5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents." Edward Petty disagreed: "It’s possible to have a 201 number assigned to an individual if there’s just one document in the file."

THE CIA TRIES TO EXPLAIN THE DELAY

The HSCA noted that a CIA Memorandum dated September 18, 1975, indicated: "OSWALD’S 201 file was opened on December 9, 1960, in response to the receipt of five documents: two FBI, two State Department and one Navy." This explanation was inconsistent with the presence in OSWALD’S file of four 1959 State Department documents and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. If the opening of OSWALD’S 201 file was triggered by the CIA’s receipt of documents, why wasn’t it opened in MAY 1960, when five documents had accumulated?

The CIA commented: ""OSWALD’S 201 file had been opened on December 9, 1960 on the basis of the receipt of the first five documents." This statement is not accurate. Although the writer of this memorandum made this statement (and it is quoted accurately) the OSWALD file was open following the completion of work in response to the State Department memorandum dated October 25, 1960."

The CIA Memorandum dated September 18, 1975 also claimed that the file was opened because of OSWALD's defection and his possible re-entry into the United States.

OSWALD, however, never officially expressed to any U.S. Government official, an intention to return, until February 1961. The CIA Memorandum dated September 18, 1975, did not explain why the CIA waited over a year before opening an OSWALD 201 file. The HSCA still could not resolve this issue.

THE HSCA EXPLAINS DELAY

The HSCA reviewed CIA files of 11 individuals on a list of defectors supplied to the State Department from the CIA and determined that: "201 files were opened in December 1960, for each of the five (including OSWALD) who did not have 201 files prior to receipt of the State Department inquiry. In each case the slot for 'source document' referred to an Agency component [CI/SIG] rather than to a dated document." The HSCA interpreted the fact that five other 201 files on defectors were also opened in December 1960, to mean that there was nothing extraordinary about initiating OSWALD's file at this time. However, it allowed: "This analysis only explained why a file on OSWALD was finally opened; it did not explain the seemingly long delay in the opening of the file."

THE SOURCE DOCUMENT WAS CI/SIG

The Committee tried again:

Finally, a reference to the original form that was used to start a file on OSWALD did not resolve this issue since the appropriate space that would normally indicate the 'source document' that initiated the action referred to CI/SIG rather than to a dated document." The CIA indicated to the HSCA that it was 'customary to refer to a component when the opening action is taken on that component's authority.'

There was nothing extraordinary about CI/SIG appearing in the Source Document Box. This was the component that sometimes handled defectors, although its main job was to unearth moles. The CIA, however, deleted the information in the source box for 30 years because it was weird that the molehunters opened the OSWALD file. It also indicated a familiarity on ANGLETON'S part with OSWALD while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union. Edward Petty was asked about why this information was withheld: "It's an internal indicator that has no real sense to anybody except to somebody who's going to read something into it."

To prove there was nothing irregular about CI/SIG waiting one year before opening an OSWALD 201 file, the HSCA did a broader analysis. It "reviewed the files of 13 of the 14 persons on the CIA's November 21, 1960, response to a State Department letter inquiring about defectors, and of 16 other defectors (from an original list of 380 supplied by the CIA) who were American-born, had defected during the years 1958 to 1963, and
who had returned to the United States during that same time period." The HSCA stated that of 29 defectors whose files were reviewed, 8 had been the Subject of 201 files before the time of their defection. This group was of interest to the CIA before they defected. The HSCA: "In only 4 of the remaining 21 cases were 201 files opened at the time of their defection. The files on the 17 other defectors were opened from four months to several years after the defection.

None of the other defectors had openly threatened to give the Soviets classified military information about American radar. OSWALD was a special case and nothing could be gained by comparing him to how other defectors were treated.

The HSCA was finally "able to determine the basis for opening OSWALD'S file on December 9, 1960, by interviewing and then deposing Ann Egerter or Ann Eggerter who was directly responsible for initiating the opening action. By her account the questioning focused on the circumstances of opening the file and possibly related procedural practices. Her story is a fairly simple one. There was a State Department request for information concerning a list of defectors. She did the basic work in preparing the information and then, on her own decision, opened 201 files on each of the individuals, totaling about 12 in all. One of them was LEE HARVEY OSWALD. She also, on her own decision, noted a restriction that required requesters for information on any of those people to contact CI Staff." [CIA OLC 78-2058 5.23.78] The only reason CI/SIG had Plans open an OSWALD 201 file was because it had to due to Martin and Mitchell flap.

MARTIN & MITCHELL

On September 6, 1960, one month before this document was written, William Martin & Bernon Mitchell, two mathematicians working for the National Security Administration, defected to Russia. They were discovered to be homosexuals, which indirectly led to the resignation of the personnel director of the National Security Administration, and the firing of 26 other employees for sexual deviation. Soon, the House of Representatives passed a bill giving the Secretary of Defense the power to fire National Security Administration employees without explanation and without appeal, if they were security risks. The White House wanted to know if there were any more defectors like Martin and Mitchell, capable of providing useful intelligence information to the Soviet Bloc.

THE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON DEFECTORS FROM STATE

On October 25, 1960, the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, Hugh C. Cummings, sent a letter to Richard Bissell, the Deputy Director/Plans of the CIA, which read:

Dear Dick:
Our efforts to answer recent informal inquiries, including some from the White House Staff, have revealed that, though the CIA and the FBI have detailed records concerning Americans who have been recruited as intelligence agents by Bloc countries, there does not appear to be a complete listing of these Americans now living in Bloc countries who might be called 'defectors.' Using definitions of DCID/4/2, these persons might be described as those who have either been capable of providing useful intelligence to the Bloc or those who desire to resettle in Bloc countries and had been significantly exploited for communist propaganda purposes. This would mean that no attention need be paid to Americans whose resettlement within the Bloc had no counter-intelligence implications or had attracted no particular attention; for instance this definition would not cover individual U.S. citizens or Eastern Europeans of Chinese origin who returned to the 'homeland' because they had never been completely assimilated into the American society. There is an attached list of such persons, covering the last 18 months, and it would be appreciated if the Agency could verify and possibly expand this list for the use of interested Bureaus of the Department. Sincerely yours, Hugh S. Cummings, Jr. 

Attachment: List of American 'Defectors' from May 1959 to October 1960. Secret. [CIA DD/P 05678]

THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

The author of this letter, Hugh C. Cummings, Jr., a former Ambassador to Indonesia, was appointed Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department in 1957. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research included numerous CIA personnel. William McAfee, the Chief of Staff for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 1963, was listed in Who’s Who in the CIA as having worked for the CIA under State Department cover since 1951. In April 1957 he entered the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and by May 1960, he had been promoted to Supervisor, Intelligence Research Specialist. McAfee became Assistant Deputy Director for Coordination in June 1967. He was a Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1972 through 1977. [State Dept. Bio. Reg. 1977] McAfee’s Deputy, James D. Crowley, a Mexico Regional Administration Specialist, worked for the CIA since 1961. In November 1963 he was promoted to Intelligence Operations Specialist. [State Dept. Bio. Reg. 1977] John T. Noonan, Chief of the Intelligence Reporting Branch of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was listed in Who’s Who in the CIA. Note the reference to recent informal inquiries, including some from the White House staff. The letters DCID stand for Director/Central Intelligence/Directive. The CIA denied my request for the substance of DCID 4/2, which was CIA-originated. The CIA Information Review Committee is currently reviewing this decision. [CIA FOIA F93-1559] On September 14, 1995, the CIA suggested I send my request to Frank M. Machak at the State Department. I have not as yet heard from Machak and the file was never released as on 2010.
Richard Bissell, who this memo was addressed to, had graduated from Groton and earned a PH. D. from Yale in 1939. He attended and headed the London School of Economics. At Yale, Richard Bissell was a member of the America First Committee, a Nazi-front group active in the United States in the late 1930's and early 1940's. During World War II he worked in the War Shipping Administration. In 1948 he joined the Marshall Plan and in 1954 he entered the CIA. Richard Bissell described himself as a high risk man.

Attached to the request was a list of 12 defectors known to the State Department entitled, "List Of American Defectors." Out of the 12, five had defected from the U.S. Armed Forces. The list provided the sources on which the State Department information was based. The defectors listed were:

1. Morris and Mollie Block.
8. LEE HARVEY OSWALD, tourist.
11. Robert Edward Webster, tourist (see NYT article of October 20, 1959).
12. Bruce Frederick Davis, U.S. Army. (Embassy Moscow telegram 1032 of October 22, 1960)."

When the CIA listed OSWALD in its response to Hugh C. Cummings, a newspaper article was cited as the CIA's source.

RICHARD BISSELL'S RESPONSE

Richard Bissell signed a response to Hugh C. Cummings on November 2, 1960: "I have your letter dated October 25, 1960, requesting certain information concerning Americans living in Bloc countries who might be called 'defectors.' Our files are being searched for the information you desire." The "Signature Recommended" on this document was that of S. H. Horton, Acting Chief of ANGLETON'S Counter-Intelligence Staff (AC/CI). According to Who's Who in the CIA, S. Herman Horton was born on October 9, 1913. From 1944 to 1946 he was in the Planning Office of the War Department. On December 20, 1954, when DD/P Frank Wisner established a separate Counter-Intelligence staff, S. Herman Horton was appointed Deputy Chief. From 1947 to 1961 S. Herman Horton's CIA cover was Deputy Chief of Operations/Composite

[Covert Action #13 July to August 1981] The name of Birch D. O'Neal appeared on this document in two places. Copies of S. Herman Horton's letter were sent to COPS [Covert Operations?] Copies were sent to Acting Chief /Counter-Intelligence (Horton); SR/6/Stacy; SR/CE/Grady; CI/SIG. The Association of Former Intelligence Officers 1983 Membership Directory listed a Harry L. Grady and William J. Grady. [Public Information Research POB 680635 San Antonio, Texas 78268]

The markings "C/CI/SIG: BDO'NEAL: bd x-2356 November 2, 1960," also appeared. S.H. Horton drafted a reply to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on behalf of the CIA. The document contained markings "C/CI/SIG/ BDO'NEAL: bd x-2356 November 18, 1960," as well as the identical dissemination markings found on the November 2, 1960, response to Hugh Cummings.

The CIA responded to this State Department request on November 21, 1960, and provided a long list of defectors and a paragraph about each of them. The information on OSWALD'S defection was classified Secret, as were seven of the 13 cases listed. The defection of the stepson of W.E.B. DuBois, "the well-known Negro leader and writer," was classified Secret. Robert Edward Webster's defection was Confidential. Five of the defections were unclassified, including Martin & Mitchell. [CIA 596-252F; WCD p69] The State Department sent this document to the White House to answer any questions it had about defectors.

OVERALL ANALYSIS

Why wasn't OSWALD 201 file opened earlier due to the number and nature of documents which had accumulated about him?' The HSCA concluded that "opening a file years after a defection was not uncommon." OSWALD was not a common case. Richard Helms stated: "I can't imagine why it would have taken an entire year. I am amazed. Defect to the USSR October 1959. This is December 1960. There wasn't a 201 file already in existence, I am amazed. Are you sure that there wasn't? Yes, (deleted) but (deleted) had they not opened a file a lot earlier. I can't explain that."

When the CIA responded to a letter from the Department of State asking if any defectors to the Soviet Union posed any security threats it received the biography below that failed to mention OSWALD'S threat to give up information on something connected with American radar. This was a deliberate omission.

OSWALD, Lee Henry
Defected October 1959

The following information is SECRET:

Born October 18, 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, Lee Henry OSWALD joined the United States Marines at the age of seventeen because he did not want to be a “burden” on his mother who was widowed prior to his birth. While in the Marines, OSWALD, a private first class, became a radar operator and had fourteen months service in Japan and the Philippines. About a year before his discharge from the Marines OSWALD began to teach himself to read and speak Russian. After receiving an honorable discharge from the Marines on September 3, 1959 OSWALD visited his mother in Waco, Texas for about three days and then departed. A note written to his mother from New Orleans stated that he had booked passage to Europe and that he was doing something he felt he must do. Shortly thereafter he appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow and renounced his U.S. citizenship, giving his reason the plight of the American Negro and U.S. “imperialism” abroad. OSWALD acknowledged mail addressed to him at the Hotel Metropole in Moscow in 1959; however he failed to do so in 1960. OSWALD is reported to have stated that regardless of any material shortcomings he sees in the USSR, he will never return to the United States.

OSWALD’S 201 FILE

The HSCA’s investigation of OSWALD’S 201 file was based largely on erroneous leads provided by this author:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel of the HSCA July 25, 1977. Present at the briefing held in GG-14

CIA: Douglas Cummings, OLC, John Walker O/SA/DO/O, William Sturbitts, LA Division, Raymond Reardon, Office of Security, Robert Wall, CI Staff, Russell B. Holmes CI Staff

1. The undersigned was called to brief Blakey on the Agency’s official file on OSWALD. A copy of notes prepared for the briefing is attached.
2. The briefing, or more accurately, question and answer period, lasted about three quarters of an hour.

4. The first point the undersigned brought up in reference to the Staff's file on LEE HARVEY OSWALD was the document opening the file. The undersigned stated that this document had been released under provisions of Freedom of Information Act and a photograph of the sanitized version had appeared in the National Enquirer of April 26, 1977, along with the comment by a former CIA employee, Patrick McGarvey, that the existence of a 201 file on an individual meant the individual had been recruited by the Agency. The undersigned said such a statement was false.

What happened here is that Canfield and I had run into a dude from the Navy named Robert Sibley who helped us sell a story on OSWALD's CIA employment file to the National Enquirer. In CIA Diary, CIA defector Philip Agee wrote: "Files are maintained on all agents and they always begin with the number 201, followed by a number of five to eight digits. The 201 file contains all the documents that pertain to a given agent..." [Agee CIA Diary p59] I had obtained a copy of OSWALD's 201 via the FOIA. However in the American Armed Forces a 201-file is a personnel file, in the CIA it is not. Fidel Castro has a gigantic 201-file and he does not work for the CIA. The CIA indicated:

A CIA 201 file is opened when a person is considered to be of potential intelligence or counter-intelligence significance. The opening of such a file is designed to serve the purpose of placing certain CIA information pertaining to that individual in one centralized records system. The 201 file is maintained in a folder belonging to the Directorate for Plans, the CIA component responsible for clandestine activities. The existence of a 201 file does not necessarily connote any actual relationship or contact with the CIA. [HSCA R p200]

When Attorney Marvin Miller asked ANGLETON if a CIA 201 file always meant CIA employment, he said: "Not necessarily." Asked to elaborate, his CIA attorney interjected: "On behalf of Director Turner, I would object to any question requiring a definition of 201 file. That information does remain classified." Edward Petty stated:

All personalities of any interest whatever, would be assigned 201 numbers. The 201 does not at all indicate operational interest, except that for some reason, someone decided to keep it and assign a number; because if you retrieve it from the file you've got to have it numbered. Any personality of any interest at all to the CIA operations side, got a 201 file. 201 files would not normally be opened on Staff members. The personnel files for Staff members were held by the Office of Security. Those are Security Files and have another designation. Agent personnel would have 201 files. But a 201 file is simply a personality file of anybody who was
ever of interest to the CIA. A great many people who were of almost no interest to the CIA would have 201 files simply because if you have information on a person and you don't want to throw it away, you open a 201 file on him.

Richard Helms told Mr. Goldsmith of the HSCA: "My recollection is that when an individual was an agent of the Agency all the papers on him were taken over by the division that was handling him and there was nothing available in the central records to identify him as an agent. Now there obviously would be exceptions to that but in the case where there were exceptions, I would think all that would be in the file, the central file, would be a carding saying to the FE Division or something...My impression was, the original impression, all the papers were kept in the Division that was handling the agent...I don't remember anymore how this dilemma was resolved about running traces, and on a fellow who was already an agent and how we dealt with the problem of protecting that fact, I don't remember, I don't recall anymore."

SENSITIVE AND NON SENSITIVE 201 FILES

The regular 201 file generally contained information such as place of birth, family, occupation and organizational affiliation. In addition, a sensitive file might be also maintained on that same person. The sensitive file generally encompassed matters which were potentially embarrassing to the Agency or matters obtained from sources, or by methods that the Agency sought to protect." [RR p144] Richard Helms disagreed: "My recollection is that there was one 201 file. I wouldn't be surprised if there were occasional cases where the thing was so sensitive that somebody made a separate file in order to protect a certain category of information." Agee stated: "The 201 file is divided into two parts that are stored separately for maximum security. One part contains true name documents while the other part contains cryptonym documents and operational information."

WHAT PERCENTAGE OF CIA 201 FILES ARE EMPLOYMENT?

The CIA had stipulated that a 201 file could mean Agency-employment. But, what percentage of the 201 files indicated employment, and what percentage indicated mere intelligence interest? While studying OPERATION CHAOS the Rockefeller Commission discovered that 300,000 names of American dissidents were stored in a CIA computer. For some of these individuals, "a 201 or personality file would be opened when enough information had been collected to warrant a file or when the individual was of interest to another government agency that looked to the CIA for information." The Rockefeller Commission came across the general breakdown of 201 files:

An analysis by the Agency of a group of [201] files opened on American citizens in 1974, as reported to the Commission's staff, showed that 70% of these files were opened on persons who were sources of information or assistance to Agency, 19% related to Americans of possible use to the
Agency and 11% related to Americans who were of foreign counter-intelligence interest.

If a 201 file existed on an American, there was an 89% chance he or she was of some use or possible use to the CIA. Since 201 represented employment 89% of the time, many former CIA Staff members and employees were certain it was exclusively an employment file. Former CIA D/DP Staff member Victor Marchetti commented:

The 201 file originated in the Armed Services. An OSWALD 201 personnel file was located at Marine Corps Headquarters. [FBI NO-100-16601 12.9.63] It was a basic employment file containing pay receipts, sickness or accident reports, unit assignments, etc. It carried over into the CIA. For example, if I wanted to find out about an agent, say Philip Agee, I would call the relevant component and say, 'Send over Agee’s 201 file.' In a telephone interview, Victor Marchetti added: "If you can prove that it is a 201 file, that's the thing...if you can prove it was a 201 file then he was an Agent...at minimum a contact, but more likely an Agent.

Former CIA Agent Bradley E. Ayers, who trained anti-Castro Cubans for the Bay of Pigs invasion, observed: "The fact that OSWALD had one [a 201 file] is absolutely fantastic. It means he was either a contract agent, working for them full-time on contract over a period of time, or he was on some kind of CIA assignment." [rec. tel. con. in possession of Nat’l Enq. 4.26.77]

Former CIA Staff member Patrick McGarvey: "You've got a bombshell, man, you have the one that cracks the egg. If a guy had a 201 file, that means he's a full-time professional staff employee of that organization."

This researcher and Michael Canfield were also mistakenly convinced that OSWALD'S 201 file indicated he worked for the CIA in a official capacity. We sold the story to The National Enquirer. The National Enquirer verified our contention that a CIA 201 file was a CIA employment file with the aforementioned former CIA agents, then published it, despite the fact that it was not true. I had unwittingly floated a false news story that linked OSWALD to the CIA. What a remarkable turn of events.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENSITIVE</th>
<th>ZI NO.</th>
<th>SOURCE DOCUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1 G</td>
<td>289248</td>
<td>CT/S1 G</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION 1**

**NAME:**
- Last: Oswald
- First: Lee
- Middle: Henry

**CLASSIFICATION REVIEW**
- Conducted on 26 April 1976
- O.S. Report 47-523-12

**NB: Harvey**
- Felt.
- 6/21/75

**FOIA Review on APR 1975**
- Document No. I-B

**SECTION 11**

**COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE:**
- USSR - 074
- US - 781

**DEPLORED TO USSR IN OCTOBER 1959**

**CITIZENSHIP & PASSPORTS -**
- Oswald, Lee Harvey

**DEPT. OF STATE INSTRUCTION A-173, APR 13, 69; SECT. OF STATE, 1957671**

**MOSCOW EMBASSY DESPATCH 234, NOV. 2, 1959**

**Foe order for D. Lynch, 3R/61/P, 106LWJ (mail address)**

**RECORD COPY**
The Field Personality 201 File Request and the index card follows:

SECRET
(When Filled In)
FIELD PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: Headquarters, RI December 9, 1960.
FROM: CI/SIG - Ann Egerter 1408 J (x2621) ACTION: OPEN AMEND CLOSE.

SECTION I All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write 'Unknown' for the items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: Cryptonym will be entered in Headquarters.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE / Non Sensitive [Neither box checked] 201 No. 201-289248
Source Document CI/SIG
Name (Last) OSWALD (First) LEE (Middle) Henry (Title) Sex Male
NAME VARIANT
Type Name (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

SECTION II
Cryptonym Pseudonym

SECTION III
Country of Residence USSR - 074 Action Desk CI/SIG 731 2nd Country Interest SR 3rd Country Interest
COMMENTS: Cit? Defected to the USSR in October 1959.
PERMANENT CHARGE. No. Restricted. Yes. Signature Ann Egerter.

In early 1993 the CIA added what appeared to be a stapled addendum to OSWALD’S 201 file:

CITIZENSHIP & PASSPORTS
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY.
Department of State Instruction A-173, April 13, 1961; still on order
October 5, 1961
Embassy’s D-806, May 26, 1962, same SAC.
Moscow Embassy dispatch 234, November 2, 1959 received October 2, 1961
Please order for (deleted) SR/CI/P, [Soviet Russia /Counter-Intelligence (Plans)] 1044AJ (mail address)
Ordered through SR6/ (deleted.) [These deletions might significant since
the Freedom of Information Section of the CIA went over these deletions
with a pen, when it sent this researcher a copy].

An Index Card was created and filed with the DD/P as a result of this 201 file being
opened:

OSWALD, LEE HENRY
SEX M DOB OCTOBER 18, 1939 201-289248*
NEW ORLEANS, LA. USA
CIT?
REF:
USSR
RADAR OPERATOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS AS OF 1960. DEFECTED
TO USSR IN OCTOBER 1959.

The request to Headquarters to open a 201 file on OSWALD was sent to the Records
Integration Division for processing on December 9, 1960.

WHY LEE HENRY OSWALD?

The HSCA asked: "Why was he carried as LEE HENRY OSWALD in his 201 file? OSWALD’S 201 file was opened under the name LEE HENRY OSWALD. No Agency
witness could explain why. All Agency personnel testified that this must have been
casioned innocently by bureaucratic error." The CIA assured the Committee that,
even with an altered middle name, it could have found him in its files. Ann Egerter, who
retired in 1969 and died on July 16, 1990, was asked about this error:

4. She was pressed on why the name LEE HENRY OSWALD appeared
on appeared on one occasion, instead of correctly as LEE HARVEY
OSWALD. She could not explain, speculating that it could have been
either a mistake, or that someone other than herself made the entry as the
handwriting appeared quite differently than the rest of her writing on the
form. She pointed out she did all 12 folders at the same time and got tired
of writing, which made her handwriting deteriorate."

There were other inconsistencies: "Defected to the USSR in October 1959, Radar
operator, U.S. Marine Corps as of 1960." All of these sounded like innocuous mistakes,
but they were there for a reason. They appeared there to make it seem that CI-SIG had
so little interest in OSWALD they could even spell his goddamned name right or his chronology! ANGELTON was deliberately leaving a paper trail that indicated CI/SIG had so little knowledge of, or interest in, OSWALD, that OSWALD might just as well been an ant that defected. Raymond Rocca would eventually correct it: "NB: HARVEY" - Name at Birth - HARVEY.

DID 'AG' STAND FOR AGENT?

The HSCA: "What was the meaning of 'AG' under 'Other Identification' in OSWALD'S 201 file?" The CIA was asked to explain its significance because the HSCA believed "this term was considered to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of OSWALD'S alleged Agency relationship." (This researcher erroneously suggested to the HSCA that "AG" might stand for Agent or Agency.) The CIA claimed that "'AG' is the 'OI' (Other Identification) code - meaning 'actual or potential defectors to the East or the Sino/Soviet bloc including Cuba' - and that anyone so described could have the 'OI' code 'AG.'" This code was reportedly "added to OSWALD'S opening form because of the comment on the document that he had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959." The letters "AG" appeared on the 201 files of many Soviet and Cuban defectors. A November 15, 1974 CIA Handbook stated: "OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI Codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations. The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country, a listing may be compiled of all members of that service."

Ann Egerter reported:

The staff questioning made it clear that the HSCA wished to determine if OSWALD had an agent relationship with the Agency. She feels an effort was made in two or three different ways to get her to make statements that there was some such relationship. For instance there were the letter AG on the form employed in opening 201 files. She was asked if this meant Agent. She replied it did not although she could not recall what it did mean. She also made the point in her testimony that she did not handle agent files.

The CIA stated:
1. In June 1960 a new form 831 (for opening 201's) came into effect which made the old (October 1957) type form used by the OSWALD 201 obsolete. Since 201's are opened by the individual offices and not at a central point, the Records Integration Division allowed for an overlap period before not accepting the October 1959 form 831's. The June 1960 form was obviously geared for machine input and specifically has spaces for the machine codes. The analyst, (initials N.S.) who reviewed the 831 form on OSWALD and assigned the 201 number added the machine codes to the old type opening sheet.

A. The OI Code (Other Identification) "AG" means "actual or potential defectors to the East or the Sino/Soviet Bloc including Cuba." The analyst added this OI code because CI/SIG (Egerter) had stated that OSWALD had defected to the USSR in October 1959. Any person who could be described as the above could have an OI Code "AG."

B. CI/SIG has been crossed out because the space now required a machine code (as explained in paragraph one above). The number "73" is called a "non-country code" which means in machine input language that CI/SIG (the office which had opened the file).

C. The number "074" is under category #10 "Country of Residence" not "047" under category #12 "Second Country Interest," as stated in HSCA letter of August 15, 1978. The number "074" is a "country code" and means the USSR.

(Note: The machine codes in Paragraph 1a, b, & c were obtained from a Machine Listing produced by IMS/Procedures Branch/EDIS (Electronic Data Input Section). It is a computer listing to identify computer fields. The IMS analysts also have handbooks entitled "Handbook for Analysis" which also specifies the same information).

OTHER MARKINGS

In Section III, the information in the slot entitled COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE read USSR - 074 and the ACTION DESK read CI/SIG 731. Edward Petty commented, "'Action Desk' can have several meanings. It could be that a report from the field that needs to answered. It could be a case or the place of residence of the file." The SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST read "SR." If numbers were to replace letters for security reasons why not fill out an entirely new 201-File-Request with just numbers? I don't buy the CIA's explanation and believe the words were crossed out for a more sinister reason. Finally, the file was marked Restricted and signed by Egerter. [CIA 2-524, 1-1-B, 1187-436, 593-252C]
WHY WAS OSWALD'S 201 FILE RESTRICTED?

A CIA Handbook stated:

RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction on Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on a permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to the Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier).

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requestor or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requestor of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

d. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel he HSCA asked: "Why was OSWALD'S 201 file restricted? The form used to initiate the opening of the file contains a notation indicating the file was to be 'restricted.' This indication was considered potentially significant because of the CIA's practice of restricting access to the files of its agents to persons on a 'need-to-know' basis. The individual who actually placed the restriction on OSWALD'S file testified that this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of the developments that might have occurred with regard to the file. The restriction achieved this purpose because any person seeking access to the file would first have to notify the restricting officer, at which time the officer would be apprized of any developments."
According to Ann Egerter, the who opened OSWALD'S 201 file, after more than one year of total disinterest in OSWALD (between the time he defected and the time the CIA opened a 201 file on him), the CIA was now intensely interested in him; so interested, it could not wait for a periodic check of his file, but had to have, instantaneously, knowledge of any intelligence officer who was interested in OSWALD so that the restricting officer would be apprised of any developments. A far more plausible explanation was that, due to the sensitivity of OSWALD'S mission, ANGLETON was interested in anyone who was interested in OSWALD.

The HSCA concluded: "Restricting access to a file was not necessarily indicative of a relationship with the CIA." Edward Petty agreed: "Restriction does not have any operational implications. It could." The initials NS appear on the bottom of the document, as do the letters CS Copy [Clandestine Services copy], OSWALD'S 201 number, and a still-deleted signature.

**OSWALD'S 201 FILE DID NOT CONNECT HIM TO THE CIA**

As stated, OSWALD'S 201 file bore no indication of his connection to ANGLETON because it was created by Ann Egerter and Jane Roman, who both worked for ANGLETON. These documents indicated OSWALD was a defector, not an operation. OSWALD'S 201 file was unwittingly forged by these ladies; OSWALD'S Agency connection was a secret even within the CIA. ANGLETON knew the system, and could easily have done this. Jane Roman's husband Howard Roman, was a close associate of ANGLETON. [Hersh, *The Old Boys*, p363] Edward Petty commented: "Jane Roman and Howard Roman worked in different areas of the CIA. Jane is retired, Howard had died. Remember, you dilute the whole business if you reach too far." Evidence existed that ANGLETON forged other 201 files.

**ZR RIFLE'S 201 FILE**

William K. Harvey's handwritten notes concerning his talk with Sid Gottlieb indicated that he was considering assassinating a world leader and blaming it on the Soviets - with ANGLETON'S help. "Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Soviets or Czechs in case of blow. (Deleted). Should have *phony* 201 file in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged & backdated. Should look like CE [Counter-Espionage] file." William K. Harvey's assassin would have a 201 file which was forged and backdated so that it simulated that of an Soviet or Czech assassin."Backstop" meant to provide *bona fides* that appeared to be real when checked. Other notes read: "RIS cover caution Bankruptcy - no Star eyes - JIM A." Russian Intelligence Service cover would be cautiously provided by ANGLETON. A false 201 file would be created.

**THE HSCA INVESTIGATED**

The HSCA assessed William K. Harvey's notes and inquired: "Did the CIA maintain a dual filing system on OSWALD?" The HSCA investigated, but never published its conclusions. "When pressed on the possibility that there might be another such file
elsewhere on OSWALD, she said that there would have to be a 'fake file.' When pressed on this she stated the word was an incorrect one, and that what would have been would have been a file folder with a piece of paper in it referring to the existence of an original file somewhere else, specifying where.” [CIA MFR 5.23.78 OLC-78-2058; HSCA R p205; William K. Harvey's handwritten notes: Z-R Rifle Item 42 CIA cover ltr.; USDC-DDC 75-0944-Civ.]

Cleveland Cram, a former CIA Staff member who conducted a study of CI, was contacted in August 1993. He stated,

> It's conceivable you could create a phony 201 file, but when you got to checking on the 201 file, it would very soon become evident that there was no support for the documents in it, and people would start looking around and find out it was phony. The minute you get into something like that, you got one or two people involved, maybe four, you start fiddling around with trying to create a phony file and the first thing you know somebody says, not at the time, maybe five years later, ten years later, now especially when all this conspiracy crap comes out. It would leak. I was so long in the CIA and I know that it was very difficult, almost impossible to keep secrets. There are leaks like crazy. There is no connection to reality. What would be the object of creating a false 201 file? Bill Harvey, towards the end of his life there, when he was in ZR RIFLE, was getting a little bit flaky. He was on the marts about a pitcher or more a day.

Scott Breckinridge, a 26 year veteran of the CIA who spent 14 years in the Inspector General's Office, commented:

> It was clear that Mr. Harvey and an associate initially contemplated trying to establish false files. It is equally clear to anyone will to pursue the question beyond its asking, that they did not do so. Why he did not cannot be recaptured factually today as Mr. Harvey is dead, but that he did not is clear. Perhaps he tried and simply could not. In any event it was not necessary to do so anyway if limited records were desired to enhance the security of the operation.

Richard Helms gave authorization for ZR/RIFLE to continue on February 19, 1962, and on March 6, 1963. [HSCA CIA 3319, 3329] Helms told the HSCA:

> The project so it could be funded, but my distinct recollection is that I told the case officer who was involved with this that this was to be changed in its concept, in other words, there was absolutely no point in having a professional killer on the payroll as such, and that he was to try and find something else for him to do.

The memorandum in question stated: "For the purpose of ZRRIFLE activities, you are hereby authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN and such other
principal agents and sub-agents as may be required. This authorization will continue to
be in force through December 31, 1962, subject to renewal at that time...Richard
Helms." [CIA D002109]

Goldsmith: Was the case officer who handled this project William Harvey?

Helms: I always thought it was (Deleted). Maybe Harvey started it and
(Deleted) took over it later. Maybe that is what happened...Harvey came to
the Agency after many years with the FBI. He handled the Elizabeth
Bentley case..."

Richard Helms was asked if ZR/RIFLE used fake or cover 201’s: "No, I don't know what
was done (deleted)."

Goldsmith: a case where, at the very least, agency personnel were
contemplating the use of a fake 201 file and possibly a fake operational
file.

Helms: Yes it looks like that. But then his boss would have known about
this. He would have had to get permission to do that. Somebody would
have known about it.

Goldsmith: Again for the purposes of clarification, when a file is faked in
the manner suggested by the author of these particular papers, how many
people would know about it?

Helms: Well, the person who instructed it to be done, I assume his boss,
the person who would do it, and whether anybody in RI or in the Registry
would know about it is problematic. They probably would not."

Richard Helms also told the HSCA,

He was not aware of the one that you brought to my attention [William K.
Harvey's phony 201 file proposal] and I am not aware of any others. ZR
RIFLE originally started out as an indication of a project which was
supposed to cover a man who in turn had been taken on to have available
an operational capability to kill people. A man was hired, before I was
aware of these things. But anyway, after I became DD/P, I put on the shelf
for good, all and any use of this capacity for killing people. We didn't need
that.

OSWALD’S HT LINGUAL FILE

After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the CIA searched its HT
LINGUAL file for additional material: "Approximately 30 pieces of correspondence that
were considered potentially related to the investigation of OSWALD’S case (even
though not necessarily directly related to OSWALD) were discovered. None of these was judged by the CIA to be of any significance. These materials were stored in a separate HT LINGUAL file." The HSCA search of the OSWALD HT LINGUAL file yielded two index cards:

INDEX CARD ONE
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY SECRET: CI-Project/RE
USSR EYES ONLY November 9, 1959
7-305
[NR/RI NOV 20, 1959
Recent defector to the USSR. Former Marine.
WATCH LIST
DELETE 15/3/60 March 15, 1960

CI/PROJECT/RE

Initially this researcher believed the words "CI/Project/RE" stood for Counter-Intelligence Project, Russia, Europe. As a result of this the HSCA asked: "Did OSWALD ever participate in a Counter-Intelligence project?" Edward Petty stated, "That is ridiculous. Russia and Europe, in my experience, were never tied together in that particular way. What you have is divisions handling possible operations such as SR [Soviet Russia] Division, SB [Soviet Bloc] Division. "E" only came to represent the European Division much later than the date on this document. The European Division was always EE so it's mixing apples and oranges." Edward Petty was correct, it probably did not signify that.

One former CIA employee told the HSCA the notation was a convenient name used to describe the HT LINGUAL project. Another testified that CI PROJECT was the name of the component that ran the HT LINGUAL project, and "RE" was the name of the translator who had worked on the OSWALD documents. The CIA told the HSCA that "there existed an office within the counter-intelligence staff that was known as CI/PROJECT, a cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the office's functions. This office was responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by the HT LINGUAL project. The Agency further explained that RE represented a former employee's initials." The CIA: "RE" represents the initials of a CIA employee now retired under cover. The presence of the initials indicates that on November 9, 1959, RE placed OSWALD'S name on the 'Watch List' for the reason given on the card, to wit, 'Recent defector to the USSR - Former Marine.'"

The HSCA questioned various former employees of the CIA who may have had some knowledge of the HTLINGUAL program and/or of these cards in particular, as to their recollection of the meanings of the aforementioned notations. Some of them recognized the cards as relating to the HTLINGUAL project but were unable to identify the meaning of the notation. "CI/Project/RE." (Deposition of Ann Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 60. Deposition of Birch O'Neal, 7/20/78, p. 39) However, one person
explained that the "CI Project" was "simply a name of convenience which was used to describe the HTLINGUAL project" (Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 7/18/78, p. 221).

The key to this is that the testimony of RE - or identity - was absent from the HSCA's report.

7-305 AND THE OFFICE OF SECURITY

The CIA told the HSCA: "The number 7-305 indicates the communication (not necessarily written) to the Office of Security informing the latter of the Staff's interest in seeing any mail either coming from or going to LEE HARVEY OSWALD in the Soviet Union." The HSCA reported:

The CIA's response went on to state the handwritten number, 7-305 was a reference to the communication from the Counter-Intelligence Staff to the Office of Security expressing the Counter-Intelligence Staff's interest in seeing any mail to or from OSWALD in the Soviet Union.

The CIA's Office of Security, acting alone over a 24-year period, ran over 91 separate mail-cover operations relating to individuals within the United States. That meant an average of 4 mail covers a year. According to the Rockefeller Commission: "Most of the cases involved CIA employees under investigation...

Why was the first document on OSWALD routed to the Office of Security? Why did CI think that the Office of Security had a mail cover on OSWALD? The Office of Security did not run many mail covers. When it did it was a very select list. Was OSWALD that dangerous? What had merited this sort of attention? And if this degree of attention was paid to OSWALD by the Agency, why wasn't there a 201 file for him in 1959? Or was OSWALD being surreptitiously checked on by ANGLETON?

Edward Petty commented, "Where is this information from?" He was told, "From the HSCA Hearings." Edward Petty responded, "Certainly Office of Security didn't have a mail cover on him in the Soviet Union, you can be sure of that. I don't know why the Office of Security might have had an interest."

N/R-RI

The CIA: "N/R-RI November 20, 1959 - this notation indicates that a name trace run in central files resulted in a NO RECORD on November 20, 1959." On November 2, 1959, the FBI received a State Department cable about OSWALD. The Bureau telexed the CIA and asked what it knew about him. "N/R-RI November 20, 1959," signified "that a name trace run through central records register [Records Integration] indicated that there was no record for LEE HARVEY OSWALD as of that date." unable

WATCH LIST
The words "Watch List" appeared on this card. The CIA claimed that an employee at HT LINGUAL placed OSWALD'S name on the Watch List:

On November 9, 1959, an employee whose initials were RE placed OSWALD'S name on the Watch List for the HT LINGUAL project for the reason stated on the card - that OSWALD was a recent defector to the Soviet Union and an ex-Marine.

When HSCA requested the criteria used by the CIA in compiling a Watch List, the Committee was referred to this Rockefeller Report section:

Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence or Counter-Intelligence interest were specified in Watch Lists provided to the mail project by the Counter-Intelligence staff [ANGELTON], by other CIA components, and by the FBI. On the average, the list included 300 names, including about 100 furnished by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of U.S. citizens. The mail intercept project was programmed to provide support data (if possible) as to Soviet attempts to:

(a) Penetrate the United States Government and strategic defense industries.

(b) Recruit travelers to the USSR, including educational leaders, businessmen and students.

(c) Exploit United States defectors.

(d) Communicate with Soviet illegals and spies

(e) Exploit Soviet exchange student contacts.

(f) Exploit and disrupt dissident groups.

(g) As a by-product, gain operational information on Soviet censorship, passports, and official document regulations within the USSR." [NARA 1993.07.01.19:37:20:530370]

Although not as exclusive as the Office of Security Mail Cover list, OSWALD was among 300 people in the United States whose mail was watched so that it could be routinely opened by the CIA. Most letters to be opened by HT LINGUAL were selected randomly; only a few were selected on the basis of the Watch List, often compiled by ANGELTON'S staff. Who had put LEE HARVEY OSWALD, teenaged defector, on it? The CI/SIG or the FBI?

THE CIA DELETES THE WORD DELETED
The most recent release of the information in this document was the word "Deleted" before April 15, 1960. The CIA had deleted the word "deleted" for 36 years. OSWALD was taken off the mail intercept Watch List just before the U-2 was shot down.

ANALYSIS: CARD TWO

INDEX CARD TWO
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY CI/SIG/Egerter 9-580
WATCH LIST 10-288
August 7, 1961 11-323
Minsk, USSR
DOB: October 18, 1939
POB: New Orleans, Louisiana
Defected to Russia 1959. August 17, 1960, received undesirable discharge from United States Marine Corps Reserve. Reportedly expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions. DELETED May 28, 1962.
Reviewed by AE 10/4/62

The Agency's explanation of the second HT LINGUAL Watch List card was: "On August 7, 1961, the CIA Staff Officer who opened the OSWALD 201 file requested that OSWALD'S name be placed on the 'Watch List' because of OSWALD'S expressed desire to return to the United States," as stated on the card. In 1993 the CIA released the notation "CI/SIG/Egerter." As in the case of the OSWALD 201 file, Egerter had acted on ANGLETON'S instructions.

9-580; 10-288; and 11-323

The card contained the numbers "9-580; 10-288; and 11-323." If the number 7-305 was a reference to the communication from Counter-Intelligence staff to the Office of Security expressing the Counter-Intelligence staff's interest in seeing any mail to or from OSWALD in the Soviet Union, then what CIA communications and components were signified by these numbers? The CIA provided no explanation. [CIA Res. to HSCA Req. 8.15.78 03203]

A handwritten notation indicated OSWALD'S name was deleted from the Watch List on May 28, 1962, about two weeks before he returned to America. Why was OSWALD no longer of intelligence interest to HT LINGUAL? If OSWALD were a bona fide defector, he might have been recruited by the KGB in the USSR then sent back to America. Counter-Intelligence should have been interested in all the mail he sent to and received from the USSR after his return to the United States.

The CIA stated: "Signification of handwritten notations on cards in HT LINGUAL file. Card Two: On August 7, 1961 (Deleted) asked that OSWALD'S name be placed on the Watch List for the reason that OSWALD 'reportedly expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions.' On May 28, 1962 OSWALD’S name was removed from the Watch List."
The CIA stated it had only one general file on OSWALD however, "The single exception to the above statement concerns one HT LINGUAL document dated July 8, 1961 but discovered only on a review triggered by press publicity following the OSWALDS return to the U.S. in June 1962. The sensitivity of this intelligence precluded its inclusion in the OSWALD file in general circulation." [CIA 1634-1088]

**MARINA’S OSWALD’S WATCH LIST CARDS**

The HSCA found two HT LINGUAL index cards on Marina Oswald. They indicated her name was placed on the Watch List on November 26, 1963. It took a Presidential assassination to get her on the list. The first card contained the markings CI/Project/RE 12-451 and the second, a June 29, 1965 card, had the markings CI/Project/PH.

Edward Petty told this researcher:

> The Routing and Record Sheet is circulated to see if anyone might be interested in a particular document. It simply goes around the circle and comes back. The document is being shopped. You can't tell if a component had an interest, except that they passed it on. They could have copied it, but basically they would have retained it if they had an interest.

Agency officials who were questioned by the HSCA testified that the substance of the DOS October 31, 1959, cable was sufficiently important to warrant the opening of a 201 file. The Clandestine Service Handbook No. 43-1-1 CSHB 70-1-1 Chapter III, ANNEX B February 15, 1960 stated: "7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system." But because ANGLETON was secretly running OSWALD, CI/SIG did not request that Headquarters open an OSWALD dossier upon receipt of this significant information. Edward Petty was asked, "Could the quality of information trigger the opening of a 201 file?" He responded, "It wouldn't necessarily. You wouldn't immediately, necessarily open a 201 file, there might be a related file in which the document belongs. There may be a case file of some sort in which it belongs."

**THE EARLY OSWALD CIA ROUTING AND RECORD SHEETS**

The Routing And Record Sheet from the Office of Security that was attached to the first document on OSWALD generated by Richard E. Snyder after OSWALD defected in 1959 has not yet been declassified. We do not know if ANGLETON and CI/SIG ever received a copy but judging from the initials on the later ones you can bet your ass he did.
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FIL. (W. had originally asked me to pull together all refs on this man.)
Since then it has been determined that Betty Eggerter is interested in either holds the 201-299248 or has it restricted to her.

For 201-299248
Document # 104-10015-10041 is a one page record and routing sheet. It is from RID/RI/AN, CIA to CI/SIG/, CIA. It is dated 07/03/61.
Document # 104-10015-10042 is a one page record and routing sheet. It is dated 04/26/62. It is from RID, CIA to SR/CI, CIA.
The location of the original of next document on OSWALD was OS File 351-164 which was an article dated November 1, 1959, about OSWALD from *The Washington Post*. The location of the original of the next Foreign Service Dispatch on OSWALD dated November 2, 1959, was in Richard Snyder's 201-file. A telex regarding John Pic, and two newspaper clippings, were added to the OS file on OSWALD in 1959. In May 1960 the OS and CI/SIG both created a Biographic Summary on OSWALD. The original of a FBI document dated May 12, 1960, on OSWALD was found in 74-500.
All totaled, the Location of Originals broke down this way when examined after the Kennedy assassination: Office of Security: 9 OSWALD Files. CI/SIG: 10 OSWALD Files. OSWALD’S 201 File: 12 OSWALD Files. In 1993 the CIA released a list of the original location of OSWALD documents. Of the documents received prior to the opening of OSWALD’S 201 file, six were found in the CIA's Office of Security file 351-164; four in CI/SIG; three in CI/SIG but were "Rec'd December 6, 1963”; one in CI/LSN [Jane Atherton Roman Counter-Intelligence liaison]; one in 201-289,248 (OSWALD’S 201-file); one in file 74-500; one in the DDP files and one, received by the CIA on November 3, 1959, in file number 201-074,8009 (Richard E. Snyder's 201 file).

The CIA released a "List of Items in OSWALD'S 201 File which predate its opening." No CIA originated documents on OSWALD were located aside from cover sheets. [NARA 1993.06.19.08:48:00:12000 4.13.64]

**CIA TOLD HSCA THE ROUTING SHEETS WERE DESTROYED**

The HSCA requested that the CIA indicate where documents about OSWALD had been internally disseminated and stored prior to the opening of his 201 file on December 9, 1960. It was advised: "Because document dissemination records of relatively low national security significance are retained for only a five year period, they were no longer in existence for the years 1959 to 1963. Consequently, the Agency was unable to explain either when these documents had been received, or by which component." [HSCA R p200]

In 1992 it was discovered that the CIA had lied to the HSCA. Most of the document dissemination records did exist - including some of those that were generated prior to the opening of OSWALD’S 201 file. When HSCA Chief Counsel Robert Blakey was questioned about the Routing and Record Sheets by this researcher in 1993 he responded, "You are talking about something 15 years ago and I don't have a specific memory on that one way or the other. We did the best we could to prove that OSWALD was Agency-connected in some fashion but we were unable to do so - I don't think he was."

Paul Garbler, the CIA HSCA liaison, was asked about this by this researcher: "From the very start it became our task to tell the HSCA that CIA was not involved in the Kennedy assassination. In the course of this, a lot of information that we gave them became distorted out of the HSCA Staff's sense of bias. They came to the case with bias, and that bias persisted. The [Routing and Record Sheets] were merely a record of what happened to documents. And CIA claimed at that time they had been destroyed?"

The CIA denied to the HSCA that the CIA's document dissemination records on OSWALD existed and the CIA is still withholding some dissemination records because one of them indicates that the document on OSWALD which mentioned his threat to divulge classified information to the Soviets was *not* retained by CI/SIG. ANGLETON
kept as far away from OSWALD as possible, so his complicity has to be explained in terms of what he didn't do, rather than what he did. When these OSWALD documents circulated, ANGLETON kept his own initials off them, just as he kept his name off all Warren Commission documents. But the initials of his subordinates Scott Miler and Elizabeth Ann Egerter appeared on them. All pre-201 (December 1960) CIA-generated documents on OSWALD were either never generated, or destroyed.

WHO ELSE KNEW ABOUT OSWALD AND ANGLETON?

Evidence suggested that although ANGLETON did not reveal the nature of OSWALD’S mission to his colleagues in the CIA, the name of ANGLETON’S defector, LEE OSWALD, was known to certain key personnel the Office of Security, and to some members of CI/SIG. Just ANGLETON and perhaps one or two trusted associates who were in key positions in the CIA knew that ANGLETON had made contact with OSWALD through HEMMING and that OSWALD was in the Soviet Union at ANGLETON’S request.

JAMES AND ELSIE WILCOTT

Two former CIA employees claimed that OSWALD was an official CIA operation and was on the CIA’s payroll. James and Elsie Wilcott were recruited by the CIA as a husband and wife team in the late 1950’s, shortly after their marriage. Their first tour of duty was in Japan (1960 to 1964) where they worked under Chief of Station William V. Broe, after which they returned to Washington, D.C. Elsie Wilcott worked as a secretary in the Soviet Bloc Division, James Wilcott as a finance officer.

WILCOTT’S STORY

November 24, 1963, was when I first heard about the CIA somehow being involved. Not long before going off duty, talk about OSWALD’S connection with CIA was making the rounds. While this kind of talk was a jolt to me, I didn’t really take it seriously then. Very heavy talk continued up to about the middle of January. Based solely on what I heard at the Tokyo Station, I became convinced the following scenario is true: CIA people killed Kennedy. Either it was an outright project of Headquarters with the approval of McCone, or it was done outside, perhaps under the direction of Dulles and Bissell. OSWALD was recruited from the military for the express purpose of becoming a double agent assignment to the USSR. It was said they had some kind of special handle on him. Perhaps, went the speculation, they had discovered that he had murdered someone or committed some other serious crime, during a routine lie detector test. In any case it was a very risky assignment. CIA taught him Russian and it was said he had been to the farm (CIA’s agent training camp, Camp Peary, Virginia) although probably not in one of the regular agent training programs. He may not have even known he had been there. (That was often done with special cases. They would be put to sleep and wake up in
a strange place and be told that it was some other place than the farm). Although they said that he knew he was working for CIA, he was kept rigidly compartmented from any of the normal contacts that a regular CIA employee would have. The operational people that I knew never admitted they were working on the project, although some hinted at it. Jerry Fox, a SR agent who purchased Soviet information, may have been one of them. The Deputy Chief of SR (first name was Dave, I've forgotten his last name) may also have been one too. More than once I was told something like 'so and so was working on the OSWALD Project back in the late 1950's.'

When OSWALD returned from the USSR in June of 1962, either on his way back, or after he got back, he was brought back to Japan to either Atsugi or Yokosuka for debriefing, it was assumed. At one point, soon after RUBY shot OSWALD, I was talking with someone, I can't recall who for sure, and I expressed disbelief about OSWALD being a CIA project. I was told something like this: 'Well James, OSWALD drew an advance some time in the past from you or for that project under such and such a cryptonym.' It was a familiar cryptonym at the time, which I have since forgotten, as well as the time that the advance of the funds was drawn...At first I thought these guys were nuts, but then a man I knew and had worked with before showed up to take a disbursement and told me OSWALD was a CIA employee. I didn't believe him until he told me the cryptonym under which OSWALD had drawn funds when he returned from Russia to the U.S.A.

James Wilcott said he was not privy to the type of project involved, since "project funds were disbursed on a code basis; as a disbursement officer, he would not have been apprised of the substantive aspects of the project." [NYT 3.27.78; WR p256; East Bay Tribune 9.18.78 pB13; San Francisco Chronicle 9.12.78; statement of James Wilcott with attach. ARA doc.]

WILCOTT DEFECTS

By November 1964, James Wilcott had established relationships with American civil rights activists:

August 31, 1965
TO: Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security
FROM: Deputy Chief, Personnel Security Division
SUBJECT: Wilcott, James Bernard Jr. #109 301

1. Tab B presents the results of an interview of the Subject conducted at Miami, Florida, and Tab C directs that certain checks be accomplished prior to the polygraph of the Subject.
2. The FBI has furnished extensive information concerning Ray Robinson, Jr., James Monsonis (Monsonus) and Reta Betty Rotondi.

3. Monsonis and his wife, Lenore Gensburg Monsonis, have participated in racial picketing and James Monsonis is President of the National Student Christian Federation. James Monsonis in December 1964, according to the FBI, was the Director of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, Washington, D.C. and several well known CP members were connected with SNICK or visited SNICK in December 1964.

4. The FBI furnished a copy of an investigation concerning Reta Betty Rotondi conducted in October 1964 and revealed that an informant revealed that Betty Rotondi is self-identified as a CP member in June 1964 and in August 1964 as one of two CP members who worked in CORE as Task Force leader. Informant made available information indicating Betty Rotondi accepted in Queens County CP Club in February 1946 and from 1948 to and including 1954. Betty Rotondi's CP associates were set forth.

5. Ray Robinson Jr. - participated in the Quebec-Washington-Guantanamo Walk for Peace sponsored by the Committee for Non-Violent Action and on November 19, 1963 was arrested by the police at Macon, Georgia for distributing literature against city ordinances. Ray Robinson has an extensive arrest record dating back to 1954, which included assault with a deadly weapon, intoxication, possession of narcotics, armed robbery etc.

6. Concerning Alex Passikloff, the FBI indicated they have no identifiable information pertinent to our inquiry.

7. In compliance with paragraph 2 of Reference C, a written report concerning Subject's arrest in November 1964 in Washington, D.C. indicated that the Subject and one Ray Robinson Jr. were arrested for being drunk. The arresting officer advised that Subject and Robinson were arrested for drunkenness and were also disorderly, but were not so charged. Subject and Robinson, according to the arresting officer, were very intoxicated and fighting among themselves.

8. Relative to paragraph 3 of Reference C, the New York Field office of IOS furnished information that Alexander Passikloff has been known to them since 1938. Passikloff has an extensive police record and in 1963 was arrested three times in connection with anti-segregation (pro-integration) protest demonstrations. There were indications of possible CP membership and/or affiliation of Passiklof. Information indicates that Passiklof in 1950 reportedly told somebody that he had been expelled
from the CP. Passikloff, in 1963, participated in sit-ins sponsored by CORE on at least three separate occasions in New York City.

9. In addition Passikloff was arrested on August 5, 1964 in Jersey City, New Jersey during the course of a race riot. He was charged with disorderly conduct and possession of a knife. It was also indicated that Passikloff had been treated at the Creedmore State Hospital for a mental disorder.

10. The New York City Police Department contained no record of Joseph or Betty Rotondi.

11. Concerning Blyden Brown Jackson, the New York Police Department indicates that Byden Brown Jackson is Chairman of the East River chapter of CORE. Jackson has a police record dating from 1958, his last arrest was on April 22, 1964 for disorderly conduct and resisting an arrest. Jackson has participated in racial demonstrations and sit-ins and in April of 1964 is listed among a group of individuals furnished by the U.S. Secret Service regarding security escort to the President of the United States.

12. Jackson was arrested by the New York City Police Department on January 11, 1965 and charged with felonious assault and Jackson is known to the psychiatric division of Bellevue Hospital in New York.

13. It is recommended that Subject be polygraphed concerning his association with the above individuals. It is recommended that coordination be effected with Jerry Mullane, Security Officer, WH Division, who is aware of this case to have Subject report to Headquarters for polygraph examination or arrange to have the Subject polygraphed in Miami, Florida, which ever is convenient.

14. It is further recommended that this polygraph examination be administered as soon as possible. Leland E. Bunn.

James Wilcott resigned in April 1966, after nine years of CIA employment. He became friendly with CIA defector Philip Agee and broke his secrecy agreement with the Agency in 1968. In 1978 James Wilcott testified at a CIA tribunal in Havana, then testified before the HSCA. Elsie Wilcott agreed with her husband: "Right after the President was killed, people in the Tokyo Station were talking openly about OSWALD having gone to Russia for the CIA. Everyone was wondering how the Agency was going to be able to keep the lid on OSWALD. But I guess they did." Elsie Wilcott never testified before the HSCA.

THE HSCA & WILCOTT

The HSCA concluded that, "Based on all the evidence, James Wilcott's allegation was not worthy of belief." [HSCA R p200] The Committee based its conclusion on interviews
with CIA personnel, including one who was named as a participant in one of these conversations. This CIA person told the HSCA he was transferred from the Tokyo CIA Station to the United States in 1962, so that he could not possibly have had the conversation with Wilcott. His CIA employment records substantiated this. The HSCA interviewed everyone who had served at the Tokyo CIA Station during this period. Not one had any recollection that such conversation ever took place.

Wilcott had this information in November 1963. He underwent a transformation to a radical in August 1965. He left the CIA in April 1966. He came forward with his charges in 1978. What took him so long? It was not common knowledge at the CIA that OSWALD was a CIA Operation. Only ANGLETON and a few of his associates were aware of OSWALD'S true status. Most CIA personnel probably thought OSWALD was a tool of the Cubans and Soviets. Wilcott stated that OSWALD had drawn funds when he returned from Russia to the U.S.A. This was unlikely. The Wilcotts were propagandists. They floated a false new story against the CIA, for whatever their reasons.

CI/SIG: SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP

As stated, the CIA component charged with investigating defectors like OSWALD was CI/SIG and was run by JAMES ANGLETON. It was hidden within the Counter-Intelligence Branch. According to the CIA, CI/SIG - the Special Investigations Group or Unit - handled the more important CIA investigations. The word "special" generally meant Secret. For example, the Special Operations Division of the OSS, the CIA's Special Operations Group in Vietnam and the New York City Police Department's Bureau of Special Services. [Powers, Secrets p401]

CI/SIG'S CHARTER

The CIA stated that CI/SIG was "a small staff usually charged with investigation and analysis of the most important security cases..In connection with reference request for information concerning a charter pertaining to the CI/SIG unit within the Directorate of Operations the following information is provided.

A. The only available information concerning a charter for the Special Investigations Unit (later referred to as Special Investigations Group) is contained in CSI 70-1 (tentative) dated March 2, 1955. A Xerox copy of the pertinent portions are attached.

B. The above mentioned Clandestine Services Notice officially established the Counter-Intelligence Staff, and as part of it, CI/SIG. CI/SIG was abolished in the 1973 reorganization of the Counter-Intelligence Staff but the reasons for it are not recorded.

C. To the best of our knowledge there is no record of the existence of any operational plans pertaining to CI/SIG. [CIA 1993 o4199 CI 260-78 for PCS/LOC Norbert
CSI 70-1 stated: "Special Intelligence Unit performs the Counter-Intelligence investigation and analysis of any known or potential security leak in the Clandestine Services organization, whether in headquarters or in the field, from the standpoint of its effect on existing operations, and the cover of personnel. In performing this function, maintains close working relations with the Office of Security, the latter being primarily concerned in such cases from Agency security rather than an operational security standpoint." A chart attached to this document indicated CI/SIG was directly responsible to ANGLETON.

ANGLETON told the HSCA:

I set [CI/SIG] up in 1954 so that no one in the Counter-Intelligence [Staff]...would ever have access to anybody's [CIA] security file. I chose an individual [Birch O'Neal] who had been ex-FBI...as the man to run that component...In the event there was an allegation about an employee, he could review the entire file [with the CIA Office of Security which]...has sole possession of security files and is responsible for the security clearance of personnel.

ANGLETON added that CI/SIG kept lists of defectors to the United States and managed sensitive cases involving Americans which were not being handled by any other U.S. Government department. He said these functions were deliberately referred to only in "fairly camouflaged terms" and were "very much fuzzed over," even within the CIA, in order to preserve the Unit's secrecy. [HSCA ANGLETON Deposition cited in Cold Warrior by Mangold; Ang. Rock. Comm. test. also w/h]

ANGLETON biographer Tom Mangold wrote:

The most secret component of ANGLETON'S empire was a short distance down the hallway to the left of his office. Little is known of it to this day. Formally designated as the Special Investigation Group - or CI/SIG - it was a small elite unit consisting of eight of ANGLETON'S most trusted and closed mouth people. The unit included a chief, deputy, two officers and a small support staff of assistants and secretaries. ANGLETON had set up CI/SIG shortly after he became Counter-Intelligence Chief in order to investigate the possibilities that the CIA itself might have been penetrated by the KGB...The CI/SIG was so secret that many members of the Counter-Intelligence Staff didn't even know it existed, and nearly everyone was denied access to it. Over the years, as the unit grew in importance, its true function became increasingly obscured, until only a handful of insiders actually understood its work. It was effectively removed from all peer or executive supervision. Secret units within a Secret unit were a hallmark of ANGLETON, the CI/SIG and the Counter-Intelligence staff.
Unsurprisingly, internal conflict grew, and by the late 1950’s resentment of the Counter-Intelligence’s staff supervisory role - as secret policemen over its own agency colleagues - was mounting.

CI/SIG PERSONNEL
CLARE EDWARD PETTY

Clare Edward Petty was born in Oklahoma December 2, 1920; from 1943 to 1946 he was an artillery officer and was in military government in Germany. He joined the CIA in 1947 and worked with the Reinhardt Gehlen organization of former Nazi Army General Staff Officers for eight years. Edward Petty stated: "It was determined at Nuremberg these men were never Nazi party members. They opposed the party. Gehlen had the files on the Soviet Order of Battle. We needed it." Petty joined CI/SIG in 1966.

Edward Petty recounted:

CI/SIG had to do with other things besides the so-called mole hunt that was instigated by ANGLETON and Golitsyn. There were a number of very sensitive things which ANGLETON would just automatically send to CI/SIG, and OSWALD was one of them. Those records were undoubtedly pulled out of other files, they didn't actually originate in CI/SIG, CI/SIG simply had the authority, capability and regularly pulled files from everywhere. CI/SIG would keep the papers on it [American defectors] and if there was something they could do about it they would, as you say, handle it. It was basically an office of record of such things, it was not an action office. Memoranda were routed to other agencies which would be generally signed by ANGLETON. CI/SIG did not carry on active investigations or operations, it was an analysis group. It had a paper sort of analysis capability. They absolutely did not run operations. They had access to all the documents, and that was the critical point where things were put together to determine, for example, a possible penetration involving CIA personnel, in which case you would go immediately to the Office of Security, and begin to cooperate on investigations. In the case of OSWALD, the chances would be extremely high that if CIA had anything to say about OSWALD, having checked CIA files, they would have said it to the FBI and that would be the end of it. CI/SIG carried on operational security type correspondence with the FBI. That was the point of liaison for that type of material. So anything that had to do with that sort of thing would go into CI/SIG files. We gauged the security problems in various Agencies. After all, things like that were usually not isolated. You have to look for connections between various things. Like the National Security Administration defectors, Martin & Mitchell, that bears upon security overall. There was a file on them in CI/SIG.

I have to tell you, I don't actually remember the OSWALD file, I would have thought that I had read all such files but I don't remember it. I don't
remember an OSWALD file in CI/SIG [in 1966]. In CI/SIG we had a very large three-room vault that was filled with such material which did not necessarily indicate that action was being taken. They keep paper on those things so they can watch the overall picture. In counter-intelligence, what you need is continuity and a totality of access. This was just part of the totality of their access. It doesn't mean they did anything about it necessarily. If action was taken, it was likely to have been simply correspondence with another component passing information or asking for information. I consider myself to be very well-informed on all of that material that was in CI/SIG. There would have been no analysis unless it seemed to tie to something else. After all OSWALD sat in the base in which the U-2 flew into and out of Japan...I say that based on everything I know about CI/SIG and everything I know about the OSWALD business and subsequently in relation to [KGB "defector"] Yuri Nosenko. The kind of organization that CI/SIG was, there were so few people there, we could not have possibly been running such operations...The absolute top [of CI/SIG] was eight people and that would be secretaries and everything...

CIA STAFFER PAUL GARBLER

You know what CI/SIG was? Find the mole. That's all they had to do. I have no idea what they were doing with files on OSWALD. You opened this conversation by talking about a relationship between OSWALD and ANGLETON. I totally unaware that there ever was one. I am unaware that CI/SIG ever had anything to do with OSWALD at all. I could see that ANGLETON would have retained for his custody only some kind of OSWALD file. I am unaware of which kind. I am not making an apologia, I am not trying to defend the CIA here. I merely telling you what I know, and what I do not know. I never knew that CI/SIG had any concern about OSWALD at all. CI/SIG was devoted, in my memory, to find the mole."

Edward Petty commented, "I can see why somebody from the outside would say that. In very, very rough terms I suppose you can say that's true, although I never used to work moles." It was suggested that ANGLETON may have been watching OSWALD because he thought he had become a double-agent. Garbler: "A lot of paranoia existed back then. There is no question about that. CI/SIG found me to be guilty, before they had any evidence, as a mole."
WILLIAM HOOD

William Hood was born in Maine on April 19, 1920. He was a former newspaper correspondent and OSS officer. While in the OSS Station in London during World War II hood took part in an intelligence operation called Ultra that outwitted an enciphering machine the Germans thought was invulnerable: the legendary Enigma. “We broke the code,” Mr. Hood explained. The Germans were using it to disguise wireless telegrams and other communications about everything from the movement of battalions to supply shortages and power outages. Ultra enabled the Allies to intercept, for example, messages to and from U-Boats during the Battle of the Atlantic. “Without it we might not have won the war,” Mr. Hood said. “In 1941 and 1942 in England there was some question about who was going to win it.” Because the Germans were unaware that their security had been breached, “it was a deep, deep secret,” Mr. Hood said. He was cleared to read the intercepted messages, but first had to sign an oath vowing never to “put myself in a position to be captured.” That sounded reasonable, he said to another man who was also signing. “He said, ‘Well, you’re supposed to do this.’” Mr. Hood pointed a finger to his temple and pulled an invisible trigger. In the CIA, William Hood was stationed in Vienna, (February 1951 to January 1955), Munich (Economic Office, August 1957), Berlin (Political Office, December 1959 to March 1960), and Washington (November 1962 to April 1964). William Hood joined the Counter-Intelligence Staff in 1973. William Hood said it was much later than 1973.

NEWTON S. MILER

Newton S. Miler, the son of a meat packer, was born in Mason City, Iowa on March 1, 1926. He was an analyst in the Navy in 1946. Newton S. Miler joined the CIA in 1947 and worked as a Case Officer in Japan and in the Philippines. He was a research analyst from 1949 to 1956. In 1956 he was in Thailand as an employee of the International Cooperation Administration, training police. He was listed as a Department of the Army area analyst in 1958. [1969 State Department Biographic Register] From May 1958 to June 1961 Newton S. Miler was in Washington where he was on the Counter-Intelligence Staff, dealing with Soviet counter-intelligence. In July 1961 he became CIA Chief of Station in Addis Ababa and in 1964 he joined CI/SIG. He was Counter-Intelligence Deputy Chief and at the same time had the responsibility for CI/SIG. Newton S. Miler stated: "The main thing we were doing was the search for penetrations. That was the primary thing..." [Wise, Molehunt, p27, Mangold, Cold Warrior]

THE MOLE HUNT

The hunt for Soviet spies within the CIA started after Kim Philby was forced to resign as British Security Service Director in 1951. In 1963 Kim Philby defected to the USSR. In
1964 the HONETOL Committee was formed to look into the mole question. It was in existence from November 1964 to April 1965, and consisted of ANGLETON, Newton S. Miler and Bruce Solie from the CIA's Office of Security, FBI domestic intelligence chief William C. Sullivan, FBI CIA liaison Sam Papich and two others. About six members of CI/SIG worked on HONETOL, including Edward Petty. Author David Wise reported other CIA officers assigned to HONETOL included Jean M. Evans, who had worked with Reinhardt Gehlen, Albert P. Kergel, John D. Walker (former Chief of Station in Israel), Charles Arnold and William F. Potocki (a former subordinate of William K. Harvey). CIA Soviet Bloc Division officers Tennent Bagley and David Murphy were the targets of this mole hunt. Both were found innocent of being moles.

PETTY: ANGLETON WAS THE MOLE

When William Colby became Director/Counter-Intelligence on May 10, 1973, he was the recipient of a report prepared by Clare Edward Petty which stated ANGLETON was the KGB mole in the CIA. Edward Petty's report suggested that ANGLETON had studied under, and been too close to, Kim Philby; had spread disinformation when he suggested the Sino/Soviet split had been contrived; and had trusted Anatoliy Golitsyn. Edward Petty suggested ANGLETON demoralized the CIA: "ANGLETON put forth the proposition that the KGB was so totally superior, and so all-knowing, that anything CIA or any of the other allied intelligence services tried to do was negated from the word go. The operational side was totally frustrated over a period of years. ANGLETON propounded the proposition that operations against the Soviets were doomed to failure." To William Colby, Edward Petty's report was a product of "the ultra-conspiratorial turn of mind" which he disliked in ANGLETON.

WILLIAM EGAN COLBY

During World War II, William Colby (born January 4, 1920), was a Jedburgh who parachuted into German-occupied Europe more than once. After the war, he was Chief of Station in Rome. Between 1965 and 1972 Colby served in South Vietnam. During much of this period he was director of OPERATION PHOENIX, an effort to identify, imprison or recruit Vietcong members in South Vietnam. Some 20,587 Vietcong
"suspects" were killed during OPERATION PHOENIX. Colby later told a House Committee there had been some "illegal killing" but he argued that he worked to halt such abuse. In the picture on the right he was the recipient of a pie thrown by my research assistant Aron Morton Kay.

THE DEFECTOR STUDY

The HSCA conducted a defector study to ascertain if OSWALD'S defection was suspicious. The Committee: "To determine which individuals the Committee would study, a letter was sent to the CIA requesting the names of persons who defected to the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1964." The CIA "provided a list of the names and variations of the names of 380 Americans who were in the USSR during that time period," entitled, "U.S. Persons Who Have or May Have Defected to the USSR Between 1958 and 1963." This list included the names of Communist Party members who made frequent trips to the Soviet Union or were there on official Party business, like Henry Winston. Winston could not be termed a defector. The names of emigrants were included in this list. Some had been in the Soviet Union for over 20 years. The CIA:

This listing represented U.S. persons, including some non-U.S. citizens, who owed some measure of allegiance to the United States, who had either defected or shown some interest in defecting." [HSCA V12 p404] The HSCA requested the CIA provide more information so that it could select, for a detailed analysis, those defectors who were most similar to OSWALD. The CIA provided a second list which was "a computer listing of the name, 201 file number, date and place of birth, and a compilation of information derived from the 201 file, as well as citations for various other Government agency reports.

No HSCA investigators visited CIA headquarters and went through defector files there. Instead, the CIA gave the HSCA some of the files the Committee requested, "the vast majority of which" were in undeleted form. The HSCA conceded there was not always "an independent means of verifying that all materials requested from the Agency had, in fact, been provided. Accordingly, any finding that is essentially negative in nature - such as that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was neither associated with the CIA in any way, nor ever in contact with that institution - should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of oversight." [HSCA R 197] From the second defector list, the HSCA eliminated those who had:

(A) Been born outside the United States.

(B) Gone to the USSR some time other than the 1958 to 1962 time period.

(C) Remained outside the United States until 1964."

The HSCA focused on the files of 23 defectors from the original list of 380. The Committee then examined the request dated October 25, 1960, from
the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research on 13 individuals whom it considered defectors. That list included the following:

(A) OSWALD.

(B) Seven individuals whose files the committee had decided to examine under the previous criteria: Mollie Block; Morris Block; Bruce Frederick Davis; William H. Martin; Bernon F. Mitchell; Libero Ricciardelli; Robert Edward Webster.

C. Two individuals whose names appeared on the computer listing but had been excluded since they were not born within the United States [Joseph Dutkanicz and Vladimir Sloboda]

(D) Three individuals who had not previously been known to the committee as defectors: David DuBois; (FNU) Sergeant Jones; Sergeant Ernie Fletcher.

When the CIA responded to the October 25, 1960 request of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, two additional names were added to the original list of twelve defectors - Maurice Halperin and Virginia Coe. The HSCA had already selected Maurice Halperin from the computer list of 380 names, but had no knowledge of Virginia Coe.

MAURICE HALPERIN

Maurice Halperin (born March 3, 1936) was a specialist in Latin American affairs employed by the OSS during World War II. In the summer of 1967 Maurice Halperin assisted Soviet agents Martha Dodd Stern and her husband Alfred Kaufman Stern to secretly travel from Mexico to Czechoslovakia. Maurice Halperin traveled to the USSR shortly after the departure of the Sterns from Mexico; he was employed by the Soviet Government as a Latin American specialist and has "periodically renewed his American passport." This information on Maurice Halperin was compiled by JAMES ANGLETON. [CIA CSCI-316/01206-67] Halperin was named as a Communist spy by Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr.

The Committee requested all CIA 201 files on the 23 individuals from the computer list. It requested files on Joseph Dutkanicz, Vladimir Sloboda, Jones, David DuBois and Ernie Fletcher, since their names appeared on the State Department defector list. Finally, it asked for the file on Virginia Coe.

Out of the 29 individuals whose files were the subject of this request, five were immediately dropped. The CIA could not identify Jones (an Air Force Intelligence document existed about his defection); David DuBois and Virginia Coe had defected to China, not the Soviet Union; and the Martin & Mitchell file was too sensitive and could not be presented to the HSCA. Now the list was down to 24, on whom the Committee
asked other Government Agencies to provide selected information. After this analysis, thirteen more defectors were eliminated: 5 for lack of substantive information; 5 for being Communist Party members who made frequent trips to the Soviet Union, or for residing outside the United States for an extended period of time before entering the Soviet Union; and three for remaining in the Soviet Union for over 20 years. The HSCA: "Thus, the defector study was reduced to 11 individuals, two of whom were married." Actually, three of the defectors were married. These three couples could logically have been eliminated from the study because OSWALD was single when he defected.

Anyone who defected to the Soviet Union at the height on the Cold War, and wasn't a hard core Communist ideologue, had to be a little crazy. Many of the defectors were just that.

THE BLOCKS

Morris Block (born March 30, 1920) attended the 1957 Sixth World Youth Festival in the Soviet Union. After the conference, he traveled to Communist China, prompting the State Department to impound his passport for misuse. He tried to defect to the Soviet Union with a falsified passport in 1958. In 1959 Morris Block, his wife Mollie, (born November 6, 1912) and his child defected to Poland. They were transferred to Moscow, where they applied for visas to China. The Soviets suggested the Blocks accept Soviet asylum in September 1959, and later issued them Soviet internal passports for foreigners. They were sent to Leningrad. There, Morris Block had an affair with his Russian-language teacher, and his family left him and moved to Moscow where his daughter was hospitalized for a nervous disorder. After the Blocks were reunited, they decided to re-defect; however, their applications for Soviet exit visas were refused. Morris Block disconnected a loudspeaker broadcasting propaganda at his place of work. Molly Block granted an anti-Soviet interview to The New York Times. Finally, the Blocks were expelled from the USSR.

LIBERO RICCIARDELLI

Libero Ricciardelli decided that exposing his three children to a Communist system of government could straighten out his domestic problems. In February 1959 he defected, contracted influenza, and was granted Soviet citizenship after he denounced the United States. By June 1963, the Ricciardelli family returned to the United States.

HAROLD CITRYNELL

Harold Citrynell (born March 10, 1923) entered the Soviet Union with his wife and child on February 27, 1958. He was granted Soviet citizenship and remained in the Soviet Union until June 29, 1959. The FBI: "Subject was born in the U.S. in 1923 and served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945. He graduated from the College of the City of New York with a degree in mechanical engineering and held many jobs in that field between 1950 and 1958. In February 1958 he took his wife and infant daughter to Russia and attempted to obtain Soviet citizenship...he returned to the U.S. in July 1959. His wife
divorced him in 1962 and after holding several jobs in the U.S. he traveled to England and then to Bulgaria in 1964. After working for one month in Bulgaria he went on strike and refused to work. He had numerous difficulties in that country and eventually returned to the U.S. in 1965 and it appears that he is *emotionally disturbed* and suffers from a persecution complex." [From Legat London (163-2201) Director (165-70603) 8.12.67] That brought the number of relevant defectors down to eight. Two of these should have been excluded because they fit the not native-born American criterion, although their names appeared on the State Department list.

**VLADIMIR SLOBODA**

Vladimir Sloboda, a native of the Ukraine, was sent to Germany as a forced laborer during World War II. He enlisted in the United States Army in Germany in 1953. He became a United States citizen in 1958. After basic training in the United States, Sloboda was assigned in August 1958 to an Army Intelligence Group in Europe. He defected to East Germany in August 1960 requesting Soviet asylum. Vladimir Sloboda's CIA 201 file reflected that the "fact of Army countermeasures caused by the arrest of 154 MID [East German Military Intelligence] agents recently" was responsible for his defection.

Lee H. Wigren C/SR/Cl/R wrote:

> Our conclusion that Sloboda was in prior connection with the KGB turned on the facts that: Sloboda's prior KGB involvement was confirmed by (deleted) VISION as reported in YT-1192. See attached memo of March 28, 1962 in regard to passage of this information to Army. Further indications are the the facts that Sloboda was a KGB resettlement case in January 1962 and that he later told an American Embassy Moscow official that he had been blackmailed and framed in going to the USSR (It is our assumption that he made the same statements to the Army debriefers who spoke with him in early 1962. The Sloboda defection was participated by increased Army security measures, according to (deleted) VISION in January 1962.

Counter-Intelligence Staff member Newton S. Miler (Cl/OG/SOV) prepared a report on Vladimir Sloboda on October 12, 1960. On April 25, 1969, the CIA reported:

The Office of Security file of (deleted 06 as of 2010) reflects that on November 20, 1960, (deleted 06 as of 2010), an employee of the Joint Overt Interrogation Center Berlin received a telephone call from an English speaking male identifying himself as 'your friend Vladimir.' The caller asked (deleted 06 as of 2010) if he had been to his mailbox yet, and when (deleted 06 as of 2010) answered in the negative, the caller said there was a letter in the box and he suggested that (deleted 06 as of 2010) pick it up. The caller added that (deleted 06 as of 2010) should not
worry about the letter since it had been placed in the box by a secure means. (Deleted as of 2010) retrieved the letter, which was postmark November 20, 1960, read it and immediately called his chief Lt. Col Gordon.

The text of the recruitment letter read:

Dear Mr. Deleted. Don't be surprised at his way of contacting you and don't take rash action before considering the contents. After watching and studying your life and activities for some time in the United States, Austria (Vienna), in Zone (Ulm) and here in West Berlin we have concluded we might be of service to each other. From different sources we have come to know many details of your official and private life and we are aware that your present position gives you small chance for promotion, and we are aware of the financial hardships you must face. These difficulties could be much greater if we did not think of sending you this letter. Being aware of your slips and blunders in work we have not made any moves which could undermine your reputation with Col. Ross (Berlin) and Major Huey (Oberusel). It is believed you could draw the right conclusion from out attitude. It is enough to mention that we were able to learn much from the documents in March 1959 in Frankfurt Am Main when you were driving a hired car. Through your slips in handling your sources Wolfgang and Dieter, in whose path we put no obstacles, many things became known to us. The same is to be said about the sources you ran in Vienna under the cover name Porter. By so doing, we hoped to come to an agreement with you at a suitable time on mutually profitable terms. We could continue to relate information regarding your activities and work of your office known to us because of your mistakes, but this would be pointless. We offer you a business-like cooperation on terms profitable to both sides. There is no need to describe what we are. It must be clear to you. Since you are a man of reason and sound logic you must understand that cooperation will give you a chance to overcome financial difficulties and make savings for the future. Also, we could create conditions which would aid the growth of your prestige at your office and in turn help you get a better job on your return to the United States. If agreement is reached we will immediately provide you with a substantial sum to settle your affairs and guarantee you monthly pay in the future, higher than your salary, as long as you stay in contact. If you agree to our proposal, come to the democratic sector of Berlin for future talks. On November 20, 1960, from 1930 to 2000 hours arrive at the U-Bahn Station in Warchauerbruecks. A representative of our organization, Vladimir, will meet you at the flower shop at the entrance to the station...It goes without saying that if during talks we can't reach mutual agreement, that we will still guarantee you absolute security and safety. You face no danger during the talks. If we do not hear from you by December 1, 1960 we shall consider ourselves free to act. To assure you this letter is not a trap laid by your security service, we shall broadcast on
Soviet Forces Volga Network an old waltz tune on November 20, 1960, at 1310. If this is not convincing, write us in advance what other piece of Russian music you would like to hear and when you would like to hear it. Write to Herr Gruneat, Berlin, Lichtenberg 1, Postschliessfach 34. When writing we recommend you do not sign the letter, using any fictitious return address you like...We would like to warn you that it would be a mistake on your part to show this letter to your chiefs, because in the long run this will only harm you. We know there is an instruction from Washington which deals with such cases and that is kept at the Security Section of Lt. Col. McCord's office. We do not like to resort to threats, and in principle blackmail runs counter to our working methods, but you must realize we may be forced to resort to certain measures, not to compromise you, but to stop your activities against us. So you have ample chance to get everything you are striving for. For this you must have courage and resourcefulness.

BOB was of the opinion "that the Russian Intelligence Service was attempting to suggest that Vladimir Sloboda (MIG defector in August 1960) was being used in this approach." [CIA AC/FIOB/SRS Jerry G. Brown 4.25.69] Vladimir Sloboda had engaged in discussion with (deleted) regarding "Wolfgang and Dieter" who were assets. Vladimir Sloboda was clearly a spy seeking asylum, not an American defecting. The Russians quoted Vladimir Sloboda as saying that he defected because of his revulsion to the U-2 flights. He never returned to the United States. On March 23, 1962 ANGLETON'S Deputy, James Hunt, Deputy Chief, Counter-Intelligence, was consulted about questioning Mrs. Lilian Sloboda by (deleted) SR/CI/RED. [NARA 1993.06.18.17:30:46:900000 dated 3.28.62]

In 1965 the CIA prepared a report on Vladimir Sloboda, much of which is still withheld as of 2010.

SLOBODA's KNOWLEDGE OF CIA PERSONNEL

8. (Deleted of 2010) CIA staff employee (Deleted of 2010) stated in October 1960, that as early as March 1960 SLOBODA knew him by his true name. (Deleted as of 2010) saw SLOBODA about three times in the latter's office concerning the acquisition of basic intelligence materials such as East German telephone books, city plans etc. (Deleted of 2010) questioned other CIA employees concerning their knowledge of Sloboda. None had any personal contact with him but all felt they had seen him at the (Deleted of 2010) coffee bar. (Deleted of 2010) thought it conceivable that Sloboda could have learned the true name of CIA employees.

POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT BY SLOBODA
The following information was extracted from U.S. Army Counter-intelligence Summary dated 15 February 1961 concerning two approach operations against USAREUR personnel by Soviet Intelligence Service (SIS) (deleted as of 2010)

It is not known whether Sloboda is affiliated with the Soviet Intelligence Services at this time. According to a December 19, 1962, Foreign Service Dispatch from the American Embassy, Moscow, (deleted as of 2010)."

[CIA Memo John F. Meredith to Chief/FIOB 9.30.65]

JOSEPH DUTKANICZ

Foreign-born Joseph Dutkanicz visited the Soviet Embassy, Washington, in 1952, made pro-Soviet statements, and listened to Radio Moscow. In 1954 the U.S. Army court-martialed Joseph Dutkanicz on charges of subversive activity. He was acquitted and allowed to continue his normal U.S. Army activities. In 1958, while he was stationed in Germany with the U.S. Army, he was approached and recruited by the KGB. A Western-bloc security investigation caused him to seek asylum in the USSR.

Joseph Dutkanicz defected to the Soviet Union in June 1960. JAMES ANGLETON commented: "Security investigations was immediate cause of defection. USAREUR Case Summary 2-62-2 indicated that DUTKANICZ told American Embassy, Moscow, official that he was under investigation for security reasons. He defected soon after, in accord with a KGB suggestion that he do so...A more significant indication of his KGB involvement before his defection is the fact that the special decree granting him Soviet citizenship was enacted three months before his arrival in the USSR." In 1962 Joseph Dutkanicz's wife, Lilian Dutkanicz recounted that after their arrival, Russian agents contacted her husband on a daily basis for a period of six months or more. After one year, her husband told her he wished to return to the United States and that she should tell the officials at the U.S. Embassy he had been blackmailed into collaborating with the Soviets. Joseph Dutkanicz's wife was allowed to leave the USSR. On November 15, 1963, Joseph Dutkanicz died in a hospital in Lvov, USSR. [FBI LHM 5.20.65 highly deleted no serial "Enclosure 105-189"]

Colonel Burke, an Army Counter-Intelligence officer informed Jane Roman that he suspected Joseph Dutkanicz had KGB connections only after his defection: "Dutkanicz had not been attached to the 513 MID but to a signal outfit in which his job was climbing telephone poles. The statement that both these men had prior KGB connections is not true. Army just suspected this to be the case after their defection. The statement that both men fled as the result of Army Security checks is not true. Both men were not under security check although the Army was taking an "informal look into" the activities of one of them." ANGLETON prepared a report on Joseph Dutkanicz's pre-defection KGB connections for the Department of the Army in connection with the Warren Commission report: "USAREUR Case summary 2-62-2 indicated that Dutkanicz himself told American Embassy officials in Moscow that he had been approached by KGB representatives in a bar near Darmstadt in 1958 and accepted recruitment as a result of
their threats and inducements. He claimed to have given them a minimum for cooperation from then until his defection, although the Army considered it probable that the had done more than he admitted." [CSCI-316/01779-64 dated 11.7.64 NARA 1993.06.18.56:10:93000]

Lee H. Wigren, Chief, Soviet Research, Counter-Intelligence Research, noted Joseph Dutkanicz's wife indicated her husband had connections with the Counter-Intelligence Corps: "She indicated that their trip behind the Iron Curtain 'had been made possible because her husband worked for the CIC and was allowed to do things the ordinary 'GI' could not do. There are also penciled notations in the 201 file suggesting that his Army assignment may have included intelligence functions of some kind." [NARA 1993.06.18.17:18:53:500000 - CIA 893-910] The file made a convincing argument for both defectors having prior contact with the KGB. This brought the number of relevant defectors down to six.

SHIRLEY DUBINSKY

In October 1961 Shirley Dubinsky (born March 11, 1925) wrote several letters to Premier Khrushchev asking for citizenship, then traveled to the Soviet Union, where her bizarre behavior caused her to be placed in a mental hospital. She returned to America in February 1963.

NICHOLAS PETRULLI

Nicholas Petrulli (born February 13, 1921; died in April 1982) was another mentally ill defector. Nicholas Petrulli visited the Soviet Union in August 1959 and believed he could land a high-paying job there. He went to the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and renounced his citizenship. Richard Snyder administered the oath of renunciation. About two months later, Nicholas Petrulli realized he had made a mistake. The State Department declared him legally incompetent and he was allowed to return to the United States. Nicholas Petrulli had received a medical discharge during World War II based on a mental breakdown, and had received disability payments as a schizophrenic. [FBI Los Angeles JFK case #11.24.63] Richard E. Snyder recalled, "The Soviets decided that they didn't want him. They looked him over for quite a while, the same as they did OSWALD. And they said, 'No, go home boy.' He was no longer an American citizen, which made for a bureaucratic tangle. The out that arose in his case was that he had been discharged from the Air Force on a mental discharge." After Petrulli returned to the United States the FBI interviewed his brother, Dominick Petrulli who said Nicholas "returned from Russia about three or four years ago; shortly thereafter the attempted to commit suicide, was committed to a mental hospital on Long Island and later moved to California. Dominick described Nicholas as being extremely nervous, highly sensitive and one who become emotional after he realized the gravity of a situation." [FBI Los Angeles 11.24.63]
On October 31, 1960, the Staff of the Office of Security of the CIA drafted a memorandum which was sent to the Chief, Security Research Staff, that listed defectors of interest to the CIA: "Robert Edward Webster, and Nicholas Petrulli were subject of OO/C [Domestic Contacts Division] requests on May 29, 1959, and June 15, 1959, respectively, with a view to their being debriefed upon their return from visits to Russia. Neither was interviewed by CIA, either before or after their visits. With reference to Nicholas Petrulli it is noted that his cousin, Michael Thomas Schiralli, [SSD 84, 253] is a former CIA covert employee who was assigned to the Robalo site in Panama under Project FJ-HOPEFUL and also took part in PB SUCCESS. [The overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954]. As of 1954 he was to be debriefed as he chose to return to private employment." [CIA Memo from M.D. Stevens 10.31.60 Subject: American Defectors]

MARTIN GREENLINGER

Martin Greenlinger, had fallen in love with a Russian woman while he was attending the 1957 World Youth Festival in Moscow. In April 1958 he returned to the Soviet Union and married her, then applied for an exit visa for her and her child from a previous marriage. In July 1958 Martin Greenlinger returned to the United States alone. One year later, the Soviet authorities issued Mrs. Greenlinger the exit visa. The U.S. Embassy, however, refused to issue an entrance visa due to her Communist Party affiliation. The CIA file on Martin Greenlinger stated: "This apparently involved Komsomol membership although the wives of Parker and OSWALD - q.v. - had many more drawbacks and were let in." In September 1960 Martin Greenlinger was awarded a National Science Foundation fellowship for one year. Still unable to obtain a U.S. entrance visa for his wife, he applied for visas at the British Embassy, and was told his wife would be issued a visa if he got a job in England. Eventually the National Science Foundation approved his plans to study mathematics in Manchester, England. The HSCA reported: "No further information is known." If no further information was known, then this defector did not fit the criterion of having re-defected before 1964.

BRUCE FREDERICK DAVIS & LEE HARVEY OSWALD

This left three defectors to correlate. One of them was Bruce Frederick Davis (born Rome, N.Y. May 4, 1936).

1. Bruce Frederick Davis was born in Rome, New York in 1936. He was the son of Dorothy Talbert of Scottsdale, Arizona. His father was killed in the Second World War. His stepfather was an officer in the U.S. Army and his family moved frequently around the U.S. His upbringing was very strict. [CIA Memo 6.29.62] Bruce Frederick Davis had a difficult childhood since he spent 12 years of schooling in ten different schools. OSWALD'S mother moved frequently during his childhood and OSWALD attended ten different public schools. [WR pp. 672-681]
2. In June 1954, following his high school graduation, Bruce Frederick Davis enlisted in the Marines and served three years. Bruce Frederick Davis attended the U.S. Marine Aviation Electronics School. OSWALD enlisted in the Marines around this time, and attended a similar school. After discharge from the Marines, Bruce Frederick Davis attended college and supported himself through various part-time jobs. He enlisted in the Army in November 1958, and was sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, for advanced training, and then to Germany, where he was given a Secret clearance. While in Germany, Bruce Frederick Davis was involved in an incident with "a Negro soldier, name unrecalled. During the fight half of Bruce Frederick Davis' right ear was bitten off...Subject's injury was called 'service connected.'" OSWALD was involved in an attack on a Mexican-American soldier while he was in the Marines.

3. Bruce Frederick Davis defected to East Germany on August 19, 1960. He raced his car past the U.S. military patrol near the border, then abandoned it at the barricade of the border itself. "He walked past the barricade and was apprehended about 300 yards inside the Soviet Zone of Germany by two border policemen who searched for weapons and turned him over to another two man police border patrol." Bruce Frederick Davis was questioned by Soviet Zone authorities. He claimed he answered all their questions innocuously, and did not reveal he had a Secret clearance while assigned for a short period to Division Headquarters in Wuerzberg, Germany. The Soviets were dissatisfied with the results of the interview, and Bruce Frederick Davis was sent to East Germany, where he was kept in a series of safehouses, then blindfolded and sent to a barred building. Bruce Frederick Davis asked if he could attend Friendship University in Moscow to complete his college education. Instead, on October 3, 1960, he was sent to the University of Kiev.

In October 1960 two articles appeared in Izvestya and Pravda, with statements by Bruce Frederick Davis attributing his defection to disillusionment with U.S. foreign and military policy: "On the night of August 19, 1960, I deserted the U.S. Army. I am 24 years old. I was born and raised in the U.S.A. I am not married. I didn't belong to any political party and didn't have any other reasons to be discontented with my life in the West. All my hopes as a simple American who wants peace were destroyed by the spy flights of the U-2 and RB-47 planes, and the breakdown of the Paris conference for heads of states...I hope to receive this political asylum in the USSR, to continue my education and to live and work among the Soviet people." On July 1, 1960, the Soviets had shot down an Air Force RB-47 reconnaissance plane which was on a ferret flight along the Soviet border, a mission designed to activate and pinpoint Soviet radar. [Ross & Wise The Espionage Establishment p251] OSWALD denied that he was a communist prior to his defection, which allegedly was based on similar objections to capitalism.
4. Although Bruce Frederick Davis physically defected, he did not officially denounce his American citizenship, and the documents provided to him by the Soviets categorized him as a stateless person. OSWALD was issued a stateless-person passport. Bruce Frederick Davis settled in Kiev as a student at the Kiev Institute of National Economy, where he was provided a free dormitory room and a subsidy of 900 old rubles per month. OSWALD received a government subsidy of 700 old rubles per month.

Bruce Frederick Davis made many unauthorized trips while he was studying in the Soviet Union. The CIA reported: "After his repatriation in 1963, Davis told U.S. authorities that he made a total of seven unauthorized trips from Kiev during the 1961 to 1963 period...Davis was apprehended on two of his seven trips, and was returned to Kiev each time under escort. On both occasions he was merely reprimanded by the Deputy Chief of the Institute at which he was studying." On May 1, 1961, he flew to Moscow and spent three days there, where "he met an American tourist, a former salesman for an electronics firm in Los Angeles, approximately 27 years old, who stated that he had been in Rumania. He was separated from his wife, by whom he had two children, because of a love affair with a girl in Rumania. Bruce Frederick Davis later wrote a letter to him and sent it off to Rumania. The unidentified tourist answered by stating that correspondence between them might be dangerous to those in the U.S.A., and therefore was not to be continued." The meaning of this was unclear. In July 1961 Bruce Frederick Davis made an unauthorized trip to Johnkoi, Crimea, where he had seen some Badger bombers arriving and departing from an unseen military airfield. Bruce Frederick Davis was apprehended for traveling without a permit, and sent back to Kiev. In September 1962 he appeared at the American Embassy, Moscow, to request an American passport. He was apprehended on the second day and sent back to Kiev under guard. He phoned the Embassy and stated he would not be completing the application, as he had been arrested for participation in a brawl in Kiev. He returned to the Embassy in October 1962, and was issued a passport and an entry visa into West Germany. Bruce Frederick Davis allowed the passport and visa to expire, allegedly due to a new Soviet girlfriend he met.

Bruce Frederick Davis visited the Embassy on another unauthorized trip in January 1963. He delivered papers to the Embassy from another unhappy defector and from Soviet citizen Vitalya Kalinochenko. These papers contained Kalinochenko's autobiography, the reasons he was dissatisfied with the Communists, and a request to be contacted regarding his experiences with the Soviet Navy and the rockets used by the Soviet Navy. On July 19, 1963, Bruce Frederick Davis went to the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and, "with the help of a Mr. Fain, U.S. Embassy official" his re-defection plans were completed. Fain was listed in Who's Who in the CIA: "Fain, Thomas Alexander. Born: March 22, 1922; Language: Russian. 1943 to 1945 First Lieutenant in G-2 of U.S. Army; from 1949 in Department of State, work for CIA (Economic espionage); 1962 Intelligence School in Oberammergau; OpA: Belgrade, Oberammergau, Moscow (2nd Secretary), Washington." The decision that Bruce Frederick Davis had not expatriated himself was made by Counsel Samuel G. Wise:
Samuel Wise “Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow” may well be Samuel Griffin Wise Jr. #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on (deleted) ACTIVE. The State Department reviewed Wise’s file on June 2, 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. Wise was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time Wise advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Fredrick Davis, #352267 who defected from the United States Army in Germany on August 18, 1960, had not expatriated himself. Davis’ case is very similar to that of OSWALD, and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.

Wise was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved Subject to polygraph on August 11, 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was 'no longer interested.' On November 13, 1953, Wise was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on (deleted) ACTIVE in New York City. [CIA Office of Security Marguerite D. Stevens 1.29.64]

Bruce Frederick Davis was returned to military control in July 1963 and was debriefed by Army Intelligence. He told Army Intelligence that he believed in “the theory of Marxism and Leninism. He feels that the system would work in a highly industrialized nation, such as the United States, because in the USSR, which is a backward nation, the system does not work properly. Bruce Frederick Davis does not believe in the present method of application of the system in the USSR. Bruce Frederick Davis refused to admit he was a communist, but he did admit that he was sympathetic towards communism. During the interview, he, at every opportunity, defended the Soviet way of life, praised their economic struggle, and voiced admiration for the Soviet communist personality.”

Bruce Frederick Davis was polygraphed by Army Intelligence with such questions as, "Were you required to sign a statement of obligation to work for Eastern intelligence upon your return to the U.S.?" Bruce Frederick Davis answered, "No," and the polygraph showed no sign of deception.

After a thorough analysis of the charts, it is the opinion of this examiner that DAVIS displayed reactions indicative of deception to question 7, Test I. Upon being confronted with this reaction Subject denied ever engaging in homosexual act. Upon intense questioning he admitted to some deviations to the normal sex acts with Soviet females, but he did not admit to any specific act of perversion or sodomy. A reaction indicative of deception was recorded in his answer to Question 2, Test III,” which was, "Isn't it true you were forced to leave Russia?” Bruce Frederick Davis answered, "No." When confronted with his reaction, "He denied being forced in any way to leave Russia, or that he was asked by anyone to leave. He denied that he left for any reason except of his own desire and
he left by the method he had previously revealed, that of contacting the
U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and being given a visa." The report continued:
"Bruce Frederick Davis failed to answer Question 7, Test III." This
question was: "Do you believe in communist theory?" "No answer." He
was asked why he did not answer the question. He replied that he refused
to answer under the provisions afforded him in Article 31, UCMJ, because
his answer might tend to incriminate him.

The FBI: "Following his return to United States control he was sentenced on October 1,
1963 to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, hard labor for
one year, and reduced to the enlisted grade of Private E-1. He is currently serving this
sentence at the Federal Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas." [Highly-deleted memo D.J.
Brennan to Sullivan 12.7.63] In the early 1960's, the CIA and the State Department
conducted an interagency exchange of information on defectors. The CIA reported to
the State Department that there were five defectors who were ascertained KGB agents:
Dutkanicz, Martin, Mitchell, Sloboda and Bruce Frederick Davis. [CIA 1634-1088 p11]
This researcher has no further information on Bruce Frederick Davis other than
a highly
deleted FBI report from Phoenix, Arizona, dated November 13, 1964. [FBI 105-92510-
35 pgs. B, 1-4, 6-8; FBI 105-92510 NR Serial dated 7.28.69] When Bruce Frederick
Davis was not on the polygraph, he expressed his belief in communist doctrine. When
he was connected to the polygraph, however, he refused to discuss his beliefs. Would
the polygraph have indicated deception? Bruce Frederick Davis fit OSWALD'S profile.
He was possibly an Army "dangle." A recently released CIA document described him as
"a source."

ROBERT EDWARD WEBSTER

Robert Edward Webster, (born October 23, 1928, Tiffin, Ohio), was a plastics technician
for the Rand Development Corporation who made several trips to the Soviet Union to
prepare for the 1959 U.S. Exhibition in Moscow. He defected to the USSR in October
1959.

THE RAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

The Rand Development Corporation was a CIA proprietary. On October 9, 1959, the
CIA surmised that

As was pointed out last June and earlier, it might well have been of value
to have obtained from ATIC, or the coordinator for the fair, a list of persons
who Rand was sending to the USSR in order to avoid inadvertent contacts
with such people as Robert Edward Webster and Ted Korycki as Guide
223 or Lincoln Leads respectively. This might be something to note for any
future operation. Of the others mentioned [in a newspaper article about
Webster's defection] H. J. Rand was sending to the USSR in order to
avoid inadvertent contacts with such people as Webster and Ted Korycki
as Guide 223 or Lincoln Leeds respectively.
In 1975 the CIA reported:

A check of Agency records has not revealed that Webster has ever been used in any capacity by this Agency or ever been given any type of clearance. Consideration was being given in late May 1959 and early June 1959 for a debriefing of Webster in regard to his proposed travel to the USSR. However, Webster was not contacted prior to his departure for the USSR. On his return to the United States in 1962 Subject was debriefed by Agency Officers to obtain Soviet Realities data. [NARA 1993.08.14.09:37:45:870028]

DOCTOR H. J. RAND

The President of the Rand Development Corporation was Doctor H. J. Rand. H.J. Rand's father was Vice-Chairman of Sperry-Rand. [63-Civ-2753-USDC SDNY; Fortune 11.63 p135] The telephone number for the Rand Development Corporation in New York City was answered at a division of Martin-Marietta. Martin-Marietta was a major stockholder in Sperry-Rand.

H. J. Rand undertook private negotiations with the USSR for the purchase of technical devices and information, on behalf of the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence. During the late 1950's, CIA Agent Christopher Bird was the representative of the Rand Development Corporation in Washington, D.C. The Executive Vice President for Research and Development of the Rand Development Corporation, George Bookbinder, was a former OSS man who worked under Frank Wisner in Bucharest in 1944. [NYT 6.15.59; Smith OSS Univ. of Calif. Press London 1977 p397; Bookbinder DOB 7.7.14 died 11.79] In 1967 the Chairman of Rand Development was J. Elroy McCaw. In 1990 Forbes Magazine named him one of the richest 400 men in America. In 1970 Bookbinder and H.J. Rand had a falling out. Bookbinder sued Rand Development. [USDC SDNY 71 Civil 5631]

On October 23, 1964, Birch O'Neal suggested that Yuri Nosenko (AEDONER, "Sammy") be questioned about George Bookbinder, H.J. Rand and Brigadier General W. Randolph Lovelace's connection to Galina Ivanovna Rednikina, a Russian language secretary.

Sammy Misc Ex 355
October 23, 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/CI/K (Deleted). Attention Miss (Deleted).
SUBJECT: Requirement for AEDONER

1. It is requested that AEDONER be shown the attached items which refer to the following individuals and be requested to provide all information he may have concerning the persons and events referred to in all the items:
Galina Ivanova Rednikina, an interpreter at the Sovietskaya Hotel in Moscow who has acted as a Russian language secretary for George H. Bookbinder, an official of the Rand Development Corporation of Cleveland, Ohio, and Henry James Rand, head of the Rand Development Corporation, and Brigadier General W. Randolph Lovelace, Flight Surgeon and head of aero-space medical program of NASA, who visited the USSR in 1958 with Bookbinder and Rand.

2. For your information, only Rand, Bookbinder and Lovelace have had frequent contact with Soviet officials both in the United States and the USSR, including Mikhail Ilich Bruk, formerly with the Soviet Ministry of Health, who was identified by AEDONER as an agent of the KGB.

3. You will also note that Rand was the employer of Robert E. Webster, who defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and renounced his U.S. citizenship.

4. This matter will also be of interest to Mrs. (Deleted) of SR/CI.

Birch O'Neal Chief, CI/SIG

Attachments: Bio Sheet and Photo of Redivkina (Photo to be returned to CI/SIG); Original clipping and copy from New York Times dated November 15, 1959, with photo of Bookbinder (Original photo of Bookbinder to be returned to CI/SIG); Copies of clipping referring to Rand and Webster; Copy of clipping referring to Lovelace.

Distribution: SR, OS/SRS, CI/SIG

THE RAND CORPORATION

The Rand Development Corporation was often confused with CIA-linked think tank known as the Rand Corporation - the Rand Development Corporation was called the Rand Corporation in at least one State Department document. The Rand Corporation was organized in 1946 by General Henry "Hap" Arnold to perpetuate the partnership of military men and university scientists that had been established during the war. Rand was initially administered by the Douglas Aircraft Corporation. The Sperry-Rand Corporation provided part of the initial funding for the Rand Corporation although Rand stands for research and development.

In 1968 the CIA ties of the Rand Development Corporation were exposed because of an Department of Interior expense inquiry into an antipollution contract between the Rand Development Corporation and that Agency. Donald L. Hambric of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration mentioned the contract to Department of the Interior officials. He wrote: "Rand also has a small classified contract with the CIA and any auditor working at Rand should have at least a secret clearance." [NYT 4.25.55,
TONY ULASEWICZ AND RAND DEVELOPMENT

Tony Ulasewicz, a member of NIXON's White House/Special Operations Group wrote: "When I first met Chotiner, the first thing he did was to hand me a file on the Rand Development Corporation and its officers...Chotiner's file on the Rand Development Corporation disclosed that during the 1968 presidential campaign Rand was named as a defendant in a lawsuit started by some angry Minnesota businessmen. The charge was that the Small Business Administration and the Government Services Administration were guilty of fraud and conspiracy in the way a government contract for some postal vehicles was awarded to a wholly-owned the Rand Development Corporation subsidiary, the Universal Fiberglass Corporation. The Universal Fiberglass Corporation, the lawsuit charged, was born for the sole purpose of obtaining this contract. "Despite apparent lack of qualifications, a crony of Senator Hubert Humphrey awarded the contract to the Universal Fiberglass Corporation. The Universal Fiberglass Corporation defaulted and disappeared under Rand Development's umbrella." Murray Chotiner was trying to bring this situation to the attention of the media. [Ulasewicz, Pres. Priv. Eye, 1990]

ROBERT EDWARD WEBSTER'S DEFECTION
While in Moscow for seven weeks, beginning May 1959, Robert Edward Webster dated Vera Ivchenko, the hostess employed at the tourist restaurant of the Hotel Ukraine. In this capacity, Vera Ivchenko contacted many foreign correspondents, including those who accompanied Vice President Nixon to the USSR. According to the information given to the HSCA by the CIA, Vera Ivchenko was suspected of being a KGB agent. When the HSCA wrote about Robert Edward Webster, it never mentioned Vera Ivchenko's name: it referred to her as Robert Edward Webster's girlfriend. Robert Edward Webster conveyed to Ivchenko that he wished to divorce his wife in the United States and return to the Soviet Union to marry her. Robert Edward Webster first revealed his desire to defect on July 11, 1959. He approached two Soviet officials in charge of arrangements for the U.S. Exhibition, and requested information concerning the procedures for a U.S. citizen to remain in the USSR. Robert Edward Webster was given a telephone number to call, and a meeting was set up in the private room of a restaurant. Robert Edward Webster was instructed to write a letter to the Supreme Soviet requesting to remain as a citizen. He was given a form to fill out which he would submit to Mr. Popof. With Popof, Robert Edward Webster filled out a questionnaire furnishing his background and expressing his wish to remain in Russia to "better himself in the plastics industry." When Popof would not accept this, Robert Edward Webster said: "I want to stay in the Soviet Union because all the businesses in America are government-controlled." He refused to publicly denounce the United States, but stated that he "wished to cooperate in every way with the Soviet Union." In late July or early August, he attended a meeting in a private restaurant room at the Metropole Hotel. Robert Edward Webster told two Soviet chemists he could help them make the Rand spray gun which he demonstrated at the U.S. Exhibition. Robert Edward Webster also attempted to design a fiberglass resin deppositor, but due to the lack of parts and equipment, the machine did not work.

Robert Edward Webster told the FBI that he was never questioned by the KGB:

The only time I was questioned concerning American defense matters occurred when some Moscow engineers asked me what government work was handled in the Rand Development Corporation. I denied any knowledge of this, because I had none." Robert Edward Webster informed the HSCA that the KGB never contacted him, that there was no reason for them to do so as the government officials who aided him in his defection had his entire story. He said he had never been questioned relative to intelligence matters. On September 9, 1959, he was told that he had been accepted as a Soviet citizen. He disappeared the next day. Although he asked to work in Moscow, the Soviets informed him he would be sent to Leningrad. The following day, the Soviet officials registered Robert Edward Webster at the Bucharest Hotel, and instructed him not to leave. He was given 1000 old rubles, and asked to write a note to a Rand Development employee requesting that money be left for him at the hotel, since he was going on a tour of Russia. The KGB threw a short party for Robert Edward Webster on September 11, 1959. He was then flown to Leningrad with an interpreter, where an Intourist representative met him.
He applied for work at the Leningrad Scientific Institute of Polymerized Plastics, and lived in a hotel with Ivchenko. On October 17, 1959, Robert Edward Webster was in Moscow. He attended a meeting at the OVIR Central Office with the original Soviet representative with whom he had contact; an unknown Soviet; Doctor H.J. Rand; George H. Bookbinder; and Richard E. Snyder. At this meeting, Robert Edward Webster said he was free to speak; he told Richard E. Snyder that when he applied for Soviet citizenship, he was granted a Soviet passport on September 21, 1959. He never exhibited the passport to Richard E. Snyder, because it had not yet been issued to him. When Robert Edward Webster later decided to re-defect, he told Richard E. Snyder he had no Soviet documentation at the OVIR meeting but was still in possession of the American passport which he never sent to Richard E. Snyder as requested. He did, however, fill out a State Department form, "Affidavit for Expatriated Person," in which he renounced his American citizenship. Vera Ivchenko joined him the following day for a month-long vacation. [also see DOS ltr. Snyder to Boster 10.28.59; Davis to Snyder 12.10.59]

On return to Leningrad, the couple began work at the plastics institute, where Vera Ivchenko was employed as an assistant and translator. They resided in a new apartment building.

On October 8, 1959, an Memorandum for the Record was generated by (deleted) "Regarding: Attempts to Locate Webster; receipt of (above) Emb. Cable. - AliC Cleveland asked whether Webster was carrying out clandestine task for CIA which hadn't been coordinated with them. Was assured that this was not case & to best of our knowledge Webster had not been briefed by & was unknown to either DDP or OO Offices. Check made with (deleted); had encountered Webster on a few social occasions; he will consult with Messrs. (deleted) to produce a more complete picture of Webster."

On October 20, 1959, this Memorandum for the Record was generated by Bruce L. Solie, Office of Security / Security Research Staff regarding Robert Edward Webster: "(Deleted) advised (deleted) called Roman regarding Agency interest in Webster. - Office of Security files - no clearance; was an OO/C interest in Webster in late May 1959, but Webster wasn't contacted by OO/C prior to trips to USSR. CI/OA files - no record." On October 21, 1959, this document was sent by (deleted) to Chief, Domestic Contacts Division, attention Support Branch "Regarding: Webster case at recent Machine Searching Conference on October 20, 1959. Our organization has no interest in matter." On October 22, 1959, an Office Memo (Deleted) to Chief, Contact Division, Attention Support (Deleted) re: Webster was generated "Questions asked by Major Robert Lochera (?) of OSI: a) Is this office doing anything re: Webster's defection? b) If not, do they contemplate doing anything? c) What would this office have done if Webster left normally? (Deleted) called next day w/response they knew only what was in newspapers regarding Webster; (not very cooperative)." "A CIA Office Memorandum dated October 23, 1959, was sent to Chief Contact Bureau (Deleted) concerned: "information on Vera Ivchenko, Webster's girlfriend." "October 26, 1959. Memo
(Deleted) to Director, FBI, regarding Agency interest in Webster. Webster never used by Agency; was considered for debriefing May 1959 to June 1959, however, he wasn't contacted prior to departure for USSR. Agency does have (deleted) [interest in Rand Development]. In view of Webster's employment with Rand Development Corporation, please forward any information obtained in the investigation of Webster." On October 28, 1959 a report on Robert Edward Webster stated: "Webster was given security clearance on June 5, 1959, but never had access to military information." "October 30, 1959. Office Memo (Deleted) regarding Kent (of WRU) conversation with H.J. Rand regarding Webster."

These document came from a handwritten summary of all the CIA documents in Webster's file prepared by the HSCA on March 15, 1978. Several pages of entries marked Volume III (Cont.) & Vol. IV have been deleted.

Some people in the CIA thought Robert Edward Webster was an operation due to his connection with the Rand Development Company. This researcher thought Robert Edward Webster was an operation until documents declassified in 1995 revealed that before coming to Rand Development, Robert Edward Webster had worked for six corporations that had nothing to do with the intelligence community. Just before Robert Edward Webster left for the Soviet Union The New York Times took a family photograph. It on October 20, 1959, and showed Robert Edward Webster, a Quaker, with wife Martha, his seven-year-old son Michael, and daughter six-year-old Anne reading a magazine entitled USSR. Robert Edward Webster deserted his wife of eight years and his two children in Ohio with no apparent warning except for a call to the Russian secretary in the Rand Development Company's Moscow office; he requested the secretary notify his family he was not returning. If Robert Edward Webster was an agent, his method of establishing a cover was extraordinary. The KGB would have found it difficult to believe that a CIA spy would leave his wife and children in the United States, then have a child with a Russian woman. Robert Edward Webster was destroying his family. Was someone carrying out the dictates of the Doolittle Report and "hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct no longer applied" or was Robert Edward Webster crazy? Logic dictated that the KGB would have been interested in the Rand Development Corporation, simply because its name evoked the Rand Corporation. Webster was probably questioned by the KGB.

Robert Edward Webster was granted a Soviet internal passport after writing a summary of his life, listing his relatives and where they worked, submitting photographs of himself, and undergoing a medical examination. In December or January 1960, he turned over his American passport and obtained a Soviet passport at the OVIR office in Leningrad. Robert Edward Webster had lawfully renounced his citizenship; the State Department issued a Certificate of Loss of Citizenship.

MARINA OSWALD AND ROBERT WEBSTER?

This entry was found in a CIA Name List With Traces on Marina Oswald's address book: "Prizentsev, Lev Kondrat'yevskiy Prosepepekt 7, Apt. 63 or Kondrat'yevskiy
Prosepepekt 63 Apt 7, Leningrad." In a December 17, 1963 FBI interview, Marina Oswald said she met Lev Prizentsev at a rest home near Leningrad [October 1960?] and that 'he had an amorous interest in Irina Volkova [q.v.] who, unfortunately was already married.' Traces: 1. No traces on Prizentsev. 2. Robert E. Webster claimed to have resided in a three-room apartment at Kondrat’evskiy Prosepepekt 63 Apt. 18, Leningrad." Did Robert Edward Webster know Marina Oswald? Robert Edward Webster told the FBI he had no contact with LEE OSWALD, although he had heard of him. [David Slawson WC Notes #340] In 1993 Lev Prizentsev said he did not know that Robert Edward Webster lived in his building. [Interview with W.S. Malone 5.12.93] ANGLETON sent a memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover about this on May 11, 1964. Marina Oswald told this researcher in 1994:

There may have been a connection or there was none at all. I tell you what it is. When I was going to pharmacy school I was there with Ellie Sobreta whose address is in my book. It just happened to be in a good neighborhood, and if Robert Edward Webster was living there, neither of us knew. She doesn't know it up to this day. So people started making connections where is none. I did not know Webster. She simply was my friend and I visit her and he lived in her building.

WEBSTER REDEFECTS

After six months had passed, Robert Edward Webster began to take the steps necessary to re-defect. In early December 1959 he wrote to the U.S. Embassy; he claimed he had received no reply to this letter. In January 1960 he received a letter from his father informing him that his mother had a nervous breakdown and he was needed in the United States. A daughter, Svetlana Robertovna Webster, was born to the couple in August 1960. In late April 1961 Popof arranged for him and Ivchenko to visit Moscow on Mayday. In Moscow, due to his American clothing, he entered the American Embassy unchallenged. He informed Consul John McVickar that he wished to return to the United States. John McVickar requested two notarized statements from Robert Edward Webster's father saying he would be responsible for his son after Robert Edward Webster's return, and told him to apply for a Soviet exit visa. When he returned to Leningrad, Ivchenko helped him prepare the application for the exit visa. She gave her consent, which was required.

Still, high government officials, suspected Robert Edward Webster was on a CIA mission. On April 15, 1961, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, sent a letter to McGeorge Bundy, the National Security advisor to President John F. Kennedy's, which stated the CIA had no operational relationship with Robert Edward Webster. [Rockefeller Commission handwritten notes.] In June 1961, Robert Edward Webster was apprised that his request for an exit visa had been denied; he would have to wait one year before he could reapply.
On November 8, 1961, a CIA Official Routing Slip indicated that documents on Webster had been sent to CI/SIG Mr. O'Neal, Mrs. Egerter, Evans, Grady, RID Files. Remarks: CD/OO Case 29.267 From S. Stetson CD/OO Support Branch.

Soviet officials from Moscow visited Robert Edward Webster, inquired why he was unhappy, and suggested he send for his American family. In February 1962 he was granted an exit visa. In March 1962 the American Embassy gave him instructions on obtaining an American entrance visa. Robert Edward Webster quit his job, and his father sent him a plane ticket for his passage home. He surrendered his internal Soviet passport for his exit visa in May. Robert Edward Webster arrived in the United States as an alien under the Russian quota, on May 20, 1962. He did not attempt to get Ivchenko or his daughter out of the Soviet Union. [DOS For. Ser. Disp. 10.25.59 - Edward Freers; WCE960 p3; FBI 105-82555-NR 2.7.64; HSCA V12 p448-450]

WEBSTER'S DEBRIEFING

Shortly after his return to the United States, Robert Edward Webster's wife divorced him. She married W.G. Belding of Zelienople, Pennsylvania. Eugene S. Rittenburg, Cleveland Resident Agent, reported this to Headquarters. Robert Edward Webster was debriefed in Ohio by CIA and Air Force representatives. The CIA reported: "(Deleted) and (Deleted) talked alone with Webster in the INS offices for about one hour. During this time, no attempt was made to secure any FPI, rather it was a general 'get acquainted' type session. Webster was very well-dressed, but extremely nervous. His nervousness was not caused by our presence, as Mr. O'Brian had previously told us that he was having difficulty getting Webster's fingerprints as he was perspiring so profusely - even through his fingertips." [CIA Pitts F.O. 6.28.62] Robert Edward Webster was brought to CIA Headquarters where he was debriefed for two weeks. The debriefing reports included a chronology of his life, the CIA's assessment of him, information regarding life in the Soviet Union, Robert Edward Webster's work there, biographical data on persons he met there, and other information which was classified. [CIA SR/6-62-274, 11.1.62, Kay Grady] Ann Egerter, Birch O'Neal, (FNU) Grady and (FNU) Evans received copies of the debriefing.

Robert Edward Webster told the CIA that his father was a ceramics engineer who was still in college when he was born.

The family lived in Columbus until the father graduated from college and then moved to South Milwaukee...Subject describes these years as being lean and describes the family as being 'poor.' He recalls that in Milwaukee he developed a fear of being in water. In Louisville he was caught trying to steal apples from a neighborhood store. He states he was sent home by the store owner but not punished. In Louisville, when the Subject was six or seven years old his mother reportedly suffered a nervous breakdown. It was described to him that his mother passed out and was hospitalized in a Louisville City Hospital. He states that his father indicated that he never knew the reason why his mother became ill. He recalls visiting his mother
in the hospital and viewing her through a screen wire door. This scene became quite vivid for him again in January 1960 in Moscow when he received a letter from his father in which the father stated that his mother had suffered a complete mental breakdown and was in the hospital again...He isn’t sure how long his mother was in the hospital...At the same time while studying at night he took a day job in a manufacturing plant. On weekends he went home to his parents by bus and during one such trip he met his future wife. She was also studying away from home in a beautician’s school and going home on weekends. After a short courtship he proposed, she accepted and they eloped. His wife was under age and kept her true age from the authorities when applying for a marriage license. Their plan was to keep their marriage secret until after his wife had finished beautician’s school. However, the news somehow got back to his wife’s parents and the secret was out. His mother-in-law was quite upset over the marriage. His parents, however, accepted in calmly and without fanfare and the subject notes that they could do little else since they also eloped when they were married. His wife finished beautician’s school and he dropped out of Carnegie Tech and began the job of supporting them. He changed jobs and his wife began part-time work as a beautician. But they found the going difficult and after a few months he found a job in a plastics factory in his home town. His wife, who is a diabetic and has been since childhood, became pregnant. Because of her diabetes she required special medical care during her pregnancy. One year and one month after their marriage their first child, a son, was delivered by cesarean section. Subject became active in civic and church affairs, was promoted to foreman capacity in the plastics plant and he began attending a local small college in the evening studying chemistry. He was gone from home three nights a week to school and on returning home one night early found a strange man in the living room with his wife. This was a shock to him and he became quite angry although he did not express this to his wife or to the man. His wife stated she was lonely and gave that as her explanation for her actions. The Subject promptly went out and purchased an expensive wrist watch which he actually could not afford. Things cooled down somewhat between them. Very soon thereafter in 1953 their second child, a daughter, was born. His wife required constant medical attention as well as insulin and special diet. On two occasions early in their marriage she went into insulin coma and was seriously ill. Their expenses were greater than his income and he found himself getting deeper in debt. Feeling he could better himself he began looking for a new job and found a better paying one in a nearby town. He again was given a supervisory position in this plastics plant but this time he was supervising all female workers. At this point he notes his real troubles began. He soon found himself involved with a female married employee and while his wife was in the hospital for one of her regular checkups he became quite involved in this extra marital affair. His wife
found out and the relationship deteriorated even further. Separation and divorces were contemplated, a lawyer visited with this in mind but again the situation cooled down.

The plastics plant where he was working was purchased by another firm and though he was advised that he would not lose his job, in anticipation of being fired he quit his job...

He continued to look for other work and through business contacts was approached by the Rand Development Company of Cleveland and was offered a better paying job with them. He accepted and moved to Cleveland. Soon he was assigned to a traveling job in which he was to demonstrate a new piece of plastics manufacturing equipment. He began to travel frequently and each trip began to keep him away from home for longer periods of time. His wife became increasingly upset because of his prolonged absences. He found his job trying and demanding and he spent a great deal of time on the minute details of the exhibits. On one trip in 1958 in Chicago after getting an exhibit set up and eating and drinking in excess he had his first episode of passing out. He describes being under a great deal of tension he knew he was going into shock. Realizing what was going on he told people what to do for him and after lying down for a while, he soon recovered. A similar episode occurred in Moscow in May 1959 where he was preparing the plastics equipment for the exhibition. In 1959 his company asked him to go to Moscow to help set up an exhibit. His first trip was in March 1959 with another company official and he remained there for one week doing a preliminary survey. He returned to the States and in May 1959 again went back to Moscow to start actual work on setting up the plastics equipment. He viewed this opportunity as one in which if he was able to do a good job he would certainly improve his standing with his company. On the second trip he was gone much longer than originally planned for and he soon began receiving letters from his wife in which she gave him a ‘fit’ about his long absences. He notes that once in the States he was away for some time and on returning home he found that his wife had taken the children and had left town. He located them at his in-laws and when he asked his wife to return she questioned whether he really wanted his family or not. He convinced her that he did and she returned.

During his second stay in Moscow he met a Russian girl, Vera. He first met her in restaurant where she worked as a translator and soon thereafter began dating her. He found himself comparing her with his wife and soon began telling Vera all his family troubles. He describes Vera as married but separated from her husband. She was pictured as petite, womanly and passionate. In the next breath he spontaneously denied intimate relationships with her until after the Soviets had officially informed him he could stay in the Soviet Union. His wife was described as being
generally indifferent sexually and only at time would their relations in this area be satisfactory.

The Subject feels that somehow, somewhere during his second prolonged seven to eight week visit in Moscow, Vera subtly suggested that he stay in Russia. But at the same time she 'pooh-poohed the idea that he could or would stay.' During this visit he made up his mind to attempt to stay in Russia and so informed Vera. 'I must have been way off base and I wonder if I had a nervous breakdown.' But staying in Russia offered him a chance to get as far away as possible from his troubles at home and the plastics industry in Russia was in its infancy and he felt he could make his mark there.

Sometime in mid-summer 1959 he returned to the U.S. and was home for ten days. This period with his wife is described as being a honeymoon but in spite of this he continued with his plan to return to the Soviet Union and request permission to remain there. He packed some winter clothes, books and jazz records to take with him.

On returning to the USSR sometime in July 1959 he approached a male translator at the exhibit and inquired as to necessary procedure to obtain permission to become a permanent resident of the USSR. He received some vague answers and then was asked to identify the person who was interested in such a step. He then indicated he was the interested party and there began shortly thereafter a series of clandestine meetings with various Soviet officials. At each meeting he states he drank heavily and was generally 'loaded' by the time the meeting was over. As he recalls it it was sometime in September before he was informed that his request to stay was being granted. When he heard the news he felt a "twinge of guilt and regret." He was particularly troubled by his neutral feeling for his children back home.

His Soviet handlers asked him to pack a small bag, leave a not for his Rand Company boss in Moscow that he was going on a tour of Russia. He was then moved to another hotel in Moscow and soon thereafter flown to Leningrad. She stayed with him five days and he states emphatically that during this period he first had sexual relations with her.

He states that he very much wanted Vera to become pregnant as he was "afraid of not being able to hold her." Vera returned to Moscow to make arrangements to join him permanently. He was given a position at the plastics institute in Leningrad. Vera soon became pregnant and was quite ill. His job was to help the Soviets reproduce the U.S. plastics machine on exhibit in Moscow. He states that by the time he had left they had not succeeded in doing this. In January 1960 he received a letter from his
father indicating that his mother had suffered a complete nervous breakdown as a result of his defection.

At this point Webster decided to redefect. Technical information supplied by Robert Edward Webster was included in a Joint Report of the Foreign Technical Division, Air Force Systems Command, and the CIA. On February 20, 1970, the Domestic Contacts Division/Operational Support Staff contacted CI/Liaison Jane Roman regarding Robert Edward Webster. [NARA 1993.08.02.20:01:25: 870033]

Robert Edward Webster

Stetson/ bm HH-20822
DCS/Operational Support Staff 2268
900 Key Building February 20, 1970
DO/DCSL
CI Liaison (Illegible)
Mrs. Roman For your information
2 C 42 Hq. (Illegible)

ROBERT EDWARD WEBSTER: A VEGETABLE

*Frontline* located Robert Edward Webster in 1993. He was in Oaks Nursing Home, New Bedford, Massachusetts, and was allegedly unable to converse. [CIA 535-227A, 522-228; CIA Name List with Traces Vladimir Makarov, Robert Aleksandrovich Ivanov also Vanda Kuznetsova] Robert Edward Webster's nurse, Susan Gilbert, told me: "He suffers from no mental illness. His family doesn't want him to talk and his legal guardian doesn't want him to talk. He's a shell of the man he once was. Medical ethics prevent me from telling you more. He doesn't want to talk to you or see you."

OSWALD'S DOMESTIC CONTACTS DIVISION DEBRIEFING

The HSCA conducted a review of defector files to determine whether defectors were routinely debriefed upon their return to the United States. The HSCA began with the CIA's full list of 380 defectors. From this list, the HSCA compiled a list of persons who were U.S. born citizens who defected, or attempted to defect, to the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1963, and who returned to the U.S. within the same period. In addition, the Committee included individuals from the October 25, 1960, State Department letter regarding defectors sent to the CIA. The Committee requested files on 29 individuals and the CIA provided files on 28 individuals on whom it maintained records. These 201 files were reviewed as well as any existing Domestic Contacts Division files. The review revealed that, in the cases of six of the individuals, there was no indication they had ever returned to the United States. As for the other 22 defectors, the file review showed there was no record of CIA contact with 17, although 4 of these files contained reports by sources who had advised the Agency of their contact with the re-defectors, so they had been indirectly contacted. The circumstances of the CIA's contact with the other five defectors differed:
Irving Amron (born December 4, 1917) - His file reflected that he had been living in the USSR since 1933 and returned to the United States in 1962. He was debriefed by a CIA officer after applying for employment in response to a newspaper advertisement. Amron had been in the Soviet Union too long to have been included in the study.

Bruce F. Davis - His file contained a CIA debriefing report.

Harold Citrynell - His file reflected he was unwittingly debriefed by a CIA officer, upon the departure of the official from the Soviet Union, in the American Embassy, Copenhagen. Also interviewed by Domestic Contacts Division.

Robert Edward Webster - Extensive debriefing at CIA Headquarters.

Libero Ricciardelli - CIA debriefing by Boston Domestic Contacts Division.

Out of 22 defectors, nine had been debriefed by the CIA either directly or indirectly, almost half. The HSCA: "Based on this file review, it appeared to the committee that the CIA did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter of standard operating procedure. It becomes clear from the review of these defector files that CIA debriefing of defectors was a random occurrence. Nonetheless, in the instances when the Agency did choose to debrief returning American defectors...the persons who were debriefed were similar to OSWALD in that they defected and returned within the same general time period and each spent his time in the Soviet Union in areas of interest to the CIA."

If the CIA had debriefed Robert Edward Webster and Bruce Frederick Davis, the defectors whose circumstances most closely resembled OSWALD'S, why not OSWALD? Was he debriefed by a component other than Domestic Contacts Division? The Committee: "The CIA has denied ever having any contact with OSWALD and its records are consistent with this position. Because the Agency has a Domestic Contacts Division that routinely attempts to solicit information on a non-clandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad, the absence of any record indicating that OSWALD, a returning defector who had worked in a Minsk radio factory, had been debriefed has been considered...not to be indicative that OSWALD had been contacted through other than routine Domestic Contacts Division channels."

REDWOOD

The HSCA discovered conflicting information when it "interviewed the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union," who, on November 25, 1963, wrote the following memo:

Chief, (Deleted)
Chief, (Deleted)
Chief of Station, (Deleted).
(Deleted) OSWALD
For Information
For the record we forward herewith a memorandum by (Deleted – Case Officer Stationed In Paris) Staff Employee in which he gives his recollections of (Deleted) interest in Subject following Subject's return to the United States from the USSR. (Deleted).

SUBJECT: OSWALD

TO: Walter P. HALTIGAN [Chief of the Soviet Section of the Paris Station]

(1) It makes very little difference now but REDWOOD had at one time an OI (Overseas Intelligence) interest in OSWALD. As soon as I heard OSWALD'S name, I recalled that as Chief of the 6 Branch [specializing in the debriefing of defectors from the Soviet Union] I had discussed, sometime in the summer of 1960, with the then Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section the laying on of interviews through the Domestic Contacts Division [KUJUMP] or other suitable channels. At the moment I don't recall if this was discussed while OSWALD and his family were on route to this country or if it was after their arrival.

(2) I remember that OSWALD'S unusual behavior in the USSR had struck me from the moment I had read the first State Department [ODACID] dispatch on him, and I told my subordinates something amounting to 'Don't push to hard to get the information we need, because this individual looks odd.' We were particularly interested in the information that OSWALD might provide on the Minsk factory in which he was employed, and of course we sought the usual biographic information that might help develop foreign personality dossiers.

(3) I was phasing into my LPOVER cover assignment and out of KUDOVE at the time. Thus, I would have left the country shortly after OSWALD'S arrival. I do not know what action developed thereafter.

Addendum

(4) As an afterthought, I recall also at the time I was becoming increasingly interested in watching a pattern we had discovered in the course of our biographical and research work in 6: the number of Soviet women marrying foreigners, being permitted to leave the USSR, then eventually divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without returning 'home.' The AE OCEAN-3 case was among the first of these, and we eventually turned up something like two dozen similar cases. We established links between some of these women and the KGB. KUDESK became interested in the developing trend we had come across. It was partly to learn if OSWALD'S wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in OSWALD'S own experiences in the USSR,
that we showed operational intelligence interest in the HARVEY story. (Thomas B. CASASIN)" [CIA 435-173A; CIA DO-02647-p3 of 3]

Edward Petty:

REDWOOD was not an operation; it was a type of activity. It was the examination for exploitation of people who had come out of the Soviet Union. REDSKIN was more a penetration type activity. Looking for operational opportunities with people who were going in.

Thomas B. Casasin told the HSCA that, to his knowledge, contact was never made with OSWALD. Moreover, if a debriefing had occurred, the officer stated he would have been informed. This officer was wrong. OSWALD photographed the plant and procured a floor plan; this was corroborated by CIA employee Don Deneselya who, in 1962, had worked in the Soviet Branch, Foreign Documents Division, Directorate of Intelligence. Don Deneselya advised the HSCA

He specifically recalled collecting intelligence regarding the Minsk radio plant. This individual claimed that during the summer of 1962, he reviewed a contact report from CIA Field Office representatives who had interviewed a former Marine who had worked at the Minsk radio plant following his defection to the USSR. This defector, whom the employee believed may have been OSWALD, had been living with his family in Minsk. The employee advised the HSCA that the contact report had been filed in a volume on the Minsk radio plant that should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch, then a component of the Central Reference Office. Accordingly, the committee requested that the CIA provide both the contact report and the volume of materials concerning the Minsk radio plant. A review by the committee of the documents in the volumes of the Minsk radio plant, however, failed to locate any such contact report.

*Frontline* researcher John Newman reported:

A memo from CI/SIG has surfaced in these files with handwriting on it which gives the name of a Domestic Contacts Division employee - a name which appears to be one ‘Andy’ Anderson - as a CIA contact for OSWALD. This document confirms the recollections of other CS employees that Andy Anderson did in fact debrief OSWALD. Don Deneselya, who worked in the Russian Branch, Foreign Documents Division, Office of Contacts read Anderson's debrief in 1962. [Testimony to Rep. Conyers 11.17.93]

John Newman stated that the former deputy chief of the Domestic Contacts Division said that the CIA did debrief Oswald. In 1993 several other CIA officers remember a Major Andy Anderson who conducted debriefings for the CIA’s domestic contact division, and two recalled the debriefing of OSWALD but would not go public with the information. John Newman found traces of a notation in OSWALD’s 201 file, that were
reversed, blended through from a document the CIA did not want copied. Newman turned it over and held it to the light, and deciphered handwriting that read “Anderson 00 on OSWALD.” Barely legible, the name ANDY preceded it. [LIVE BY THE SWORD: THE SECRET WAR AGAINST CASTRO AND THE DEATH OF JFK by Gus Russo]

The HSCA Casasin, Haligan and Hart interviews were a waste of time because these men were not about to link OSWALD to their beloved CIA:

Casasin said at the time (the SR Division considered interview Oswald) he assumed Oswald had been sent out of the Soviet Union by the KGB, so exercised caution and did not attempt to debrief OSWALD…Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would have been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his opinion that the nature of KGB operations made it conceivable that Oswald could have been a “lay low” Soviet operative.

Haltigan stated that he had never heard any rumors to the effect that Oswald had been used by the CIA at any time. He felt that because of his assignments within the Agency, he would have been in a position to know if Oswald had been used in any capacity.

Lastly the Committee contacted Mr. Paul Hartman, who served on the Counterintelligence Staff Research and Analysis Group at the time of the assassination. Mr. Hartman authored a memo dated September 18, 1975 which detailed the steps he took on November 27, 1963 to determine whether Oswald had ever been used by the CIA or connected with the Agency in any conceivable way. Hartman, who was considered a CIA clandestine records expert, concluded the allegation of Oswald’s connection to CIA were totally unfounded.

Scott Malone also reported that in September 1993 Richard Helms admitted that OSWALD "might have been" debriefed. In 1964 the Warren Commission questioned then-CIA Director John McCone about CIA contact with OSWALD. John McCone's testimony was based on a search supervised by Richard Helms. John McCone submitted an affidavit and testified: "I have gone into the matter in considerable detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate people within the Agency, examined all records in our files relating to OSWALD...OSWALD was not a CIA agent, employee or informant. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him...The Agency never furnished him with any funds or money...in the Soviet Union or anyplace." John McCone was then asked whether he was made aware of every CIA agent and informer. He answered, "Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that Agency division's activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be permissible?"
Richard Helms stated: "On Mr. McConne's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the CIA with OSWALD. We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records. Now, this check turned out to be negative." Richard Helms said "no contact had even been contemplated with OSWALD." [Wash. Star 10.1.76] The Warren Commission never questioned ANGLETON.

ANGLETON

When questioned in the late 1970's ANGLETON denied that the CIA ever contemplated contacting OSWALD. Attorney Marvin Miller asked:

Q. Could it have happened without your knowledge?

A. No.

Q. Then your testimony would be that every single activity undertaken by your section with any individual was cleared with you first or given to you afterwards?

A. Well, I think I would have learned from my Deputy if there had been any, any attempt or any desire to contact OSWALD because of the FBI jurisdiction of the case.

Q. What about the time he was in the Soviet Union?

A. I don't think I was aware at the time.