NODULE X14

KENNEDY & THE CUBAN EXILE MILITIAS AND THE BAY OF PIGS DUMP

FRANK STURGIS STANDS ON THE GRAVE OF 59 OF ROLANDO MASFERRER’S KILLERS HE MOWED DOWN WHEN HE WAS STILL TIGHT WITH FIDEL CASTRO
“EL TIGRE” ROLANDIO MASFERRER

Rolando Masferrer was the leader of a group of Batistiano murderers known as “El Tigres” who trademark was to dismember anyone connected to Fidel Castro or any other opposition figure. Masferrer had grandiose ambitions and the FBI reported:

On August 8, 1958 a follower of Prio, former President of Cuba, while being interviewed in another matter stated that Prio had requested him to advise the FBI that Prio had received info from a source in the Armed Forces in Cuba that Rolando Masferrer was planning to take over the Cuban Government when Batista fell and that about three days before one Carlos Sayes had come to Miami from Cuba as a representative of Masferrer. According to Prio’s sources, Sayes contacted Jimenez, former President of Venezuela. Jimenez agreed to give a sum of money to an agent of Sayas to purchase arms. Jimenez was also to leave Miami August 8, 1958 for NYC to obtain money there to give an agent of Sayas in NYC in order to purchase the guns. Miami advised that when Prio follower furnish information he was requested to advise Prio that this office preferred to receive this info from original source whenever possible and we would appreciate being place in contact with the original source of Prio’s info. [FBI 1-100-344127]

Masferrer fled to Miami with a yacht full of money in January 1959. Cuba demanded the extradition of Masferrer as a war criminal but C. Douglas Dillon, the Under Secretary of State during the Eisenhower Administration, refused to extradite Rolando Masferrer. A notation on Masferrer's FBI arrest record read: "Contributor of Prints: USINS, Miami, Florida, March 30, 1959, EXCLUDED from admission to the United States." In January 1959, 59 of Rolando Masferrer's Tigres were executed on San Juan Hill in Santiago de Cuba. As stated, STURGIS supervised these executions. In March 1959 four of Rolando Masferrer's men were arrested in Havana for plotting to assassinate Fidel Castro. [Wash. Post 3.27.59] In April 1959 the FBI was informed that Fidel Castro had hired Jack Youngblood, an American mercenary who had helped Castillo Armas escape from a Guatemalan prison, to kidnap Rolando Masferrer and return him to Cuba. The plan failed.
THE PLOT TO KIDNAP MASFERRER AND HIS ASSOCIATES

The FBI reported:

William Pawley, former United States Ambassador, advised CIA today of contact with Arthur Patton a Commissioner from Dade County, Miami, Florida. Patton stated that one of his police officers had been offered $200,000 to kidnap Rolando Masferrer. Police officer went to Patton for advice. Patton turned to Pawley who consulted CIA. CIA believes Bernard Reichardt, CIA, Miami, has furnished this data to your office. Sutel January 26 specific facts and action taken. Teletype being sent in view of urgency of matter. Foregoing information furnished to S. J. Papich 1025060 by J. C. King of CIA" [FBI 105-84265-34, 36 p 1 page 2 w/h]

In August 1959 the Bureau received information about an anti-Castro uprising sponsored by Rolando Masferrer. Most of this telex was withheld. [FBI 100-344127 NR 5.13.59, 26; FBI 109-584-305] In November 1959 the FBI received word that Rolando Masferrer was planning to drop phosphorus on Cuban sugar cane fields. [FBI 100-
In January 1960 William Pawley, a former United States Ambassador, advised the CIA that he had been contacted by On January 27, 1960, a FBI document stated that Estaban Ventura and Julio Laurent (the former head of Cuban intelligence under Batista) were also the intended victims of this plot. [FBI 105-344127] \ 

Catherine Taaffe, who over the past year has provided considerable information on Cuban matters some of which has been discredited, advised Miami Office 1/26/60 that during three or four days prior to 1/15/60 she had several discussions in office of Raul Castro, Cuban Chief of the Armed Forces, with Cuban officials named Jorge Valdez, Roberto (LNU) and Eduarda (LNU). These men proposed plan to bribe a Miami police officer to falsely arrest Rolando Masferrer and/or Esteban Ventura and Julio Laurent, all of whom are anti-Fidel Castro, and thereafter transport the victims outside U.S. jurisdiction. The three Cuban officials reportedly planned to kill Masferrer as soon as he was delivered to them; put his body and unnamed items bearing U.S. identification on some undisclosed island in the Bahamas in order that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro could personally “discover” this “anti-Castro base” and then accuse the U.S. and Britain of assisting anti-Castro faction.

At 2:10 p.m. today SAC Teague, Miami, called to report that Taaffe had advised that Jorge Valdez and three other Cubans who work under Raoul Castro were then in Miami in Room 317, Airport Hotel, International Airport. They contacted Taaffe who told them she had a friend from Dade County Sheriff’s office who might assist them in the plan they had previously proposed with regard to kidnapping captioned victims. She further told them she would contact this friend and if he would agree she would have him call Valdez. SA Bill Holloman of Miami posing as Bill Haley of the Dade Country Sheriff’s Office then telephonically contacted Valdez; told him Taaffe had suggested he call as he was interested in this matter. Valdez asked Agent Holloman to meet with him and his friends tonight at the Airport Hotel between 7:30 and 8 p.m. and let him know if he would do so by 6:30 p.m. today.

SAC Teague proposed that Holloman meet with Valdez carrying credentials of the Dade County Sheriff’s Office which Miami can readily secure for this purpose. Miami Office will rent another room at the same hotel and desires to place microphone (legal) in the rented room and try to arrange for the meeting between Holloman and the Cubans to take place in the rented room. If this is not possible Miami will attempt to place a microphone covering Room 317 under full security conditions and without trespass if at all possible.

VALDES said that FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO did not speak much English but understood some VALDES asked SA HOLLOMAN if CATHERINE had explained the deal. SA HOLLOMAN replied that she had
explained it in general and that he knew it concerned ROLANDO MASFERRER but VALDES would have to explain the whole thing to him. VALDES stated that they wanted MASFERRER delivered to Cuba. SA HOLLOMAN asked if VALDES vented him delivered dead or alive to which VALDES replied they wanted him alive so he could be made to stand trial in Cuba. VALDES asked how SA HOLLOMAN thought he could get MASFERRER out of the U. S. SA HOLLOMAN said he wished to hear whatever plan VALDES had and he would either agree to the plan or would disapprove it. VALDES said he thought MASFERRER could be arrested and taken to a boat where he could be turned over to them. VALDES said MASFERRER would be taken out of Miami by boat. VALDES asked SA HOLLOMAN if he would need any assistance. SA HOLLOMAN said he probably would need help in getting MASFERRER to the boat because MASFERRER would certainly not go voluntarily. VALDES replied that he could make two or three men available to help SA HOLLOMAN get MASFERRER on the boat. 

VALDES agreed to pay SA HOLLOMAN 825,000.00 if MASFERRER was delivered to their boat within one week. SA HOLLOMAN asked VALDES if this was a final agreement or would it have to be approved by someone else. VALDES replied that this was a firm deal and SA HOLLOMAN could start working on his part immediately. VALDES said he would have to contact someone else about other details of the plan. SA HOLLOMAN expressed concern over what would happen when it van learned that MASFERRER had been kidnapped. VALDES said they planned to take MASFERRER into international waters, transfer him to a ship of the government of Cuba and then take him to Cuba. He said MASFERRER would be held in Cuba for several days then information would be released that MASFERRER had been captured while leading an invasion of Cuba. He would then be tried in the courts of Cuba. According to VALDES, this would make it appear that MASFERRER had come voluntarily to Cuba leading an expedition.

An G-2 agent named Fernandez de Castro came to Miami to consummate the deal and was arrested along with Valdes. After the arrest of two Castro agents on attempted kidnapping charges, J. Edgar Hoover sent a letter to then-Vice President RICHARD NIXON about the affair. [Castro agent Juan Fernandez De Castro Rodriguez FBI 105-84265-36] In March 1960 the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered seven Cuban exile leaders to leave Miami. Among them was Rolando Masferrer and Estaban Ventura Novo. [FBI 100-344127 - NR 3.15.60] On October 3, 1960, Rolando Masferrer landed 27 men in Cuba. These men included Bobby Fuller, Tony Zarba and Paul Hughes. [FBI 2-1622-38, Cover Page 6, Hughes FBI File No. 105-3138] Only three of the men were captured; the others escaped. On November 9, 1960, Rolando Masferrer informed the FBI that it was:
During interviews with Masferrer and particularly on November 9, 1960, Masferrer indicated it was common knowledge that the Cuban Revolutionary Front [an anti-Castro exile group under the supervision of E. HOWARD HUNT] FRD was engaged in recruiting activities in the United States and in some Latin American countries (FRD is part of the CIA covert operation). He claimed that the United States Government, through CIA and Tony Varona, a Cuban exile and FRD leader, is paying hundreds of thousands of dollars each month. He claimed Varona helped Castro in allowing Russians and Chinese to enter Cuba and is egotistical to such an extent he is waging a private war against Cuban exiles. Masferrer expressed a desire to join the Cuban Revolutionary Front although Varona was head of that organization. He stated he would cease all operations in his anti-Castro movement if he was so directed by the United States Government. He indicated that without being specific that the Cuban Revolutionary Front receives aid from United States officials in some American Embassies as well as in the United States. (Deleted).

Secretary of State Christian Herter received a report on this interview. [FBI 2-1622-45, 46] The Miami Herald reported in December 1960 that Rolando Masferrer had composed an army of 23 Americans and nearly 200 Cubans who were allegedly poised to invade Cuba. Rolando Masferrer's men were training at a base at No Name Key, Florida. The FBI reported:

Masferrer planned to use as staging area prior to moving men to island or country other than the U.S. prior to invasion of Cuba to avoid violation of U.S. laws. Reference is also made to Miami report of S.A. James D. Hayes, dated December 15, last, in this case, which among other things mentions arrest of vagrancy by Miami Police Department of 13 Masferrer supporters, including Kenneth Joseph Proctor, Alvin Carl Wentz, Nick John Neri, Welburn Vernon Gee, and Larry Lee Bice, Jr. It is noted therein Proctor stated this group intended leaving the U.S. unarmed, and proceed to an island located in international waters, where they would be armed before proceeding to invade Cuba. [FBI 2-1622-60; FBI 2-1622 NR 128 NR 12.19.60 w/h; 2-1622-1st NR serial after serial 51 (LHM) Enc.]

On December 30, 1960,

Frank J. Devine Bureau of Un-American Affairs, Department of State, contacted an FBI Liaison Agent making reference to our letter of November 30, 1960, and requested FBI assistance in stopping Masferrer. Frank J. Devine stated that recent newspaper publicity on Masferrer presented a good opening wedge for an FBI Agent to call on Masferrer and take him up on his offer to cease operations. Frank J. Devine was advised that we had no legal basis under which the FBI could intrude itself into the situation, and if we attempted to do so, it would put the FBI into the role of a messenger for the State Department and involve us in a
matter which is not our affair. On the memorandum prepared on the above contact by Frank J. Devine on December 30, 1960, the Director made reference to our letter of November 30, 1960, and noted: 'Note: State didn't get around to considering it for one month.' [Memo to Belmont FBI 2-1622-72]

HOOVER'S DILEMMA

On January 5, 1961, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was under pressure to indict Rolando Masferrer from the Department of Justice, which was headed by Robert F. Kennedy, yet he wrote that

Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice called and stated he thought he ought to bring me up to date on the Masferrer case (Neutrality Matters). Mr. Yeagley stated that the Bureau had investigated and submitted a detailed report on the case last Friday and his Division thinks they have a case, not a real open and shut case, but as far as the facts and laws are concerned, it looks like enough to go before a Grand Jury. Mr. Yeagley stated this is delicate in view of the break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, because if we start a Grand Jury, people are going to ask which side are we on, Fidel Castro's or the United States. Mr. Yeagley continued that as late as last Friday, he believed it was, he had a call from the State Department to see what we were doing, whether going ahead or not, and he, Mr. Yeagley, thought when he called the State Department back, as he intended, to get confirmation that they ought to go ahead despite the break in relations, he thought he ought to mention it to me because from the Justice Department's standpoint, they would normally proceed, but when they go to Miami, Justice is going to have the public relations problem.

I told Mr. Yeagley that I thought it would be a difficult one and that I recalled last week, I thought it was, some fellow in the State Department had wanted to know if we would not go to Masferrer and ask him to refrain from any activities that might embarrass this Administration and we refused and said it was the State Department's place to do it. This chap replied he at least made an effort to get us to do it but thought our reaction would be what it was, but it took so many days and weeks to get something like that cleared in the State Department, he had hoped we might do it on his request. Mr. Yeagley inquired if I thought this represented Masferrer's position and I told Mr. Yeagley it did not; that it was the man in the State Department, but that we had received word from Miami from Masferrer, or from his man, that Masferrer would be very glad to refrain from action of any kind and abide by whatever this Government wanted him to do and this State Department man, having been advised of this, was the one who asked us to go to Masferrer and ask if he would not
lay low for the time being. After checking with Mr. Belmont, I advised Mr. Yeagley that the man’s name was Frank J. Devine, Special Assistant, Bureau of Inter American Affairs. I stated Devine apparently thought we would fall for it right away, but our man wisely refused on the spot and Devine said then that he had assumed that would be our reaction but that it was impossible to get the State Department to clear something like this for days or weeks. I stated that his occurred, of course, before we broke relations with Cuba and whether that would have any effect or not I did not know, but I think that for us to start proceedings now is going to seized upon by the press in this country with severe criticism and it will be the Department of Justice that would be holding the bag, not the State Department as they won’t do it.

I stated the if he, Mr. Yeagley, has been following the news releases, there was quite a number of Senators and Congressmen who have been loud in their commendation of what the Administration has done in breaking relations with Cuba and indicated it should have been done long ago.

I stated the whole area in Miami public opinion is strongly sympathetic to the anti-Castro forces and in many of the hotels there are waiters and busboys who were very prominent in Cuba, having been lawyers, doctors and dentists, and you also have 40,000 to 50,000 refugees and the papers there each day have stories on the front page about the refugees; that at Christmas time a lot of food was sent by religious groups and there was quite a celebration for the refugee children; and in the midst of that, if we come out and start proceedings against Masferrer when he stands as being against Castro, I thought there would be very bad public reaction, both in the newspapers and in Congress, as everyone now is saying the Administration has done the thing they should have done long ago, with which I agree. I stated, however that the State Department is not going to take the blame nor is CIA and it would be up the the Justice Department.

I stated it was almost parallel to the situation in Drew Pearson’s column the past couple of days about the Hoffa case in Florida. I stated Pearson had jumped on Vice President Nixon for having tried to prevent the prosecution of Hoffa and successfully preventing the indictment until after the election and then the attorney general had gone ahead and indicted and now leaves it all with the new Attorney General. I stated I did not know whether Nixon interceded and I had by doubts, but, on the other hand, the case in Florida against Hoffa is fairly strong and I thought the indictment was proper. I stated I did know it had been held up a long time before finally going ahead; that the Special Assistant on the case, Dowd (phonetic) seemed to be a capable fellow and he had been trying to get an indictment for some time but there was a question of the individuals to be included, but there was no question about Hoffa, but a question about
third party in Detroit. I stated Drew Pearson is trying to make it appear as if it were done just as a dying gasp by the current Administration and I think there would be the same reaction in the Masferrer case.

I advised Mr. Yeagley that he could use the information about the call from Devine and indicate the position we took and it seemed to me that the State Department ought to put in black and white what they want done. Mr. Yeagley stated he thought he had to ask them to. I stated this was loaded with dynamite, because of the way the public had been reacting in Florida; that there is a hatred of Castro and I cited some incidents which had occurred while I was recently in Miami and it seemed to me that with that kind of public opinion, they were inviting great trouble if they went against Masferrer. Mr. Yeagley stated he thought I was right and appreciated my help.

I mentioned to Mr. Yeagley that I thought Masferrer was under some kind of immigration bond to refrain from certain activities, but I did not know. Mr. Yeagley said that was a good thought. I stated there were several factions of Cuban who were anti-Castro, but each one wants to be king. I stated however, that the State Department is not going to take the blame, nor is the CIA, and it would be up to the Justice Department. (Deleted as of 2010) Mr. Yeagley stated that might be what is behind and mentioned the Senate Committee is going to start an investigation next week of this fellow. I stated George Sokolsky had come out with a column and Senator Eastland’s Committee was going to hold public hearings on him as they think they have an Alger Hiss case. I stated that pressure to go against Masferrer may emanate from elements like this in State and CIA. I stated that CIA has a group training to go over and invade Cuba overthrow Castro and while it is supposed to be hush-hush, around Miami it more of less public knowledge that Castro knows about it as he has his agents over here who, no doubt, have penetrated the group, that Masferrer has not joined the group that CIA is backing and it may be some elements like that are involved. (Deleted as of 2010) I stated Masferrer was wealthy and I thought he got come money out of Cuba before he came to this country, but he has connections and is getting money and living in ease and comfort while other refugees are serving as waiters, etc. I stated Masferrer has not been allowed to join the group CIA has been supposed to be secretly backing and there may be some motivation to try to knock him off but it would backfire against Justice and not CIA.

Yeagley stated he has not been told but has inferred that (Deleted as of 2010). Mr. Yeagley stated they have a case where they would normally go ahead and indict with one count and maybe more, and he can't say don't do it, but the State Department can. (Deleted as of 2010) I stated it seems in view of the action of the President, it does not make sense and I did not see how getting an indictment against somebody trying to overthrow
Castro can be explained to the public. I stated I had noted in the press that it had been intimated by somebody in the State Department that the only way diplomatic relations with Cuba could be resumed would be the overthrow of Castro and here you would be prosecuting somebody who may not have the good will of our Administration but who wants to remove Castro and has more facilities really than some of these groups with CIA backing. I stated the sympathy down in Miami is all with the anti-Castro forces and it seems in any move is made, it ought to be at the specific request of the State Department and it should be in black and white, that it ought to be put in writing by them.

Mr. Yeagley stated that was excellent and he thought that is exactly the kind of help he needed and would let me know the outcome. He stated we had gone ahead with the investigation and we are holding the bag and we out to make the proper disposition. I stated it seemed to me if the disposition is made properly the State Department should indicate that prosecution would be ill-considered or ill advised and should so state their desires. Mr. Yeagley stated he appreciated my help and would let me know the outcome. [FBI Memo Hoover to Tolson, Mohr, Parsons, Belmont and DeLoach 1.5.61 (deleted) 1622-65]

In late January 1961, when the FBI was made aware of an anti-Castro sea-borne strike backed by Rolando Masferrer, the Miami FBI telexed Headquarters:

TO DIRECTOR FBI
FROM SAC MIAMI
MASFERRER NEUTRALITY MATTER

MM (deleted) Dash S advisedon January 25, 1961 instant that Kenneth J. Proctor, an American from Boston, Mass eleven Americans and three Cubans are going to leave in a day or two from Miami aboard the Marianne the Second, a six-eight foot yacht for an expedition to Cuba. The boat is presently in Miami, is of State of Virginia registry, and the owner, name unknown, gave permission to Proctor to take the boat. Two days after the expedition has gone the owner will report the boat stolen. Informant furnished names of Americans and Cubans participating. Proctor contacted FNU Cardenas CIA Cut out asked for arms and will receive an answer by 4:00 PM. Proctor swears that his group will go on expedition even without arms. Informant doubts if group can obtain arms from any other source. On January 24th last, Proctor allegedly received telephone call from Cuba telling him to land at Mamalata, Pinar Del Rio Province and proceed to Guajaibon, Pinar Del Rio. Proctor is to be met by two hundred anti-Castro revolutionists in Cuba and will join other anti-Castro forces in Cuba. Informant feels this may be a trap on the part of the Cuban Government. CIA, Miami, advised it had no operational interest in Proctor’s group and will not suppy arms. Miami Office notified US
Customs and US Border Patrol. US Customs said if boat has no arms aboard it will allow the expedition to leave. Unless Department of Justice authorized prosecution for conspiracy to violate neutrality act, Miami Office will take no action to stop this expedition. SAC Teague was instructed to locate and interview Proctor and such associates as are readily available regarding their plans...[Teletype to Dir. Fr. SAC Miami 1.25.61; JEH Memo for Tolson 1.5.61]

After the FBI interviewed Proctor's crew the expedition was called off.

ROLANDO MASFERRER AND JOHN F. KENNEDY

On February 4, 1961, Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to President John F. Kennedy telephoned the FBI and advised that "an individual whom he did not identify had just been in to see the President this morning and had discussed with the President the activities of a reported Cuban right-wing refugee now in Miami. Kenneth O'Donnell said that the name he got from the President for this Cuban was either 'Ferri' or 'Ferre' and his first name was 'Mas.' The President asked O'Donnell if he could identify this Cuban for him and find out something about him. O'Donnell wondered if we could be of any assistance, saying that this wasn't much to go on and the only additional information we had was that this Cuban may have been organizing troops." The FBI identified the Cuban as Rolando Masferrer.

Kenneth O'Donnell was called back and informed the individual to whom he referred was undoubtedly Masferrer. He was furnished briefly information as to his background and activities. It was specifically pointed out to O'Donnell that full details had been forwarded to the Justice Department, which at present time had a question of prosecution under consideration. O'Donnell was informed that we would be happy to send a letter to him furnishing him information relative to Masferrer. O'Donnell said this wasn't at all necessary as he had enough information to identify Masferrer for the President. O'Donnell was most appreciate and said nothing further need be done.

J. Edgar Hoover underlined the words "an individual whom he did not identify." He then wrote: "I don't understand how such a character gets in to see the President. H." [FBI 2-1622-78] On April 10, 1961, the Justice Department had the Immigration and Naturalization Service revoke Rolando Masferrer's parole as a warning to the Cuban exile community that he had no intention of restoring the Batista dictatorship in Cuba: "Acting District Director, Joseph Minton, INS, Miami, advised Masferrer served with written notice his parole has been revoked and Masferrer taken into detention. However, Masferrer, due to ill health (heart trouble) is under guard at Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, under care of Department of Public Health." [FBI 2-1622-92,94]
Rolando Masferrer was subsequently indicted for violations of the Neutrality Act. Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote a letter to the United States Attorney General which stated in part: "The continued presence at large of Rolando Masferrer in the United States and particularly in the State of Florida is prejudicial to our national interest...revoking this alien's parole, deporting him, or restricting his presence at large, would accordingly advance our foreign policy objectives." The FBI was instructed to handle the Rolando Masferrer arrest "with the utmost secrecy." [FBI 2-1622-961 4.7.61] One of the witnesses against Masferrer, Julio Fernandez Trevejo was put at the disposal of the Justice Department by the CIA. The unindicted co-conspirators were Armentino Feria Perez, aka "El Indio," Julio Fernandez Trevejo, Anselmo Aliegro, Franklin Joseph Williams, Horacio Canizares, Santiago Alvarez and one (FNU) Cartaya. [USDC SDF Indictment 12, 105-M] The Kennedy Administration had Justin F. Gleichauf, a CIA representative who was in contact with various law enforcement agencies, contact Judge Emmet Choate and inform him that

Masferrer sponsored anti-Castro activities at this time might be more a liability than an asset to developments in progress. Judge Choate was quite concerned that actions taken against Masferrer might be construed as a 'coddling' of anti-Castro elements, but indicated that he would delay Masferrer's hearing several days, and would give the matter further consideration. The U.S. District Attorney appeared to be quite happy with the developments as he stated that he had been afraid that Judge Choate would release Masferrer on April 17, 1961, the original date of the hearing." [CIA Justin F. Gleichauf to Chief, Contact Division.]

Released on bail, Rolando Masferrer was re-arrested in May 1961. He was charged with having violated the Neutrality Act by making war on Cuba. The charges were dropped five months later. FBI informant FRANK STURGIS became involved in the Rolando Masferrer case. [FBI 2-1622 NR 2.24.61, 107]

THE BAY OF PIGS BRIGADE - BRIGADE 2506

Manuel Artime was the military leader of the Cuban Revolutionary Front's military arm, Brigade 2506 (the Bay of Pigs Brigade). The Bay of Pigs Brigade was composed of
1,443 men. A split occurred within MRR when some of its leadership decided Manuel Artime had become a dictator who was to replace Fidel Castro, should the Cuban invasion be successful. Because of this Manuel Artime was assaulted, but HUNT stepped in and put an end to this revolt. HUNT made frequent trips between Washington, New Orleans, Miami and Guatemala trying to reconcile the dissension which plagued exile politics. He convinced Pedro Diaz Lanz and some expelled MRR members, who were followers of Carlos Prio Soccarras, to disband their counter-organization - the Liberation Alliance. [FBI Miami 105-1742 9.13.60] Orlando Bosch left Cuba in July 1960. In early 1961 the CIA imprisoned the opponents of Manuel Artime, then ejected them from the camp. The CPUSA reported that despite his anti-Batista credentials, Manuel Artime cultivated Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza as a major supporter. [Daily World 11.19.76 p4]

VICTOR PANEQUE AND ORLANDO BOSCH

Victor Manuel Paneque y Batista (201-286382) assumed military leadership of MRR in Miami and organized a infiltration team to re-enter Cuba to continue MIRR operations. Victor Paneque was born September 22, 1918 in Holguin, Oriente Province, Cuba. His formal education was short. From 1934 until 1942 he worked as a farmhand together with his father. In 1942 he had four months of military training and then served two years as an infantry private at the Military Base, Managua, and Province of Havana, Cuba. Released from military service in 1944 he found employment as a waiter and bartender in various bars in Holguin. He worked in this field until October 13, 1956, when he joined the 26th of July Movement and was appointed chief of all clandestine activity against the Batista regime for the Northern Coast of Oriente Province. Victor Paneque was arrested by the police of Bayamo, Oriente Province, sentenced to one year in prison by the Tribunal of Santiago De Cuba for conspiracy against the Batista regime. He served his sentence and was released on November 22, 1957. On November 27, 1957 he was appointed by the Castro organization Chief of Political Action, Sabotage and Violent Assaults, for Las Villas Province. He organized a "Front" on the North Coast of Las Villas which was eventually replaced by columns headed by Ché Guevara and Camillo Cienfuegos. In October 1958 Victor Paneque was chief of action for the Province of Pinar del Rio, Havana, and Matanzas and the area east of Havana. This operation took place between November 1959 and December 1959. From January 1, 1959, to January 5, 1959, the headquarters of Victor Paneque were located at the Sports Palace of Havana and when Fidel Castro entered the city, Victor Paneque turned over full control to his leader. On January 5, 1959, Victor Paneque was appointed Chief of the Revolutionary Army 5th Military District of Havana. He held this post for 22 days. In March 1959 he was made Chief of Public Order in the General Staff of the Rebel Army. In April 1959 Fidel Castro made him Chief of the Rural Police of Cuba. He was given full authority to set up and organize military schools for training a new rural police force. He established a school to train this force. None of the instructors there had been associated with the Communist Party of Cuba. Toward the end of October 1959 Castro was thoroughly disillusioned with the anti-Communist political attitude of the training school. He dissolved it and assigned its staff teaching jobs at the Peasant Militia schools. This decision was preceded by numerous violent
arguments between Victor Paneque and Fidel Castro and convinced Victor Paneque that Fidel Castro was a Communist. On November 9, 1959, Victor Paneque was removed from his post as Chief of Public Order and Chief of Rural Police. He was appointed administrator general of a large state-owned truck company. In spite of this prestigious position Victor Paneque escaped Cuba by small boat in 1960 and was picked up by an American tanker after drifting for 14 hours. He came to the United States on September 3, 1960. The CIA reported:

Paneque, y Batista, Victor Manuel, 201-286382. According to Carlos Quiroga, Victor Paneque was in charge of the military training camp conducted for Cubans from Miami in August 1963 at Lacombe, Louisiana. Quiroga added that before the coup, Paneque had been in charge of all underground work in Havana. Traces have shown that Paneque, AKA Commandante Diego, DPOB September 22, 1918 Holguin, Oriente Province, Cuba was the chied of rural police under Castro, was major in the army and also served as G-3 of the Cuban Army (chief of Public Order). Various reports indicate that:

(1) When Paneque arrived in the U.S. on or about September 7, 1960, he first stayed in the home of Dr. Orlando Bosch, suspected Castro agent and possible DGI member in Miami.

(2) He was associated with Carlos Rodriguez Castro, reported by an FBI source as a possible plant in anti-Castro organizations in U.S.

(3) Before he left Cuba, Paneque spent two hours with Raoul Castro.

(4) A Major Sanjenis, former G-2 Chief who, in 1960, was serving 10 years on the Isle of Pines, stated that Victor Paneque tried to give the impression that he was against the Castro Government but in reality was a Cuban Government agent. [CIA report from Joaquin Pedromo Sanjenis - dated September 21, 1960]

(5) That the general manager of the Pepsi Cola company said that Paneque had gone to Miami but was a member of G-2."

According to a report dated October 6, 1960, prepared by another office of this agency members of the Student Group at the University of Havana reported the presence in Miami of two Castro 'plants' said to be DGI agents. One of these was Victor Paneque. The information in this report came from a United States national with business contacts in the Latin American areas. UFGA-17153, August 10, 1964, discounted some of the foregoing and said that there had been reports that Victor Paneque had been on Castro's list of officers to be eliminated and that he had been in touch with anti-Castro groups in the Escambray before he fled Cuba. Moreover, he was given a polygraph examination on August 4, 1964, with
positive results. The Station requested a POA and commo clearance as soon as possible. The POA was granted on November 13, 1964. Victor Paneque was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on November 14, 1964, for use by JMATE, which was canceled October 13, 1965. UFGA-23382, October 5, 1965, reported that Victor Paneque was to be terminated as of October 31, 1965, because there was no immediate operational use for him. [To: Ass. C. Of Staff Dept. Army Atten: Interagency Source Register. Subject: Paneque SD-10237]

In 1967 the CIA reported "Victor Manuel (Paneque) Batista 201-282382 Station has not had contact with Subject since his termination." [CIA 12.30.67 100-300-17 00005] The CIA received a report on March 31, 1962, which indicated that Victor Paneque was the organizer of a hunger strike group and was the first speaker at a rally to urge the United States to give arms to exiled Cubans. The CIA reported: "Victor Paneque was the first speaker. He advised the audience that the "Hunger Strike to Death" took place to show JFK that the Cubans are willing to die in exile if their right to defend Cuba from Communism is negated. The motto of the strike is 'Hunger or War.' The strike was primarily initiated to ask for arms for the Cubans in exile. He also stated that the compatriots in Cuba are asking in despair what the Consejo is doing to solve the Cuban problem. In answer to that question Paneque said the Consejo has done nothing and means nothing in the USA and Cuba. The Consejo should step aside and allow action people to take over the direction of the Cubans in exile." Luis Conte Aguerro also spoke at this rally. [CIA 201-286382]

MRR and MIRR

During a deposition in HUNT v. WEBERMAN, STURGIS explained MRR and MIRR were two different groups:

The MIRR was a group headed by Dr. Orlando Bosch, who broke off from the MIRR in Cuba and formed his own organization that was the MIRR. Manuel Artime never worked in the MIRR. Remember, there are two different organizations, two different leaders. Dr. Bosch was the leader of the MIRR. I just want to specify that, you know.

Associates of MRR in the United States included Alexander Rorke, William Johnson and STURGIS. The HSCA reported that STURGIS and William Johnson provided the CIA information on Cuban exile activities. A highly deleted FBI document read: "FIORINI is presently cooperating and associating with Orlando Bosch cooperating and associating with Orlando Bosch..." [CIA Secret Document F.O. Case # deleted]
ORLANDO BOSCH

In late 1961 Orlando Bosch was given CIA support and relocated to a camp at Homestead, Florida. Orlando Bosch, however, came to the conclusion the camp was an exercise in futility. He believed that the CIA had no intention of mounting another invasion of Cuba, or of even initiating guerrilla attacks. Unofficially, his CIA contact confirmed these suspicions. After nine months of inactivity, Orlando Bosch sent a complaint to President Kennedy and then he closed down the camp. On January 11, 1962, the CIA'S PM (Para-Military) stated that it maintained contact with Orlando Bosch through Case Officer (Deleted). [Memo For Chief of Operations. Subject PM Contact with the Constitutional Thesis (Garcneran)]

MIRR engaged in a series of bombing raids over Cuba aimed at destroying Cuba's sugar-producing capacity. It also conducted air strikes against a MIG base in Cuba. The Justice Department charged Orlando Bosch with sponsoring these attacks. Orlando Bosch was acquitted with the help of sympathetic Federal judges like Emmett Choate who had stated: "I hope the American people are wise enough when they elect another President. I'm a staunch Republican; but I don't care whether he's a Republican or Democrat or a Socialist, if necessary, so long as he's a patriot and he'll do everything he can to wipe out this communistic influence that seems to pervade at times through our Capitol; namely Washington, D.C." [SD Fla 70-389-Cr-EC] Orlando Bosch felt betrayed by the Kennedy Administration and the CIA.

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

The founder of the Christian Democratic Movement, Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco, was a delegate to the Cuban Revolutionary Front. Jose Ignacio Rasco was a 35-year old former lawyer and professor who founded the Christian Democratic Movement during early 1960 in Cuba. Initially, this group, consisting of several hundred people, had supported the Cuban revolution in general terms, although it was critical of communist infiltration of the Castro movement. The Christian Democratic Movement also strongly advocated private property and the free enterprise system and warned against Castro's attacks on these institutions. As a result, the group found itself increasingly at odds with Castro's policy and by April 1960 Christian Democratic Movement leaders decided they could no longer operate freely in Cuba. On May 18, 1960, Jose Ignacio Rasco took refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy, Havana, at the same time blasting Castro for his failure to hold elections and his tolerance of communist infiltration. Rasco was granted safe conduct and came to Miami on April 22, 1960. On May 3, 1960, the CIA's Office of Security made hotel reservations in New York City for Jose Ignacio Rasco for four days. By June 1960 Jose Ignacio Rasco had met with HUNT and aligned the Christian Democratic Movement with the Cuban Revolutionary Front. The Christian Democratic Movement was comprised of many former members of Fidel Castro's military including
Victor Paneque, however, the FBI reported: "The MDC had about 1,000 men operating in Havana and Pinar del Rio Provinces prior to the April invasion. They are led by Captain Ruben Carcines, a career military man who had an office job under Batista. The group is made up of persons who are former supporters of Batista but who did not participate in any strong man operations." [NO DA file-interview with Quigora p6; FBI 97-4133 NR 1.31.62] Pedro Diaz Lanz was a member of the Christian Democratic Movement. [HSCA V10 p72; HUNT Day p12; Facts On File NY 62 Lib. Cong. Cat. #64-16075] In late 1960 there were indications that the leaders of the Christian Democratic Movement were impatient with waiting for action and were becoming mistrustful of Cuban Revolutionary Front leadership. Beginning in November 1960, the Christian Democratic Movement occasionally initiated independent actions without consulting the Cuban Revolutionary Front. [FBI 97-4110 NR 191 3.24.61] The January 27, 1961, issue of the Washington Daily News reported that Rasco predicted that acts of great importance including sabotage and something more than sabotage. In February 1961 the FBI Office in Springfield, Missouri, requested permission from Washington, D.C. to open a case on the Christian Democratic Movement. The Springfield office was advised that the Christian Democratic Movement was a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Front and: "The Bureau has advised on a need-to-know basis that (deleted as of 2010). The Bureau has instructed that no investigation is to be conducted of Cuban Revolutionary Front and member organizations, but any information received should be furnished to the Bureau." [FBI 97-4110-28 2.6.61]

After the Bay of Pigs, the Christian Democratic Movement split into two factions. One group was headed by Laureano Batista Falla and the other by "Lucas." "Lucas" worked with the successor to the Cuban Revolutionary Front, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, while Laureano Batista Falla dissociated the Christian Democratic Movement from the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The FBI stated: "On June 5, 1961, Jose Cardoso, Chicago leader of the Christian Democratic Movement of of the anti-Castro Cuban revolutionary groups which comprised the FRD, advised as follows: In late May 1961 the Christian Democratic Movement disassociated itself from the Cuban Revolutionary Front on a national basis and it was believed that other anti-Castro groups had also dropped out of the Cuban Revolutionary Front, for one reason or another." [FBI 97-4110 Chicago 6.6.61] On May 16, 1961, the Chief of the CIA's Contact Division L/A Branch received this report from Robert P. B. Lohmann of Chicago:

Richard Cain (our private eye) passed the following on to me...He was hired as a bodyguard for Jose Rasco during Rasco's visit to Chicago last week and he heard details of some of the covers that took place. One Manny Fefferman, described by Cain as a 'thief, a sharpie with an arrest record' has been given the authority to collect funds for the Christian Democratic Movement by Rasco. When Cain told Rasco that Fefferman was no good, Rasco answered that some of the money was bound to be turned over out of Fefferman's collections and that the Christian Democratic Party needs all it can get. That Abascal, a delegate of the Christian Democratic Party was to see Robert Kennedy last weekend to try and get U.S. dollars switched from the Varona/Cuban Revolutionary
Front/OA to the Christian Democratic Party and if they fail, to enlist the aid of Adenauer of West Germany, to intercede for them, in his capacity with the German Christian Democratic Party, with President Kennedy. That there are very bitter arguments and serious splits among the groups over which is to get control of the dollars. [Richard Cain file #272141 5.17.61]

From March 10, 1962, to March 12, 1962, Laureano Batista Falla was one of the organizers of the hunger strike in Miami protesting the lack of determination on the part of the Kennedy Administration to overthrow Castro. Batista was the Cuban who officially ended the strike. [FBI 109-584-3681]

ARTIME AND KENNEDY

In December 1962 Manuel Artime was released from prison in Cuba. In January 1963 Artime met with President John F. Kennedy and United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and he asked them for six American Army Divisions for an attack on Cuba. The Kennedys refused because the United States was not planning military intervention in Cuba. [FBI 105-8544 NR 7.31.63] Manuel Artime told the FBI in June 1963, that he participated in CIA-authorized anti-Castro missions ever since his release. Soon, the Kennedy Administration ordered pay cuts for the Bay of Pigs veterans. In response, Manuel Artime formed a Bay of Pigs Brigade Veterans Association at the same time actively recruiting in Miami for MRR. The recruits were to be sent to a training camp located in Louisiana. From there, they would go to a base in Nicaragua sponsored by Anastasio Somoza. In July 1963 the CIA bugged Manuel Artime's safehouse. [CIA 210838 Folder 7] The coverage was requested by the Chief, Special Affairs Staff, DDO, Desmond FitzGerald. Results of coverage: Office of Security files do not contain reference to coverage results. The FBI reported in November 1963: "Artime had been offered aid by the Somoza regime...an American at Fort Benning, Captain Robert K. Brown, was reported as a possible acquaintance of Artime."

Manuel Artime told the FBI that the CIA supported his anti-Castro efforts. The FBI never disputed this: "For Bureau's information it is public knowledge among the Cuban colony in Miami...that MRR members themselves claim to have United States backing. Artime travels all over Central America, has no problem obtaining reentry permits from the U.S. Government, and neither Artime or the MRR have any financial problems." At this time, Manuel Artime attempted to undercut the efforts of the Kennedy Administration to train Cuban exiles at Fort Benning, Georgia, by persuading a group of Cuban officers to resign and join MRR. [RG I, 112th Intell. Group, San Antonio, Texas 1963 Army Rep Re: Cuban Officer Training Program 12.5.63, 12.28.63] The FBI reported that on July 16, 1963, Artime held a press conference and stated that the MRR was going to move out of the United States and establish bases in Central America. "He refused to identify the country or countries where the bases would be established. Artime accused the United States government of impeding Cuban exile efforts against the government of Cuba, and said that although the United States government is sympathetic with Cuban exiles, the Fidel Castro government in Cuba cannot be overthrown by sympathy. Artime said his group would continue to infiltrate arms and men into Cuba, and help the
underground in Cuba, but MRR does not plan to conduct any raids against Cuban shipping." [FBI 97-4133-69]

THE DEATH PLOTS AGAINST CASTRO
JAMES O'CONNELL AND TONY VARONA

William Harvey's established an assassination group within the CIA. Peter Wright stated in 1961 William Harvey told him: "We're developing a new capability [assassination] in the company to handle these kinds of problems." The HSCA interviewed James O'Connell about William Harvey's assassination group. James O'Connell, a former FBI Agent, started as a CIA Operational Support Branch Chief. He then served as the Chief of Station of a domestic field office and became Division Chief of Headquarters Operational Support between 1960 and 1962. In 1962 he was transferred to the Far East, and became Chief Regional Security Officer there. Upon returning to the United States, he assumed the title of Deputy Director for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security of the Office of Security. He retired in June 1973. James O'Connell contacted John Rosselli about Tony Varona. In 1993 the CIA revealed that "When Juan Orta was not successful in carrying out the mission against Fidel Castro, TRAFFICANTE suggested Tony Varona be used. John Rosselli contacted Tony Varona. Tony Varona was to use assets of his own to carry out the mission." HUNT told the SSCIA he served as a paymaster to Tony Varona, but was unaware of Tony Varona's role in an assassination plot against Fidel Castro. Artine told the SSCIA the same.

John Rosselli, born in Italy on July 4, 1905, entered the United States illegally at age six. John Rosselli joined the Capone Mob in Chicago, where he worked for Sam Giancana. When James O'Connell met with Rosselli he first "called Mr. Cregar per our agreement with the FBI." [CIA D-000678]

James O'Connell was asked by the HSCA: "Directing your attention to 1960, did there come a time when you, in your official CIA capacity, became involved in an operation to assassinate Castro?" James O'Connell answered, "Yes, he had." The CIA assassination effort to which James O'Connell referred was supervised by William Harvey. The HSCA asked James O'Connell if he were involved in Phase Two of this assassination plan, which took place about the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion. James O'Connell answered: "Very generally as I remember it, and again I'm calling upon my memory here. And I'm not sure, I remember Giancana meeting one of the members of the Cuban Junta, an individual by the name of Varona. Now whether that was before the Bay of Pigs or after the Bay of Pigs, I'm at a total loss to tell you. That, I think, was part of the Second Phase." [HSCA V5 p251] James O'Connell was referring to the Cuban Revolutionary Front when he said "Cuban Junta." The HSCA Report stated: "At the time of his introduction into the CIA-organized crime plots, Tony Varona was active in the Cuban Revolutionary Front and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Adding to the support for the Cuban exile leader were the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini...In his HSCA testimony Tony Varona described a meeting with an anti-Castro Cuban and Meyer Lansky in Meyer Lansky's home in Miami in the Summer of 1960." Tony Varona: "Mr. Lansky offered us to conducted (sic) a campaign in the U.S. favoring
the Cuban movement and against Castro. At the beginning I accepted his offer. When I met with HUNT afterwards, he told me to discontinue the contacts with this man. And that was it; it ended. I did not ask Mr. HUNT how he knew of my contact with Mr. Lansky." James O'Connell added that either TRAFFICANTE or Sam Giancana introduced him to Tony Varona, who was given a poison pill to use against Castro. [HSCA Ev. & Imp. CIA Spon. Ass. Con. Against Castro p171]

Tony Varona's assistant for fund raising operations and for public relations matters was **Edward Kipper Moss**. Edward Moss (born June 23, 1916) was a graduate of Yale University and George Washington University Moss was a highly decorated World War II Navy veteran who had served in government under several Presidents. On October 22, 1962, the CIA considered issuing an Operation Clearance for Edward Kipper Moss. [Response to Green List Request No. 109631] On December 3, 1964, a Routing And Record Sheet on Moss from CI/OA was created which was sent to CA/PAG and CIA/OA 2B-11. Attached to this was a dossier on Edward Moss which indicated that he was a Staff writer, Atlantic City (N.J.) Evening Union 1935-1936, Atlantic Press 1936-37 etc. asst. chief analysis & reports div. Natl. Emergency Council 1939-40; chief info section Office of Govt. Reports, 1940-1942, dir. pub. Rel. Amer. Mgmt. Assn. 1946-50 etc. Moss was the Public Relations man for several African nations. [Response to Green List Request No. 109631 From Edward P. Dunn CA/PAG] On March 24, 1965, Lewis J. Lapham, Acting Chief, Covert Action Staff, generated a Memorandum to the DD/P regarding Edward Moss:

1. Our records show that clearances were obtained by NE Division and by CA Staff, for possible use of Subject in the public relations field. The records do not show any use of Moss by either element.

2. So far as CA Staff is concerned, Moss simply is a file under (Deleted) we have no intention of using him. A full bio sketch is available if anyone is interested. Signed Lewis J. Lapham Acting Chief, Covert Action Staff CA/PEG/WC Needham: rh..."

The CIA generated this report on Edward Moss.

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

**FROM:** Jerry G. Brown

**SUBJECT:** Moss, Edward K. #172 646

1. Reference is made to a memorandum, dated February 28, 1968, captioned "Brazil Fishing Venture and Russian Fishing Vessels" submitted by Edwin P. Wilson (#104 653) (Louis N. KAROKAI-ps) who at the time was a Staff agent under commercial cover under Domestic Operations Division / Deputy Director Plans. In this memorandum Wilson outlined his 'limited' contacts with Moss. Wilson stated that he had met Moss in 1966
through Frank O'Connell, Washington representative of the Transport Worker's Union. The memorandum also suggests that one of Wilson's business associates, Richard S. Cobb (#503 714), was also having business contracts with Moss.

2. In referenced memorandum, Wilson stated that "subsequent investigation surfaced information and a verbal report from Dunn and Bradstreet recognizing Moss' long standing 'Mafia' connections. Moss' operation seems to be government contracts for the underworld and probably surfaces money in legitimate business activities."

3. The Moss Office of Security file is devoid of any further information concerning potential Mafia connections on his part. The OS file will not be summarized as present, but will be highlighted in a forthcoming memorandum.

4. As a result of the foregoing, research was initiated concerning Moss which resulted in the recovery of an FBI letterhead memorandum, dated January 18, 1961, captioned, "Manuel Antonio Varona, Internal Security, Cuba," containing information furnished to the FBI by a "representative of an Agency of the United States Government." The information the FBI received from the other U.S. Government Agency is as follows:

A Washington businessman who desires that his name be left out of this record, called on me today and expressed his great concern about the relationships of one of the anti-Castro group leaders with representatives of the so-called International Crime Syndicate. In summary his observations were as follows:

(a) Tony Varona, 201-196435, is reputed to be the leader of an anti-Castro group in the Miami area. Varona lives in Miami at the present time.

(b) Varona had taken on Edward K. Moss as his assistant for raising funds to finance operations against Castro and for public relations matters. Edward K. Moss had an office address of 1025 Connecticut Avenue, North West, Washington, D.C.

(c) Julia Cellini is alleged to be Moss' mistress and operates a secretarial service at 1025 Connecticut Avenue, North West, Washington, D.C. It is reported her secretarial service is really a front for Edward K. Moss' activities.

(d) Julia's father is reported to have been one of the big numbers racketeers until a few years ago.
(e) Julia Cellini’s brother, Dino Cellini, and his brother (FNU) are active fronts for two of the largest casinos that operated in Cuba until the Castro regime.

(f) It is alleged the Cellini brothers are in close contact with Tony Varona, through Edward Kipper Moss, and have offered to contribute considerable sums of money (reported as high as two million dollars) through Edward K. Moss to Tony Varona to finance operations against the Castro regime, with the understanding that they would have the major slice "in the Cuba of the future."

(j) My informant stated that American businessmen are being contacted by Edward K. Moss' organization to solicit funds for Varona's contemplated operations against the Castro regime.

The Washington businessman was quite concerned over the impact and potential propaganda value of this alleged connection of Tony Varona and the alleged racketeers in the event this organization is penetrated by Castro's intelligence organization. He enjoys many contacts throughout Latin America and fears that any propaganda stories by the Castro regime regarding such a relationship between Varona, American businessmen and Edward K. Moss’ activities would have serious impact on United States prestige throughout Latin America.

5. The referenced FBI letterhead memorandum referred to CSCI 3/762,992 regarding the Cellini brothers, but this CSCI was not recovered when IP traces were conducted in the name of the Cellini brothers mentioned below. The FBI additionally reported that Julia, Dino, Edward and Goffredo Cellini are the children of Benvenuto Cellini and that Dino Cellini is believed to be identical with Dino Vincent Cellini, FBI Number 2198122. The FBI further reported that prior to the fall of the Batista regime in Cuba, that Edward Goffredo Cellini and Goffredo Cellini were known to be the evening manager and afternoon manager, respectively, at the Casino International in Havana, Cuba. Dino Vincent Cellini was formerly employed in the gambling casino at the Tropicana night club in Havana.

7. Polk's Directory reflects that all of the following were living at 8144 Eastern Avenue. N.W. Washington, D.C. phone TU-2-3627: Julia T. Cellini, Consultant, General Services Administration, Adorna Cellini, employee Federal Aviation Administration, Benvenuto Cellini, manager, Piece of Pizza Inc. and Liberata Cellini, wife of Benvenuto.

9. Office of Security File #529 101 concerns Julia T. Cellini. This file was established as result of the recent research relative to the association between Edward K. Moss and Julia T. Cellini. An FBI report was
recovered in the name of Rouhi Jamil (Office of Security #36 384), dated June 18, 1957. Apparently the FBI was attempted to determine the subscriber to certain telephone numbers that Jamil was cognizant of, Jamil then being the Syrian Consul General and a member of the Syrian delegation to the United States. Among these numbers was TUckerman-2-3627 which was subscribed to by Benvenuto M. Cellini in 1956 with an address of 8144 Eastern Avenue N.W. Washington, D.C. The FBI report established the identitites of the family of Benvenuto M. Cellini, among them being Julie Cellini, then President Treasurer of the Washington Business Service; that in March 1952 Adorna Linda Cellini, sister of Julia Cellini, stated that her brother Dino Cellini was in Cuba.

The FBI report concluded with the following statement: "On February 12, 1945, Inspector Baer of the Washington Field Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service advised SA John P. Stutskan that during a naturalization investigation being conducted in Ohio concerning one Bernard Nucilli, it was learned that Nucilli had been making daily long distance telephone calls to Union1645, Mt. Ranier, Maryland. Inspector Bear advised the Nucilli had a reputation of being a procurer and a nightclub gambler around Alliance, Ohio. Baer stated that the number UNION 1645 was listed under the name of Nella L. Cellini, of Mt Ranier and that Julia Cellini and Dino V. Cellini also resided at that address. Inspector Baer advised that Julia Cellini had been a procurer and there was some evidence that Dino V. Cellini was also a procurer. Inspector Baer among other things, based his opinion concerning Dino V. Cellini on the fact that Cellini had no apparent means of income but regularly traveled by plane from Washington, D.C. to New York City, from New York City to Ohio, from Ohio to Florida and from Florida to Washington. He further advised that in an INS investigation then going on there was evidence Dino Cellini was a procurer. Based upon Inspector Baer’s allegation, an investigation was conducted by the FBI. At the conclusion of this investigation no definite information had been developed indicating a violation of the White Slave Traffic Act.

10. 201-885706 concerns Dino Vincent Cellini, born on November 19, 1914, which was opened in 1971 when an unsolicited dispatch was provided to the Rome Station for information on Dino Cellini who was then living in Rome. For the most part the dispatch referred to information already mentioned in instant memorandum. However the the dispatch did reflect that Dino V. Cellini was detained in May 1959 in Havana by Cuban authorities at the request of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics. Cellini’s name had been included in a list published by the U.S. Bureau of narcotics concerning U.S. citizens suspected of dealing in narcotics. Cellini was subsequently released June 1959 for lack of evidence. Dino V. Cellini worked at the Casinos Tropicana and Riviera in Cuba before going to Haiti, and as of 1961, he was residing in Miami, Florida.
11. The April 1970 edition of *True Magazine* contained an article entitled "The Mafia vs the CIA" by Andrew St. George. This article deals mainly with alleged CIA and Mafia conflicts for "influence" in the Caribbean. The article comments on the activities of Meyer Lansky (Office of Security #623 652) and mentions the name of Lansky's subordinates, one being Dino Cellini. It is considered quite possible that Dino Cellini is the brother of Julia T. Cellini. The article suggests the following were also Lansky's subordinates; Ben Sigelbaum, Ed Levinson, Sid Jacobs, Joe Napolitano, Joseph Krikorian and Mike McLaney. IS Subject files are negative in these names except for the names of Meyer Lansky (#623 652), Edward Levinson (#463 982) and Michael McLaney (#509 046) however these files contain nothing of pertinence to instant memorandum.

12. In regard to Julia T. Cellini, the Office of Security file of Subject, Edward K. Moss reflects that from 1950 to 1953, Moss was serving in an appointed position with the United States Government, first as an Assistant Administrator in charge of Public Information, National Production Authority; and then with the Defense Production Administration, both with the Department of Commerce. Moss's secretary during this period was Julia T. Cellini, who later became a close business partner of Moss.

13. The foregoing would suggest that Moss does indeed have potential underworld connections. Jerry G. Brown FIOB/SRS.

[CIA Memo for DC/SRS from Jerry G. Brown 5.14.73; CIA Index Card 138879]

Tony Varona told the HSCA he did not know Edward Kipper Moss or anyone named Cellini. Robert Aime Maheu was part of William Harvey's assassination effort aimed at Fidel Castro. Robert Maheu [SF #111 540; born October 30, 1917, Waterville, Maine] had been employed as a FBI S.A. from 1940 to 1947. Upon resigning from the Bureau, Maheu formed a private enterprise doing business as "Dairy Dream Products." The venture culminated in bankruptcy in 1952. In 1952 he became Security Director of the Small Business Administration. In February 1954, he was forced to resign from the Small Business Administration because of political reasons, determined to be the result of his backing the wrong political party in the election. He then set up his own investigative organization known as Robert A. Maheu Associates. Prior to 1954 the CIA component NE/NS had an interest in Maheu.

In 1954 Maheu received a Cover Security Approval from Central Cover Staff. Maheu was recruited by the Office of Security of the CIA to perform certain operational support
activities: "He was initially recruited by the Office of Security in 1954 and granted a Provisional Operational Approval on August 30, 1954. He performed many sensitive Office of Security assignments and also accepted assignments from elements of the Deputy Director for Plans.

5. Some of these assignments included the following:

A. (Deleted) The procurement of feminine companionship for President Sukarno during an official State visit to this country during the period (deleted) (See attached Tab 1 – taken from “Family Jewels” memorandum dated May 16, 1973.

B. Johnny Rosselli. The use of a member of the Mafia in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, initiated in August 1960. (See attached Tab 2---taken from 'Family Jewels' memorandum dated May 16, 1973)

C. Cover. Various Clandestine Service officers met with Mr. Maheu over the years from March 1954 to 1970 to determine the feasibility of using his firm for non-official purposes. Actual cover uses were provided for one officer in Mr. Maheu's Washington Office from September 1964 to June 1966 and another officer used the cover of Maheu Associates from August 1, 1968 to December 31, 1970. (See attached Tab 3 - Director of Security Memorandum to Director / Counter-Intelligence January 20, 1971.)

6. No contact had been made with Mr. Maheu since the termination of the above cover arrangement." [CIA Eyes Only Memo 10.4.73]

In 1954 Robert Maheu received $500 a month from the OS. The CIA reported:

In July 1954, Maheu was engaged by 'British shipping interests' to check on Aristotle Onassis' activities while in the United States. This included technical coverage of the New York office of Aristotle Onassis. It was later learned that the principal 'British interest' was Stavros Niarchus and that the ultimate goal of this task was to scrap the Onassis/Saudi oil deal. Maheu took the job but conditioned his acceptance with the fact that he would do nothing inimical to the U.S. Government. Any information developed of interest to the United States was to be passed by Maheu to the appropriate government agency.

During this operation Maheu had his staff employee prepare a paper citing dangers to the U.S. economy and trade resulting from the Onassis deal. Through contacts in FOA, Maheu had Harold Stassen read this paper in the National Security Council on June 22, 1954. During the same period Maheu briefed Scott McLeod, Assistant Secretary of State for Security and Consular Affairs on the project. McLeod agreed to furnish State commo
and pouch facilities subject to John Foster Dulles' approval. Additionally, Maheu briefed J. Edgar Hoover and Vice President Nixon.

In August 1954 Maheu advised this office of his relationship with Niarchus. NEA Division was contacted and expressed interest in this matter. They were put in touch with Maheu and furnished him a commo channel, a pouch sys and operational guidance. International litigation erupted as a result of the Onassis / Niarchus matter and as a result Niarchus claimed Government priviledge in the case, the Agency was subsequently identified as being the Government agency involved. Files of this Office reflect extensive correspondence furnished us by the Office of General Counsel in 1956 regarding the Onassis matter.

On August 16, 1954 Subject was granted a covert security clearance for utilization as an agent under Project (Deleted) in the Near East. On August 30, 1954 he was granted a similar clearance to permit his use in the United States as covert associate under PROJECT LPHIDDEN. In November of 1957 a cable from (deleted) indicated that Mr. Maheu had allegedly been involved in a violation of the Mann Act in procuring and transporting prostitutes for (deleted) during (Deleted's) visit to the United States in (deleted). Mr. Maheu contacted this Office to advise that the allegations were without foundation and stated that he would take steps to immediately have his attorney see that appropriate (deleted) official would retract these charges. This was subsequently done. Edward Bennett Williams acted as Maheu’s lawyer in this matter.

In 1957 information was received indicating that during President Sukarno’s visit to Moscow in the fall of 1956, he was introduced to a Soviet woman within the Kremlin. He had an affair with her against the admonitions of his advisors. It was reported that the Soviets took detailed films of the affair and that a copy was sent to the PKI. In June of 1957 Al Ulmer and Samuel Halpern, FE Division, contacted the Director of Security and outlined a project wherein they envisioned a film being made simulating this affair. It was planned that clips from this film would be inserted in a leaflet for distribution throughout Southeast Asia suggesting that Sukarno was compromised by the Soviets. In July of 1957 Robert Maheu was given this assignment. He utilized a trusted make employee of this organization (since deceased) and his fiancé. Maheu, after an intensive makeup course, administered makeup to the participants himself, utilizing available pictures and descriptions of the subjects as a guide. He hired a studio where he was given detailed instruction on the use of the lights and camera. When the film was taken, only Maheu and the two participants were in the studio. The project known as “Happy Days” was never completed and the film was not distributed.
Files of this office reflect that during the 1958-1959 period, FE Division was put in touch with Maheu by this Office for assistance in another operation relating to President Sukarno. This project was originated in May 1958 when FE Division initially contacted the Director of Security and briefed him on the project now as (deleted). Basically the project capitalized on Surkarno’s weakness for Caucasian women. Robert Maheu was given the assignment to locate a female candidate. He advised that a prominent (deleted) attorney and “man about town” (deleted) could come up with a qualified woman. (Deleted) was investigated with favorable results and given a CSA on (deleted) but was not made witting of CIA interest. The female candidate was (deleted) resident of (deleted) considered to be highly intelligent and extremely attractive. In August of 1958 the Project (deleted) plan was concurred in by the COPS and DCI.

In September of 1958 Maheu and James O’Connell of this Office met with (deleted) in New York City. (Deleted) was briefed on Agency interest in this matter. Later in September Maheu met with (deleted) under his true name and told her of governmental interest. (Deleted) knew Maheu’s true identity having been introduced to him socially by (deleted). On the same day (September 23, 1958) (deleted) was introduced to Joseph Smith, FE Division (known to both (deleted) and Maheu as Joseph Sims. (Deleted) was briefed on the assignment, indicated that she understood exactly what was expected of her and stated that she could leave the country in 45 days. On September 24, 1958 Sims again met with (deleted) at which time she was told she would be accompanied by a female traveling companion. (Deleted) Hogarth (actually (deleted) FE Division) (Deleted) was told that Hogarth would ostensibly be her secretary but would be, in fact, the person she would look to for direction. It is known that she did meet Sukarno, but due to unfortunate timing that had him leaving his country on official business she had little time to cultivate him. Consequently the purpose of the mission was not fulfilled. The last known contact (deleted) had with the Agency was in the form of a telephone call on April 12, 1961 when she called on a sterile line and talked to Hugh Tovar. She advised that one (deleted) had asked her to give a party for President Sukarno on April 21, 1961. (Deleted) wanted to know whether the Agency was interested in sponsoring this party. A negative response was given...In August 1960 Richard M. Bissell, the then DD/P contacted the Director of Security regarding the Rosselli matter. Details concerning this are set forth in Attachment B.

SUBJECT: The Johnny Rosselli Matter:

1. In August 1960 Mr. Richard Bissell approached the then Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, to determine if the Office of Security had any assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.
2. Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a small group was knowledgeable of the project. The DCI was briefed and gave his approval. Colonel J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, was briefed, but all details were concealed from any of the JMWAWE officials. Certain TSD and Communications personnel participated in the initial planning stages but were not witting of the purpose of the mission.

3. Robert Maheu, a cleared source of the Office of Security was contacted, briefed generally on the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an entree into gangster elements as the first step toward accomplishing the desired goal.

4. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny Rosselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. Maheu knew Rosselli only casually through clients but had been given to understand that Rosselli was a high ranking member of the Syndicate and controlled all of the ice making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if Rosselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into Cuban gambling.

5. Maheu was asked to approach Rosselli, who knew Maheu as a personal relations executive handling domestic and foreign accounts. Maheu was to tell Rosselli that he had recently been retained by a client who represented several international business firms which were suffering heavy financial losses in Cuba as a result of Castro's action. These firms were convinced that Castro's removal was the answer to the problem and were willing to pay a price of $150,000 for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made clear to Rosselli that the United States Government was not and should not become aware of this operation.

6. The pitch was made to Rosselli on September 14, 1960, at the Hilton Plaza Hotel in New York City. Mr. James O'Connell, Office of Security, was present during this meeting and was identified to Rosselli as an employee of Maheu. O'Connell actively served as Rosselli's contact until May 1962 at which time he phased out due to an overseas assignment. Rosselli's initial reaction was to avoid getting involved, but through Maheu's persuasion he agreed to introduce him to a friend, Sam Gold, who knew the Cuban crowd. Rosselli made it clear that he would not want any money for his part, and he believed that Gold would feel the same way. Neither of these individuals were ever paid out of Agency funds.

7. During the week of September 25, 1960, Maheu was introduced to Gold at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach. During this meeting Maheu also met an individual identified as "Joe" who was supposedly a courier operating between Havana and Miami. Several weeks later Maheu saw photographs of both of these individuals in the Sunday Supplemental
Parade. They were identified as Momo Salvatore Giancana and SANTOS TRAFFICANTE. Both were on the list of the Attorney Generals ten most wanted men. Giancana was described as the Chicago Chieftain of the Cosa Nostra and successor to Al Capone. TRAFFICANTE was identified as the Cosa Nostra boss of Cuban operations. Maheu called this office immediately upon ascertaining this information.

8. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but that he be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro’s food or drink. Gold indicated that he had a perspective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kickback payments for a gambling interest and who still had access to Castro and was still in a financial bind.

9. TSD was requested to produce six pills of high lethal content which were then delivered to Orta by Joe. After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet and asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

10. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Varona, one of the principal officers in the Cuban exile junta, had become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress of the junta and was willing to handle the mission through his own resources. Varona asked that he be given $10,000 for his organization expenses and requested $1,000 worth of communications equipment. Dr. Varona's potential was never fully exploited as the mission was canceled shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode. Varona was advised the offer was withdrawn, and the pills were retrieved.

11. Of significant interest was an incident which involved a request levied by Sam upon Maheu.

At the height of the project negotiations, Gold expressed concern about Dan Rowan who he learned was (Deleted). Gold asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan's room to determine the extent of Rowan's relationship with Phyliss McGuire. The technician involved in the assignment was discovered in the process, arrested and taken to the Sheriff's Office for questioning. He called Maheu in the presence of Sheriff's personnel and informed him that he had been detained. Subsequently the Department of Justice announced its intention to prosecute Maheu along with the technician. On February 7, 1962 the Director of Security briefed the then Attorney General Robert Kennedy on the circumstances leading up to Maheu's involvement in the wiretap. At our request, prosecution was dropped.
12. In May 1962 Mr. William Harvey took over as Rosselli’s case officer and it was not known if he was used officially from that point on. It was subsequently learned from the FBI that Rosselli had been convicted on six counts involving illegal entry into the United States some time during November 1967. On December 2, 1968 Rosselli, along with four other individuals, was convicted of conspiracy to cheat members of the Friar’s Club of $400,000 in a rigged gin rummy game. Mr. Harvey reported his contacts with Rosselli to this office during November and December 1967 and January 1968. Rosselli was facing deportation at that time but felt he could win an appeal.

13. On November 17, 1970, Mr. Maheu called James O’Connell, Rosselli’s first case officer, to advise that Maheu’s attorney, Ed Morgan, had received a call from Thomas Waddin, Rosselli’s attorney, who stated that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted and Rosselli faced deportation. Waddin indicated that if someone did not intercede on Rosselli’s behalf, he would make a complete expose of his activity with the Agency. On November 13, 1970, Mr. Helms was briefed on this latest development and it was decided that the agency would not in any way assist Rosselli. Maheu was advised of the Agency’s position and was in complete agreement. He stated that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally should Rosselli decide to tell all. Subsequently Rosselli, or someone on his behalf, furnished Jack Anderson details of the operation. Anderson wrote two columns regarding this operation on January 13, 1971, and February 23, 1971. Rosselli was last known to be in the Federal Penitentiary in Seattle, Washington. [Memo for IG from Sidney D. Stembridge Acting Director of Security 3.16.76]

On May 9, 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was advised by the CIA that Robert Maheu had been hired to approach Sam Giancana regarding an assassination plot against Fidel Castro. "Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the DOJ he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such steps with first checking with the DOJ." [FBI 62-109060-4984]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Analysis Group June 24, 1975

SUBJECT: Robert a. Maheu/ Johnny Rosselli Matter

1. The following is provided for your information.

2. Reference is made to previous memorandum, same subject, which have been provided to the Inspector General regarding information contained in Office of Security files concerning the existence of a separate file entitled "Project Johnny," which was alleged to have been kept in the safe of the Director of Security.
3. All attempts to locate a file maintained separately by the Director of Security entitled "Project Johnny" or any other separate unofficial file concerning the Maheu/Rosselli matter within the Office of Security, have met with negative results. However, in conducting research into this matter, a search of the Office of Security Top Secret Registry disclosed a Top Secret document control card concerning a May 14, 1962, memorandum for the Director of Security to the U.S. Attorney General. The Top Secret control card indicated that a copy of this memorandum was being retained in the Director of Security's personal safe "under Project Johnny."

4. The Office of Security file relating to Johnny Rosselli has a file number of 667 270. Memoranda contained within that file include the above-mentioned May 14, 1962, Top Secret memorandum from the Director of Security, as well as the originals of numerous other memoranda dating back to 1966, which concern various aspects of the Rosselli/Maheu matter. According to the Chief, Security Records Division, the above official file on Johnny Rosselli, using the 667 270 file number, was not established until November 1974. Further, one such memo contained in that official Office of Security file relating to Johnny Rosselli has the original "buck slip" which forwarded that memorandum to the Director of Security. On the buck slip, which is dated June 6, 1968, the following handwritten notation from the Director of Security appears: "Kathy, Johnny file.

5. In view of the above, it would appear that a separate file did exist prior to November 1974, the contents of which would appear to have been consolidated within the above noted Office of Security files on Rosselli. Further, presuming that the heretofore missing "Project Johnny" file is now an official file, the conclusion may be drawn that all the Office of Security files relating to the Rosselli/Maheu matter have been reviewed, and that the pertinent information contained therein has been forwarded to the Inspector General for review.

6. It should be noted that in 1967 the Inspector General conducted an investigation into the Rosselli/Maheu matter, and in doing so collected numerous memoranda from the various Agency components directly involved. As a result, additional memoranda which may have been previously held separately by the Director of Security, may be in the possession of the Inspector General. As a result, additional memoranda which may have previously been held separately by the Director of Security, may be in the possession of the Inspector General. John S. Hunt Security Analysis Group.

By 1964 the Public Relations firm of Robert Maheu, whose principal - and perhaps only - client was Howard Hughes, was utilized by two CIA components despite information
which Charles Kane, Deputy Director of Security, received from the Society of Former FBI Agents and despite his close association with Howard Hughes: "I also indicated to Mr. Strange that it had been rumored that Maheu had been involved with labor unions and had been involved in a case investigated by the Bureau in Las Vegas. During the conversation I reiterated that the above information was rumored but that it might have an effect on the utilization of the Maheu organization. Mr. Strange indicated that he had also heard these rumors but that he did not feel that this would effect the utilization of the Maheu organization." [Memo for DD/S (IOS) 7.22.64]

HUNT AND MAHEU

June 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Call from Birch O'Neal

1. Birch O'Neal indicated that Mr. HUNT had asked him to check the Counter Intelligence Staff files to see if they had anything on Bob Maheu. He advised that he had completed his search and there was no information in Counter Intelligence files that we did not already have in Office of Security files. Charles W. Kane, Deputy Director of Security.

On July 14, 1968 ID/1 received a request for a "Covert Security Approval to permit utilization of (Deleted) in connection with the latter's employment with Robert A. Maheu and associates. In view of DDP policy as set forth in CSI-50-10 regarding use of employees of US private detective investigative agencies, the use of (Deleted) was discussed with Central Cover Staff; the writer was assured that the firm Robert A. Maheu Associates, which the Agency is using for cover purposes, is no longer associated with investigative or security activities. (See Central Cover Staff memorandum for the record dated July 30, 1968).

However, it appears that Robert A. Maheu does in fact own, or is a co-owner of the Bel Air Patrol which is one of the organizations that is currently establishing security services for Howard Hughes. (See LAFO RUC dated July 29, 1968. Subject: (Deleted) #517 843 and the above cited Central Cover Staff memorandum). This matter is being brought to your attention because of the possible interpretation that the use of Robert A. Maheu and Associates conflicts with CSI 50-10, and that the undersigned believes that the matter should be reviewed for that reason prior to ID/1's processing of the Covert Security Approval request on Peter Maheu and (Deleted).

Central Cover Staff does take the position that the use of Robert A. Maheu and Associates does not conflict with CSI 50-10 in as much as the firm is
now solely engaged in public relations activities; they believe that Robert A. Maheu's ownership or interest in the organizations currently providing security and investigative services to Howard Hughes is irrelevant. The undersigned agrees with this position. Ervan E. Kühnke Jr. Acting Chief, ID/1.

On February 14, 1969, an unnamed component requested a Provisional Operational Approval on Robert Maheu's son, Peter Maheu, a former CIA Office of Security clerical employee. The CIA: "Subject's son Peter Robert Maheu was a staff employee of the Agency and of this Office from 1963 to 1964. He was a clerical employee. In February of 1969 Peter Maheu was granted a covert security approval as an employee of Maheu Associates for use on PROJECT QKENCHANT."

When Jack Anderson exposed Robert Maheu's connection to the Fidel Castro murder plots on January 18, 1971, the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division/Cuban Operations Group requested an investigation. On March 19, 1971, this document was generated:

SUBJECT: Maheu, Robert A.
FILE No. 111 540
BEFORE ANY ACTION WHATSOEVER IS TAKEN REGARDING THE
SUBJECT OF THIS FILE CONTACT:
Howard J. Osborn D/Security
Ermal P. Geiss DD/Security
Arthur C. Sheridan DDS (IOS)
James P. O'Connell DDS (PTOS) [NARA 1993.07.21.06:43:40:430140]

In January 1971, in light of the involvement of Maheu in a suit between executives of the Hughes Company and Maheu, the Director of Security recommended to the DCI that all existing clearance with Maheu and Associates be terminated. The DCI concurred in this recommendation. Files of this Office reflect that Subject's company, Maheu and Associates, cooperated with the Agency in supporting the activities of (Deleted) GLOBE agent (deleted) in Equador. Information regarding the possibility that Subject was involved in a leak of information concerning a sensitive DD/S&T Special Projects Staff project is set forth in Attachment C.

INTERTEL

Resorts International, a company that owned the Paradise Island casino in Nassau, reportedly put up two millions dollars to establish the International Intelligence Corporation (INTERTEL) security firm in Washington which was headed by former Justice Department experts on organized crime William Hundley and Robert Peloquin. INTERTEL was described as an organization that looked into the operations of large corporations to ascertain whether any of their assets were being directed towards activities controlled by organized crime. Three major accounts of that firm were Life Magazine, the National Football League and Resorts International. Resorts International
owned 91% of INTERTEL’S stock. In the mid-1960’s Eddie Cellini managed the Paradise Island casino where William Hundley and Robert Peloquin were in charge of casino security. [They Call it a Game - Bernie Parish - 1971] In March 1971 INTERTEL began an investigation of Robert Maheu Associates, before taking over its operations. INTERTEL had been engaged by Howard Hughes to look into his Las Vegas operations which was formerly managed by Maheu.

The CIA asked INTERTEL investigator Edward Mullin, who was formerly employed in the FBI, and CIA DDP, to report back to it on the investigation of Robert Maheu Associates. The CIA:

Officers in this organization who know and have dealt with Mr. Mullin vouch for the honesty of Mr. Mullin's willingness to do what he can to prevent unnecessary exposure of CIA's interests. Although he been described by Agency staffers who know him as 'not a mental giant' they believe he will cooperate even to the extent of advising us of the results of his investigations where our vital interests are concerned. It should also be considered that Mr. Maheu is currently under investigation in Las Vegas and we have no way of knowing what connection with CIA may be disclosed by a search of Robert A. Maheu Associates files. It would be highly desirable to have someone in Intertel on the alert for matters of concern to CIA which might be developed by the broad investigation of Robert Maheu Associates currently under way. It is my proposal after consultation with Mr. James P. O'Connell, DD/PTOS, that Mr. Mullin be briefed on the cover relationship between Robert A. Maheu Associates and (Deleted as of 2010) and (Deleted as of 2010) role in the removal of (Deleted as of 2010). The briefing would be done by Mr. Connell and a member of my staff. Naturally, nothing of an operational nature will be revealed to Mr. Mullin. Erich W. Isenstead, Chief, Central Cover Staff. [3.25.71]

The CIA reported that "One of the things that concerns Mullin is that in perusing the material, they have noted that several of the records are missing. They want to be sure that if Maheu states that these particular records were purged from the files because they pertain to sensitive Government operations, this is actually the case and not a subterfuge to withhold pertinent information which could be used in the forthcoming law suit involving Hughes and Maheu."

Other members of the Castro assassination team included: Chief/Office of Security, Sheffield Edwards; Deputy Director / Plans, Richard Bissell and Chief / Western Hemisphere Division Colonel J.C. King. Richard Bissell told the HSCA he would not have become involved in the early assassination operations without personal authorization of then-Director Allen Dulles. He claimed: "If Dulles told me not to become involved in such a thing, I know for sure I wouldn't. You can't disobey the Director." This operation had been approved by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, and a May 14, 1962 CIA Memo reflected that $150,000 was allocated for it.
Senator Walter Mondale (Dem.-Montana), who uncovered the existence of the assassination group, claimed it that " petered out" in 1963. In 1975 William Harvey testified that he and then-Deputy Director/Plans Richard Helms had concealed the existence of the assassination plots from CIA Director John McCone.

THE ORIGINS OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION  
FIDEL CASTRO AND UNITED FRUIT

In December 1959 the newspaper of Fidel Castro, Revolucion, stated United Fruit was protecting anti-Castro plotters in Guatemala and Honduras and was helping them get airplanes, boats and arms. [NYT 12.29.59] In early 1960 Fidel Castro threatened the United Fruit Company. He repeatedly pointed out that United Fruit owned vast amounts of Cuban land, "While hundreds and thousands of peasants owned nothing." Soon Fidel Castro would seize $58 million worth of the Cuban assets of United Fruit. [Szulc, Tad Cuban Invasion p47; DuBois Castro p11] On March 17, 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed a National Security Council recommendation to arm and train Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro. At that time the National Security Council included Eisenhower, NIXON, Christian Herter and Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates, a Director of Nelson Rockefeller's International Basic Economy Corporation. Because of this directive, Allen Dulles, (who had been the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency after Arbenz was deposed and still held that post in 1960), ordered his Deputy Director, General Charles Pearre Cabell, to reactivate the team which had overthrown Arbenz in 1954. Charles Cabell was a West Point graduate, four-star Air Force General and former head of Air Force intelligence who came to the CIA in 1953, where he became an intelligence advisor to General Douglas MacArthur. In April 1953 Charles Cabell became a Deputy Director of the CIA. Charles Cabell was from Dallas, where his brother Earle Cabell would become Mayor. [HSCA V4 p153] Allen Dulles believed that the Arbenz operation had not raised the specter of massive American intervention in Latin America affairs, and was committed to overthrowing Fidel Castro in a like manner. General Charles Cabell activated Frank Wisner's successor, Deputy Director/Plans Richard Bissell, who activated his Assistant Deputy Director/Plans, Tracy Barnes. General Lyman Lemnitzer was included in the early planning of the Bay of Pigs. In 1961 Lyman Lemnitzer became head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and played an important role in the invasion.

MARIO ZUNIGA AND THE FIRST STRIKE

The Bay of Pigs began on April 15, 1961, when a B-26 bomber took off from an airfield at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. Authors Thomas Ross and David Wise elaborated:

The tall, 35-year-old Cuban exile pilot sat alone in the cockpit of the big bomber...On the nose of his plane the number 933 had been painted in black letters. On the tail, the letters F-A-R - the markings of Fidel Castro's Air Force. But Mario Zuniga was not a Castro pilot. He was flying on an extraordinary Top Secret CIA mission.
As part of the propaganda campaign against Castro, Mario Zuniga was slated to land at Miami Airport, then claim he was a Cuban Air Force defector who had joined with other defectors, and carried out an air strike against Fidel Castro. There was to be an air strike, but it would not be carried out by defecting pilots. A few hours after Mario Zuniga took off, eight B-26s headed to Cuba from Nicaragua, each with a payload of bombs. When Mario Zuniga landed in Miami, he cut his right engine as if it had been put out of action by gunfire. Photographers were allowed to take pictures of his bullet-pocked aircraft. Mario Zuniga read the pre-written statement prepared by HUNT and PHILLIPS: "I am one of 12 B-26 pilots who remained in the Castro Air Force after the defection of Pedro Diaz Lanz. My comrades and I had broken off earlier, to hit airfields that we agreed they would strike. On the way out, I was hit by some small arms fire..." Miro Cardona of the Cuban Revolutionary Council issued this statement: "The defections came as no surprise, because the Cuban Revolutionary Council has been in contact with, and encouraged, these brave pilots." The Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, Raoul Roa, gravely protested the latest CIA violation of Cuba's sovereignty: "The statement of Miro Cardona that he had been in touch with those who did the bombing was a violation of United States Neutrality Laws." Tracy Barnes had briefed U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson about the invasion. Ambassador Stevenson accepted the cover story given to him by Tracy Barnes at face value, and was unaware that the attacks on Castro's airfields had been conducted by the Agency-sponsored Brigade. Ambassador Stevenson:

No United States personnel participated. No United States Government airplanes of any kind participated. The two planes, to the best of our knowledge, were Castro's own Air Force planes, and according to the pilots, they took off from Castro's own Air Force fields. These pilots have apparently defected from Castro's tyranny. I have here a picture of one of these planes. It has the markings of the Castro Air Force right on the tail, which everyone can see for himself.

Ambassador Stevenson went on to read Mario Zuniga's statement. The next morning, many papers ran the Associated Press lead out of Havana, Cuba: "April 15, 1961. Pilots of Prime Minister Fidel Castro's Air Force revolted today and attacked three of the Castro regime's key air bases with bombs and rockets." Tad Szulc's story in The New York Times questioned how the Cuban Revolutionary Council had advance knowledge of the fliers' defection, since the pilot who landed in Miami described their escape as hasty. There were other unanticipated problems with the HUNT/PHILLIPS cover story. The B-26 which landed was the wrong model for the Cuban Air Force. When Mario Zuniga appeared on television, his wife called a wire service and asked, "What's my husband doing on T.V.?" A Miami reporter saw the bullet holes, but noted that dust and grease covered the bomb-bay fittings, and that the plane's guns did not seem to have been fired. The cover story was becoming transparent. Thanks to HUNT and PHILLIPS, the Bay of Pigs invasion was off to a bad start.
THE SECOND AIR STRIKE

Richard Bissell was encouraged by the partial success of the April 15, 1961, raid. Nine B-26s had left Nicaragua: one was shot down, three landed in the United States and Grand Cayman, and five returned to base. The next phase of the Bay of Pigs script called for the destruction of Fidel Castro’s Air Force on the ground by another Cuban exile air strike. This second strike was scheduled to take place at dawn on Monday, April 17, 1961, as the 1,400-man exile invasion force fought its way to shore. Without bombing and strafing of Castro’s troops there was no way a 1,400 man Army could defeat Castro’s forces. The invasion, which was to supposedly coincide with an internal uprising, was meant to establish a beachhead, after which the exile government would call for help from the Organization of American States. President Kennedy insisted that no Americans be involved in the actual invasion.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, was in Puerto Rico during the Bay of Pigs. Months before, he had accepted a speaking engagement there, and he believed its cancellation might have alerted Castro to the invasion date. With Allen Dulles in Puerto Rico, General Charles Cabell became Acting Director. En route home from a morning of golf, Charles Cabell decided to check on the progress of the invasion. HUNT related: "It was this chance decision that was to affect the destinies of men and nations from that moment on." When Charles Cabell heard about the second air strike, he reflected: "Now, seems to me we were only authorized one strike at the airfields." Charles Cabell was told there had been no restriction on the number of strikes. "Well," Charles Cabell said, "I just don't know about that. So to be on the safe side, I'm going to ask [Secretary of State] Rusk about it. Meanwhile, someone call Richard Bissell and get him in here. Cancel that strike order until I can get someone to approve it." Charles Cabell could not reach Secretary of State Dean Rusk, because Dean Rusk was attending a meeting at the State Department. Charles Cabell and Richard Bissell went to the State Department and met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Dean Rusk called President Kennedy. President Kennedy refused to authorize another air strike. HUNT called Tracy Barnes and reported what happened. PHILLIPS told HUNT that General Cabell’s brain must have been "addled" when he didn’t authorize the strike himself. Richard Bissell and Charles Cabell persuaded Dean Rusk and President Kennedy to at least allow the planes to fly limited support missions over the beach.

On the morning of the invasion - Monday, April 17, 1961 - the Cuban Revolutionary Council, on CIA orders, issued this HUNT / PHILLIPS press release:

Before dawn Cuban patriots in the cities and in the hills began the battle to liberate our homeland from the despotic rule of Fidel Castro and rid Cuba of the cruel oppression of international Communism...

Soon, HUNT dictated this bulletin: The Cuban Revolutionary Council announces a successful landing;" then a third, which claimed,
Our partisans in every Cuban town and village will receive, in a manner known only to them, the message that will spark a tremendous wave of internal conflict against the tyrant...before dawn, the island of Cuba will rise up, en masse, in a coordinated wave of sabotage and rebellion which will sweep Communism from our country...

In 1961 HUNT won a commendation from the Chief/Western Hemisphere Division "for performance of duties with distinction in support of the mission outlined in Project JMATE." On April 17, 1961, 27 Cubans were arrested in Havana and charged with having plotted to assassinate Fidel Castro. Partially because of this, there was no internal uprising, and no one came to the aid of the invaders. The Army of Fidel Castro arrived. They made short work of the exiles, who fought with a high degree of determination, although greatly outnumbered. Manuel Artime was taken prisoner, as were over 1,000 Brigade members. PHILLIPS wrote that the staffers in the CIA war room had a visceral reaction to the episode, and began to retch and vomit.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL’S LAST BULLETIN

The recent landings in Cuba have been constantly, though inaccurately, described as an invasion. It was, in fact, a landing mainly of supplies and support for our patriots who have been fighting in Cuba for months...We did not expect to topple Castro immediately. [Ross & Wise Inv. Gov. p73]

HUNT recalled this version to the Rockefeller Commission:

Within twenty-four hours prior to the time that the Cuban brigade was to hit the beaches at the Bay of Pigs. President Kennedy made two critical decisions that affected the final outcome: he cancelled plans for an airstrike on Cuba which would have destroyed the six remaining combat planes that were available to Castro; second, the order that there be no air cover for the invading brigade. The result was that the invading force was chopped up while it was still in the water; the ships carrying the armored vehicles were sunk, as were the supply ships, and the troops were left abandoned on the shore. The remnant of the Cuban Air Force was entirely adequate to demolish the invasion fleet. Hunt concedes that he was bitter about the decisions made by President Kennedy, but he primarily blames Arthur Schlesinger, Adlai Stevenson and Robert Kennedy for advising the President to follow the course he chose. He particularly feels that the Cubans had been recruited with certain promises and that those promises were withdrawn at the last minute. Hunt says, in fact, that the decision not to make the air strike and not to provide air cover was made after the invasion fleet had arrived at the point of no return, i.e., when radio communication to the invasion fleet had already terminated for security reasons.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION
In January 1962 President Kennedy retired the CIA officials involved in the Bay of Pigs, including Richard Bissell, Charles Cabell and Allen Dulles, who was forced into retirement. Allen Dulles died on January 31, 1969. John McConne of Standard Oil and Bechtel became the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Richard Helms became Deputy Director (Plans) as a result of his having kept his name out of the Bay of Pigs CIA documents. General Charles Cabell went to work as a member of the board of the Pacific Corporation, the parent company of Air America, the CIA-run air carrier. General Charles Cabell (born October 11, 1903) collapsed and died after a physical examination at Fort Meyers in April 1971; his brother, Earle Cabell, (born October 27, 1906), died in September 1975 of natural causes. In Undercover, HUNT described Charles Cabell as a "short, rather aggressive man, who came to the CIA with no prior background in covert intelligence, much less in propaganda or political action operations." [p93] In Give Us This Day, he blamed Charles Cabell for the outcome of the Bay Of Pigs invasion: "If only Cabell hadn’t come mousing around."

In 1962 [the FBI w/h the exact date of this document] the FBI reported that Jose Ignasio Lasaga prepared a document which accused the United States government of President John F. Kennedy for following a policy of peaceful coexistence with Cuba.

On April 26, 1962 Jose Fernandez Badue, head of the Christian Democratic Movement advised that he is the head of that organization and a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Fernandez said that he had seen a copy of the document prepared by Lasaga which would be submitted to the Revolutionary Council on the following day. Fernandez said this document accuses the United States government of President Kennedy for following a policy of peaceful co-existence with Cuba. This policy is the same as that expounded by the government of the USSR and that this policy should be severely criticized by Americans and Cuban exiles alike. Fernandez said such a document, if accepted and approved by the Revolutionary Council, would cause the United States government to withdraw its support from the Revolutionary Council and cease to recognize the Council as the voice of the Cuban exiles in the United States. Fernandez said there is no chance the Council would accept this document or approve it inasmuch as the United States is the only country that is helping the Cuban exiles and the only country interested in the defeat of Communism.

Fernandez advised that they attended a meeting of the Cuban Revolutionary Council on the previous day, where Jose Lasaga, Nino Diaz and Cesar Baro, three leading members of the MRR, introduced a document for acceptance by the Revolutionary Council. This document claimed that Richard N. Goodwin of the United States State Department and certain other officials in the State Department had accepted a Communist policy of peaceful coexistence with Communist Cuba. This document was voted against acceptance by all members of the Council except Lasaga, Diaz and Baro. [FBI 94-4133-45]
Lasaga resigned from the Cuban Revolutionary Council on April 29, 1962.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND THE NO-INVASION PLEDGE

THE GUNS OF OCTOBER 1962

Fidel Castro, fearing another invasion of Cuba, had armed Cuba with Soviet missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads. The United States discovered the secret missile sights 90 miles off-shore and, outraged, issued an ultimatum for the removal of the missiles. A Cuban naval blockade was planned for October 24, 1962, and a nuclear confrontation was imminent. The crisis ended when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the offensive missiles from Cuba. In return, President Kennedy gave the Soviets and Cubans a no-invasion pledge. President Kennedy agreed to curtail the activities of the Cuban exile organizations. HUNT believed the Soviets had "gained a great deal for very little." STURGIS was asked:

Q. Did you feel that the Russians and President Kennedy had come together to make a deal to curtail these anti-Castro activities?

   a. Yes, I felt that Russia and the United States made a deal.

Gaeton Fonzi wrote:

   If the actions of President John F. Kennedy at the Bay of Pigs first raised doubts in the minds of Cuban exiles about the sincerity of the President and his determination to bring about the fall of Fidel Castro, his handling of the missile crisis confirmed those doubts. President Kennedy's agreement with Khrushchev was termed a violation of the pledge he had made three days after the Bay of Pigs invasion that the United States would never abandon Cuba to Communism. The bitterness of the anti-Castro exiles was exacerbated by the actions of the U.S. Government to implement the President's 'no invasion' pledge. Suddenly, there was a crackdown on the very training camps and guerrilla bases that had been originally established and funded by the United States, and the exile raids - which once had the Government's 'green light' - were now disavowed and condemned. The feeling of betrayal by the Cuban exiles was given reinforcement by prominent sympathizers outside their community... NIXON urged an end to what he called the 'quarantine' of Cuban exiles.

An undated document that originated with the CIA: "Subjects: Handwritten notes under heading 'General' Subject: Assassination; 'No-Invasion Pledge' CIA. Author unknown - date and place unknown." The text of the document:

   General

   -- Extent to which CIA picks up on loose language.
-- To what extent was the assassination fork contemplated, discussed etc?

Would "no-invasion pledge" leave U.S. in a position where assassination is a viable alternative because overt sabotage / invasion is estopped?

Extent of expectation by SG (a) that CIA will report in detail on any covert ass against Castro? E.G. any assassination planning would require reporting? [SSCIA 157-10007-10312]

During his deposition in HUNT v. WEBERMAN, HUNT made a vague reference to a secret agreement: "Well, I can speculate that the alleged Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements, if they ever existed, might be detrimental at this phase in the American policy; but, then, nobody seems to know if it was undertaken, or who was made to pay for it, Other than that, I know nothing."

To: DCIA November 27, 1962
FROM: William Harvey

ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support and invasion of Cuba.

B. Those assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions In Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few-days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of ranking operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and
discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasing difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factor Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective in the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basin as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated above.

In December 1962 the Bay of Pigs Brigade prisoners were released in return for a $53 million ransom in medical supplies. The final formation of Brigade 2506 took place at the Orange Bowl Stadium in Miami on December 29, 1962. President Kennedy was there to welcome back the surviving members, who had spent almost 20 months in the prisons of Fidel Castro. The President accepted the Brigade's flag and declared: "I assure you this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana." Gaeton Fonzi: "HUNT, once assigned liaison duties with the Brigade, claimed later that the Brigade feeling against Kennedy was so great that the presentation of the flag nearly did not take place."

Circa July 21, 1963, Anastasio Somoza (Tachito Jr.) visited Miami and spoke to Pedro Diaz Lanz and others. Anastasio Somoza told the Cuban exiles he wanted to support and direct them and he "planned something big." According to Anastasio Somoza, the Central American countries would fall to communism within five years. [Miami Herald 7.14.63] HEMMING told this researcher:

Somoza opened conversations with all of the nine action groups and their leaders and also held meetings with a limited number of exiled political leaders. Somoza offered the use of Nicaragua as a sanctuary, site for training camps, and a jumping off point for future raids and other operations against Cuba. Miami newspaper headlines announced that ex-Bay of Pigs Brigade leader, Manuel Artime, has decided to move his headquarters to Central America, ostensibly Nicaragua.
On October 12, 1963 Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez advised that he is head of Commandos L, an anti-Castro organization, which has conducted raids against Cuba in the past. Santiago advised that he conferred with Luis Somoza in Miami in July 1963. Somoza went to Washington returned to Miami and they again conferred. Alvarez said when Somoza first went to Washington in July 1963, he claimed he had presented a plan for the liberation of Cuba to President John F. Kennedy, who seemed interested and sent Somoza to confer with officials at the Pentagon, CIA, and State Department. Then President Kennedy left on a trip to Europe. Military officials at the Pentagon and civilian officials at the CIA allegedly approved Somoza's plan but the State Department rejected it. When President Kennedy returned to the United States from his European trip, Somoza again visited Washington, but President Kennedy refused to see him. Alvarez was told by Somoza that the United States government was interested in his plan with some modifications and conditions, one condition being that Artine would be the military leader. Alvarez said that since President Kennedy refused to see Somoza, his plan never materialized. [FBI 97-4133-78 11.5.63]

Before the visit of President John F. Kennedy to Miami on Monday, November 18, 1963, the Secret Service learned from a confidential source that "Pedro Diaz Lanz, a Cuban political extremist, might attempt to approach the President to embarrass him publicly. Pedro Diaz Lanz attacked President Kennedy verbally at a Cuban rally in New York on November 3, 1963." The Secret Service ordered Pedro Diaz Lanz put under surveillance beginning Friday, November 15, 1963. Through Miami Immigration and Naturalization Service intelligence officer Charles Yaeger, "arrangements were (telephonically) made to have Pedro Diaz-Lanz report for an interview by that Agency [Immigration and Naturalization Service] during the time the President was in Miami. Mr. Yaeger subsequently confirmed that when Pedro Diaz-Lanz was requested to report to their office for an interview on Monday, November 18, 1963, he informed them that he was leaving for New York City on the morning of Monday, November 18, 1963." [Ernesto Aragon 12.30.63 File 2320, Miami] Miami television Newsman Vic Walters interviewed Pedro Diaz Lanz about this telephone call. Pedro Diaz Lanz neither remembered any phone call from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, nor any appointment or trip to New York City. As for his whereabouts on November 22, 1963, he was lecturing in front of a Woman's Club in Wichita, Kansas. Newspaper accounts supported Pedro Diaz Lanz, who appeared as a replacement for Alexander Rorke. [Wichita Eagle 11.22.63]

ORLANDO BOSCH AND MANUEL ARTIME

A United States Secret Service document on President John F. Kennedy's visit to Miami noted that Orlando Bosch was interviewed
about a demonstration he was planning against the President: "From a confidential source of this office, information was received that Orlando Bosch was planning to picket the President by using widows of Cuban Freedom Fighters dressed in black. Orlando Bosch was interviewed about this report at his home, at which time he was told that he would be personally held responsible for any adverse incident." [USSS Field Force File, Miami, Florida (2326) 1-16-602.111 Aragon/Rowley 12.30.63 - Rowley dead 11.2.92 at 84] The United States Secret Service also received word that two former members of the Bay of Pigs Brigade were planning to ask President John F. Kennedy to return the Brigade flag that he had been presented in December. An article in the Miami Herald reported that Manuel Artime planned to demonstrate as well.